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Characterizing Economic and Legal Approaches to the Regulation of Market Interactions

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Book cover Economics in Legal Reasoning

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Institutions, Economics and Law ((PSIEL))

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of how EU private law (and national European private laws) and, more specifically, contract and consumer law do not see eye to eye with economic—and law and economics—views over those kinds of interactions. With some illustrations from ECJ case law as motivating the study, it is argued that the divergent approaches reflect a deep divide between the intellectual goals and perspectives in both disciplines. This is to be lamented, since a greater openness by legal theory and legal academics toward economic ways of looking at market interactions would greatly enrich and refine the functioning of legal systems.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The European experience, perhaps similar to that of other legal contexts (Latin America, among others), differs from that of the US, although the true influence of Law and Economics there is a matter of debate: Garoupa and Ulen (2008, p. 1555).

  2. 2.

    For instance, a recent special issue on “Empirical Methods for the Law” was published in a European economic journal (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 174, 2018), and very few contributions were authored by European legal scholars.

  3. 3.

    See Micklitz et al. (2018), Mathis and Tor (2016) and Alemanno and Sibony (2015).

  4. 4.

    Coase (1994, p. 42), ironically, characterized this attitude with an apt historical metaphor: “At a time when the King of England claimed to be also King of France he was not always welcome in Paris”.

  5. 5.

    Bogdan Matei, Ioana Ofelia Matei v. Volksbank Romania SA, Case C-143/13.

  6. 6.

    Building upon a previous CJEU decision, Arpad Kásler, Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v. OTP Jegzálogbank Zrt, Case C-26/13.

  7. 7.

    See Bar-Gill (2008, p. 1140, 2014, p. 465).

  8. 8.

    Horatiu Ovidiu Costea v. Volksbank Romania SA, Case C-110/14.

  9. 9.

    Francisco Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco SAU, Ana María Palacios Martínez v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (BBVA), Banco Popular Español v Emilio Irles López and Teresa Torres Andreu, Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15.

  10. 10.

    Already anticipated by the CJEU in RWE Vertrieb AG v. Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., Case C-92/11.

  11. 11.

    Gut Springheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt, Case C-210/96.

  12. 12.

    Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände – Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. v Teekanne GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-195/14.

  13. 13.

    Kornhauser (2018).

  14. 14.

    See, for instance, the treatment of “goals or functions” and of the “Natur der Sache” in legal methodology, in Larenz and Canaris (1995, pp. 153 and 236).

  15. 15.

    See Kornhauser and MacLeod (2013, p. 918).

  16. 16.

    James (1992, p. 42).

  17. 17.

    I am aware of the Is/Ought dilemma, and I do not claim that a reliable bridge between empirical findings and normative conclusions always (or even often) exists. But not rarely, both in law and in law and economics, the research question does not lie with ultimate goals or normative justifications for an action or policy, but merely on how to best achieve a shared or undisputed normative goal.

  18. 18.

    A period in which the three major agents in economic interactions (consumers, firms and the government) were treated almost as black boxes beyond analysis: consumer tastes are given, firms exist to maximize profits, and governments are benevolent agents of citizens and the common good: Sandler (2001, p. 95).

  19. 19.

    Alemanno and Sibony (2015, pp. 22–23). Critically on this view, Esposito (2015, p. 257). For different reasons, others are critical with the use of behavioral economics to explain legally relevant behavior and legal institutions (Leeson 2019, p. 30) or advise caution to legal scholars in order not to misuse behavioral economics (Zeiler 2019, p. 22).

  20. 20.

    This is the prevalent view among many of the most representative behavioral economists themselves: Laibson and List (2015, p. 385).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

    Fernando Gómez Pomar

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  1. Fernando Gómez Pomar
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Correspondence to Fernando Gómez Pomar .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK

    Péter Cserne

  2. Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Fabrizio Esposito

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Gómez Pomar, F. (2020). Characterizing Economic and Legal Approaches to the Regulation of Market Interactions. In: Cserne, P., Esposito, F. (eds) Economics in Legal Reasoning. Palgrave Studies in Institutions, Economics and Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40168-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40168-9_5

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