Abstract
This chapter addresses the literature on interregional competition. It is in line with research which analyses the political dynamics of competition instead of adopting a purely economics-based perspective. The chapter’s argument is that competition between regions in France and Germany concerning educational policies takes the form of a race to the middle. With political entrepreneurs unleashing competitive relationships between regions to promote certain policy changes, and national governments challenging the regions’ capacity to develop education policies that meet its standards, regional governments enter the competition seeking to develop policies that vary little from those of other regions. Taking the same actions as other regions can be a way to be competitive either because the state and voters prefer the policies of other regions, or because following others is a means of self-protection when other avenues are contested and controversial.
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Notes
- 1.
This model is part of a larger body of theories on fiscal federalism that support (Kirchgässner, 2001) or qualify these conclusions (Rodden, 2003; Wellisch, 2000). The “race to the bottom” is based on a number of this body’s classical hypotheses, particularly the idea that electors vote “with their feet”, that is, they move according to the subnational governments’ policies (Tiebout, 1956) and that subnational governments accordingly offer different baskets of goods from one territory to the next reflecting the preferences of their voters (Oates, 1972).
- 2.
Theoretically, this model is derived from competition through comparison (Besley & Case, 1995; Breton, 1996). The general idea is that voters missing information look at policies conducted in other regions to have a point of reference to compare their own elected officials and regional policies. The comparison may be encouraged, and sometimes even initiated, by political entrepreneurs. The findings of competition through comparison are analytically unclear: depending on what other regions do and what the involved political entrepreneurs are pushing, bottom-up and top-down pressures can ensue. Furthermore, domestic regional factors continue to shape each government’s development of public policies and the analysis does not a priori enable the determination of their relative importance vis-à-vis the effect of competition through comparison.
- 3.
Political entrepreneurs can be defined as actors with proposals who “invest their time, their energy and their resources to promote an alternative in exchange for an anticipated benefit” (Ravinet, 2004, p. 221).
- 4.
This measure only covers personal equipment, not collective equipment (like tooling machines, computers, and ovens), which are covered by the regions as equipment for educational institutions.
- 5.
In Brittany, this measure also applies to vocational tracks of secondary education.
- 6.
Contrary to the German case, where teacher unions served as entrepreneurs promoting change in the educational system, in France, the unions did not act as entrepreneurs promoting equality or anything else at the regional level. Teacher unions did not appear to play any role in the development of regional educational policies. This is attributable to the fact that they do not work with regional governments. As a general rule, it appears that at the subnational levels the action of teacher unions remained very limited (Robert, 1995). This was the case in the context of their relationships with the ministry’s decentralized services: “At the level of the academies the role of the teaching unions appeared severely restricted” (Cole, 1997, p. 145). More specifically, “the trade unions exercised some influence in relation to issues of staff management, much less elsewhere” (Cole, 1997, p. 145). Interviews conducted with the directors and departmental heads of education in the regional councils largely confirmed this observation. Besides office staff, the regional councils’ contact people at the national educational level included few teachers and union representatives and more heads of institutions and high school administrators. However, the latter did not appear to have been entrepreneurs vis-à-vis the regional councils either.
- 7.
Following Wilson, one could also criticize the assumptions of the race-to-the-bottom model as unrealistic (1996). The credibility of a given business’s threat to relocate, which depends on the associated costs and benefits; the effects of the given business’s relocation, which varies depending on its economic importance for the regional government; and the opportunity cost of policy change are the principal conditions. However, given the cost of real estate and employment issues, it is highly unlikely that individuals would move from one region to another because of educational policies (Harrison, 2006).
- 8.
Generally speaking, the federal level of teacher unions only plays a minor role in the organization and positioning of its affiliate regional unions. Significant differences can therefore appear in the objectives and positions adopted by unions attached to the same confederation at the federal level. They are attributable to the fact that regional unions define their interests, strategies, and positions in relation to the school policy of their home region, to its history and recent developments, and to the respective positions of other teacher unions in the region. The variation in the positions of various unions at the regional level, in the school systems and regional policies, and in working relationships between each union and the elected regional officials of different parties in the government or in the opposition, translates into highly differentiated power configurations, bringing together the different teacher unions and regional political forces.
- 9.
The first option consisted of retaining the traditional three-tiered structure, and emphasizing and facilitating the possibility of moving from one track to another. The second option proposed an integrated education melding the three traditional tracks into one. The third option consisted of bringing together the Hauptschule and Realschule programmes into one track, alongside the Gymnasium. As in the first option, the two tracks would be brought together in general secondary schools, and the ability to move from one to another would be facilitated. According to the VBE NRW, in addition to ensuring more social justice, by extending the duration of the period when all students are schooled together, this model would address the compounding effects of the demographic evolution and the decreased attractiveness of the Hauptschulen.
- 10.
The context was also characterized by a middle-term disaffection towards the Hauptschule, which was traditionally the type of school that prepared students for manual training, but then became a fallback school for students who were not accepted elsewhere. The Realschule remain a more prestigious path for education and technical programmes at the university level. A 50.7% of students attended a Hauptschule in 1970 versus only 17% in 2006 (KMK, 1973, 2009).
- 11.
Thus the RLV RP union developed proposals to ensure that this type of school would have opportunities to develop. They included reducing the number of students per class, increasing the number of social workers assigned to each institution, and developing the programme so that it would focus more on the acquisition of practical skills.
- 12.
To date, exit exams at the Hauptschule and Realschule, as well as the baccalaureate until very recently, were exams composed of questions developed by each school and corrected by teachers from the school in which the students had pursued their education.
- 13.
No tangible element to this effect is apparent, but one can assume that if this change occurs, it will do so over the long run.
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Dupuy, C. (2020). Being Competitive in Interregional Comparisons. In: Converging Regional Education Policy in France and Germany. Comparative Territorial Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40834-3_5
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