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Economics in Legal Reasoning pp 45–61Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Economics in Judicial Decision-Making: Four Types of Situations Where Judges May Apply Economics

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Institutions, Economics and Law ((PSIEL))

Abstract

The chapter is based on the premise that economics may present epistemic difficulties for judges. It offers to conceptualize situations where judges may or have to apply economic thinking. The chapter focuses on four model categories where judges intentionally or unintentionally use economic considerations and economic arguments, or where there is a place for an economic consideration to be employed: issue of procedural economy and efficient management in everyday decision-making, abstract economic reasoning in explicitly economic fields of law, economic analysis of facts, and awareness of different economic theories that may have an impact on the judicial decision-making.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On legal reasoning, see Canale and Tuzet (2020). On economics in legal reasoning, see Cserne (2020).

  2. 2.

    Judgment of the Court of First Instance, T-83/91, Tetra Pak v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1994:246, para 137.

  3. 3.

    Judgment of the Court of First Instance, T-340/03, France Télécom v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:22, para 224.

  4. 4.

    More examples in Hubková (2014).

  5. 5.

    See Broulík (2020) and Giocoli (2020).

  6. 6.

    The determination of detailed rules on how the courts should estimate damages is left to national law (Recital 46 of the Directive). In Czech law, see the judgment of the Supreme Court, 21 December 2009, no. 30 Cdo 5188/2007 or the judgment of the High Court in Prague, 17 January 2012, no. 4 Cmo 29/2011-252.

  7. 7.

    Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Text with EEA relevance) (2013/C 167/07), p. 3.

  8. 8.

    Communication from the Commission. Guidelines for national courts on how to estimate the share of overcharge which was passed on to the indirect purchaser (2019/C 267/07).

  9. 9.

    Similarly, in the field of tax law, see the judgment of the CJEU, C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World and Others, EU:C:2003:533, paras 96 and 100.

  10. 10.

    See Broulík (2020).

  11. 11.

    See, for example, a judgment of the UK court: The High Court of Justice. Queen’s Bench Division. BSkyB v. EDS, [2010] EWHC 86 (TCC) (26/01/2010), para 303.

  12. 12.

    See Giocoli (2020).

  13. 13.

    It is important to note that the previous two categories of use of economics are typically influenced by a leading economic theory. Even the experts hired by opposing parties usually subscribe to the same theory and they disagree on how it applies to the facts.

  14. 14.

    Arguably, the process of European integration was influenced significantly by ordoliberalism. See, for example, Nedergaard (2013).

  15. 15.

    See article 3(3) TEU that stipulates that the EU “shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability” (emphasis added).

  16. 16.

    Judgment of the Court of Justice, C-438/05, Viking Line, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772, para 44.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., para 72.

  18. 18.

    Ibid., para 90.

  19. 19.

    Judgment of the Court of Justice, C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333, paras 78–79.

  20. 20.

    On the basic economic model of the legal process, see Cserne (2020, pp. 35–37).

  21. 21.

    The examples are taken from Czech law, but they may appear in other jurisdictions as well.

  22. 22.

    Article 219a and article 221 of the Act no. 99/1963 Sb., Czech Civil procedural code.

  23. 23.

    Article 112 of the Act no. 99/1963 Sb., Czech Civil procedural code.

  24. 24.

    Article 109(2)(c) of the Act no. 99/1963 Sb., Czech Civil procedural code.

  25. 25.

    Article 135(2) of the Act no. 99/1963 Sb., Czech Civil procedural code.

  26. 26.

    In general, Czech courts are not very keen to stay proceedings on competition damages. For example, in case no 15 Cm 56/2012, the Municipal Court in Prague (first-instance court) stayed proceedings in order to wait for the decision of the competition authority, but the High Court in Prague (appeal court) dismissed this decision saying that it would delay the exercise of justice excessively (case no Cmo 126/2013-437) and ordered the first-instance court to continue.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxemburg

    Pavlína Hubková

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  1. Pavlína Hubková
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Correspondence to Pavlína Hubková .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK

    Péter Cserne

  2. Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Fabrizio Esposito

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Hubková, P. (2020). Economics in Judicial Decision-Making: Four Types of Situations Where Judges May Apply Economics. In: Cserne, P., Esposito, F. (eds) Economics in Legal Reasoning. Palgrave Studies in Institutions, Economics and Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40168-9_4

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