Abstract
This chapter discusses the income protection experience of TA workers. As for the other chapters, it starts by describing the institutional framework in relation to income protection. As regards institutional divides in social protection, the countries broadly reflect the characteristics of their respective welfare regimes. In Italy, divides can be said to be predominantly dependent on the workers’ contribution history, as is the case for countries with a Conservative welfare regime. In the UK, where many benefits are means-tested and not contribution-based, the legal employment status of TAW appears to play a more important role in shaping the divide with standard workers, as it does not allow TA workers to access occupational schemes. Nevertheless, the status of ‘insider’ also strongly depends on the employer’s provision of occupational schemes, as not all standard employees have access to them. Therefore, in the UK, there appear to be two intersecting divides: one based on the employment status and the other based on employers’ provisions.
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Notes
- 1.
A ‘new style’ JSA is available for those who are entitled to apply for Universal Credit (UC). It works in the same way as contribution-based JSA (GOV.UK 2017b). UC is currently being rolled out and it is meant to replace six benefits: income-based JSA, Housing Benefit, Working Tax Credits, Child Tax Credit, income-based Employment and Support Allowance and Income Support. UC was still in the pilot phase at the time of the interviews.
- 2.
All the amounts presented here refer to 2014, year in which the majority of interviews was carried out. There was a small increase over time, but typically not keeping up with inflation. Different rates apply to lone parents and couples.
- 3.
The person has to have less than £16,000 pounds worth of savings and their partner should not work more than 24 hours per week. If the partner works more hours, other means-tested benefits are available.
- 4.
Including free dental care and sight tests.
- 5.
The Claimant Commitment is an agreement between the claimant and the jobcentre, which states the activation requirements which need to be satisfied in order for the claimant to receive JSA.
- 6.
Only permanent employees in public administration are excluded.
- 7.
In 2013 and 2014, it was 8 months for workers below 50 years old, while it has been kept constant at 12 months for workers 50–55 years old. Longer durations apply for workers above 55 years old. In 2015, the maximum duration was 16 months.
- 8.
There are two main types of CIG, CIGO – Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria and CIGS – Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria (Ordinary and Extraordinary Wage Guarantee Fund). The difference between CIGO – Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria and CIGS – Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria (Ordinary and Extraordinary Wage Guarantee Fund) is whether the redundancy is due to general economic downturns (CIGO) or specific firm necessities (CIGS), such as restructuring, reorganisation or conversion. It is the employer that requests to use the CIG for a certain number of the employees. A third type of CIG, the Cassa Integrazione Guadagniin Deroga (Exceptional Wage Guarantee Fund) has been introduced after the beginning of the economic crisis in order to face the rapidly increasing unemployment. An employer can request the CIG in deroga if excluded from the use of CIGO and CIGS, in case her employees have exhausted CIGO or CIGS, and for categories of employees excluded from CIGO and CIGS. The main requirement is to have been continuously employed by the same employer for at least 90 days (INPS 2015d). The CIGin deroga is available to TA workers, although for them and for other categories of atypical workers, the benefit is only 20% of previous earnings compared to 80% of other employees (INPS 2015e). However, the requirements necessary to access CIGin deroga make it a de facto limited option for TA workers.
- 9.
CIGO can last for up to 52 weeks (104 weeks in economically deprived areas). CIGS lasts up to 2 years, but can be extended for 2 more years in specific cases. The CIGO is reserved for permanent and fixed-term employees (excluding managers and apprentices) in commercial, agricultural and industrial firms and cooperatives. The CIGS has a more limited application, being reserved to permanent and fixed-term employees in industrial firms with at least 15 employees, commercial firms with at least 200 employees and agricultural firms (INPS 2015f).
- 10.
The mobility allowance can last from 12 months to up to 4 years and its amount is 100% of previous CIGS for the first 12 months and 80% afterwards (INPS 2015g).
- 11.
There is no minimum income scheme but several income-based benefits provided at the regional and municipal level. In Bologna these include: public transport discounts, internet and phone discounts, electricity, gas and water discounts, income support schemes, family income support if the household includes at least three dependent children, subsidised pre-paid debit card (social card), family discounts if with at least two dependent children (family card), exemptions from health-care out-of-pocket payments, micro-credit schemes, social housing and housing benefits. Despite the long list, none of these benefits is generous, they are not integrated and they are strongly dependent on annual resource allocations (by national, regional and municipal government).
- 12.
All data refer to 2015.
- 13.
Including non-working days.
- 14.
Different rules apply to agricultural workers.
- 15.
The worker is paid 100% of daily pay for the first two ‘sickness events’ in the year. For the 3rd is paid 66.6% and for the 4th only 50% of daily earnings. From the 5th onwards the worker is not paid.
- 16.
Lower amounts apply if the maximum amount of contribution has not been paid (GOV 2015c).
- 17.
Pension Credit can be regarded the main form of income for pensioners on a low income. The benefit is meant to top up both public and private pension income. It has two components: a Guarantee Credit, which is an income-based benefit, and a Savings-Credit, which is a form of inverse means-tested benefit for those who have invested into private schemes (GOV.UK 2017c). Other means-tested benefits, such as housing benefits and Council Tax benefits, are also available for pensioners on a low income.
- 18.
€417 for those between 65 and 70 years old.
- 19.
Variable with age, but a minimum of 8 months for workers below 50 years old and a maximum of 16 months in 2015 for workers above 55 years old.
- 20.
The number of months depends on unemployment contributions, which should have been paid for no less than 12 months in the two years before the unemployment claim.
- 21.
A form of minimum income scheme was only introduced in 2018.
- 22.
A lower rate applies to workers below 25 years old.
- 23.
Provided that the claimant’s income sources fall below the means-tested threshold.
- 24.
100% of daily earnings for sick days 1–3 and after day 21, and 75% from day 4 to 20 (INPS 2015h).
- 25.
SSP covers 50% of total sick pay from day 4; 66.7% from day 21, whilst occupational sick pay covers the rest.
- 26.
£86.70 per week, and only if she has earned at least £109 on average per week in the 8 weeks before she got sick.
- 27.
To be precise, the worker could claim Employment Support Allowance (ESA) but none of the interviewees were aware of the possibility as ESA was perceived as a benefit for people with disabilities or long-term health issues, not for those in employment with short-term sicknesses.
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Bertolini, A. (2020). Temporary Agency Work and Income Precariousness. In: Temporary Agency Workers in Italy and the UK . Work and Welfare in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40192-4_5
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