Abstract
A central concern of a number of Peter Winch’s early papers is the relationship between, on the one hand, moral philosophy and, on the other, the philosophy of mind and action. In one strand in these discussions Winch argues that certain familiar tendencies to say how things must be in ethics spring from a mistaken metaphysical picture of “the will”. However, other strands in his discussions raise the possibility that the inclinations in our thinking about ethics may be not only nourished by but themselves nourish the metaphysical picture of action. This paper is an exploration of these relationships in the light of Winch’s discussions in these papers. As we might express one aspect of this, Winch offers his detailed discussion of possibilities in our ethical thought as a contribution to “the metaphysics of action”.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
As Anscombe expresses it, when I am in error, “the mistake here is one of performance, not of judgement” (Anscombe 1957, 5).
- 2.
The criticism, along with the challenge spoken of in the next sentence, may also take forms familiar in other cases of “knowledge”. My point is that they may, and perhaps normally do, take the form I sketch here. More generally, I should stress that throughout this discussion I am speaking of how things “characteristically”, or at least very often, are.
- 3.
What now if someone asks: why do we speak of “reasons” in these two very different cases? The following remarks are the beginnings of an answer to that question. A fuller answer would explore the ways in which talk of “reasons” in both contexts is linked up with other commonalities in the grammar across the “theoretical” and “practical” cases.
- 4.
I suspect that this is the truth in the remark by Aquinas quoted by Anscombe: “Practical knowledge is “the cause of what it understands”, unlike “speculative” knowledge, which is “derived from the objects known”.” (Anscombe 1957, 87)
- 5.
Perhaps we see this in one way in which he himself appears to minimize the contrast in his suggestion that: “[W]hen I think about the moral decisions and dilemmas of others, it seems to me that I am very often asking “What would I think it right to do in such a situation?” That is, I am making a hypothetical agent’s judgement of my own”. (Winch 1965/1972, 153–4)
- 6.
“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. / In that case we could no sketch any picture of the world (true or false).” (Wittgenstein 1922, 2.0211, 20212)
- 7.
I here try to articulate the key idea in a way that will be acceptable both to the early Wittgenstein and to the many philosophers who will be more or less in agreement with him at this point, if nowhere else. One respect in which I clearly fail in this is that for the early Wittgenstein the words “I ought to condemn Billy Budd” do not articulate a thought.
- 8.
Towards which Winch perhaps leans in his suggestion that “the deciding what to do is, in a situation like this, itself a sort of finding out what is the right thing to do” (1965/1972, 165). For an explicit defence of such a view see (Rödl 2007, 48–49). See also Korsgaard’s suggestion that there is a sense in which no human action can happen without reflective endorsement (Korsgaard 1996, 161).
- 9.
See Aristotle, The Movement of Animals (2014, 701a1). I will speak of this as “Aristotle’s suggestion” without pursuing the question of whether it is clearly a correct reading of Aristotle.
- 10.
One might aim to articulate the theme of this section in this way: while familiar philosophical pictures entail that my relation to the world is mediated through, and only through, judgement, we must acknowledge the possibility of direct, and perhaps more fundamental, relations to the world through action. But there may be room for reservations about both halves of that articulation; reservations stemming from the contrast presupposed between “myself” and “the world”.
- 11.
See also: “In Principia Ethica Moore argues that there are three great divisions of ethical inquiry. The first concerns the question: What is the meaning of the word “good”; the second: What things are good in themselves?, and the third: What things are related as causes to that which is good in itself?” (Winch 1968a/1972, 176).
- 12.
Lars Hertzberg has pointed out to me that there are serious doubts about whether this characterisation of a “world” is even intelligible. Despite such doubts, I believe that we have sufficient grip on the speculation for there to be room for the judgement I make on it.
- 13.
This line of thought may throw light on the idea, which I described as “surprising”, that we do not really have control over something if that “control” is not itself something under our control.
- 14.
It is tempting to add “as opposed, simply, to what he has tried to do”. But Winch warns that with this formulation we may already be revealing the grip of the picture he is resisting.
- 15.
Also relevant here is the variety in the ways of thinking and feeling that we can readily imagine. But this is not an aspect of Winch’s work that I will pursue.
- 16.
In particular, moral philosophy that construes morality as a guide in the individual’s exercise of her will.
- 17.
I would like to thank Lars Hertzberg and Lynette Reid for helpful comments on drafts of this paper.
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Oxford: Blackwell.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981). Modern moral philosophy. In Ethics, Religion, and Politics: Collected Philosophical Papers (Vol. III, pp. 26–42). Oxford: Blackwell.
Aristotle (2014). Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 1 (J. Barnes, Ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Clark, P. (2001). The action as conclusion. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31(4), 481–505.
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rödl, S. (2007). Self-consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schopenhauer, A. (1818/1883). The World as Will and Representation (R. B. H. Haldane & J. Kemp, Trans.). London: Trübner & Co.
Winch, P. (1965/1972). The universalizability of moral judgments. In Ethics and Action (pp. 151–170). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Winch, P. (1968a/1972). Moral integrity. In Ethics and Action (pp. 171–192). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Winch, P. (1968b/1972). Wittgenstein’s treatment of the will. In Ethics and Action (pp. 110–129). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Winch, P. (1971/1972). Trying. In Ethics and Action (pp. 130–150). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner &, Ltd..
Wittgenstein, L. (1984). Notebooks, 1914–1916 (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans., G. H. von Wright & G. E. M. Anscombe, Eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cockburn, D. (2020). Ethics and Action. In: Campbell, M., Reid, L. (eds) Ethics, Society and Politics: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter Winch. Nordic Wittgenstein Studies, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40742-1_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40742-1_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-40741-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-40742-1
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)