Abstract
As the concluding chapter of the book, this chapter has two purposes. The first is to provide an overview of the main conclusions, the primary lessons, arising from the previous seven chapters. The second is to point to major gaps in the literature, pertaining to game theory and fisheries management, and thus to look forward to the future challenges in the application of game theory to fisheries management.
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- 1.
These seemingly sharp differences have to be qualified to a certain degree. In the case of the static symmetric non-cooperative fishery games, for some parameter values, one can in fact approach a situation, which is close to that of Bionomic Equilibrium, with n far below ∞. With respect to the dynamic non-cooperative fishery games discussed in Chap. 3, many simplifying assumptions are used. More complex dynamic non-cooperative fishery games will be found to yield less drastic results.
- 2.
The cooperative games that are examined are, without exception, dynamic. Static cooperative games do not add to our store of knowledge.
- 3.
As Chap. 3 clearly demonstrates.
- 4.
In the discussion of non-cooperative games in fisheries, the point was made that cooperative games are linked to non-cooperative games. Chapter 6 provides a clear example with its title being: “Non-cooperative Coalition Formation Games”.
- 5.
References
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Grønbæk, L., Lindroos, M., Munro, G., Pintassilgo, P. (2020). Conclusions. In: Game Theory and Fisheries Management . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40112-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40112-2_8
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