Abstract
The following discussion of the international financial architecture explores four separate areas of international finance that are fundamentally interconnected: international borrowing practices, privatization, emerging capital economies, and the corruption of international capital markets. Considered together, these are the fundamental aspects of the underlying international financial architecture that supports (and undercuts) the development process globally. From a larger perspective, this part of the text is also dedicated to the idea of structural legal reform. Accordingly, this section focuses on global finance and the underlying legal structures that support it (or not, as the case may be). Changes in the legal architecture greatly affect the process and potential success of development, and the state plays a pivotal role in this.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Michel Camdessus, “Stable and Efficient Financial Systems for the 21st Century: A Quest for Transparency and Standards,” Address at the IOSCO Annual Meeting (May 1999); see also Sheng (1999), pp. 855, 857; OECD , “Reports on the International Financial Architecture” (October 1998), wherein G-7 countries agreed in principle in 1998, particularly in response to the Asian financial crisis, by: (1) enhancing transparency and accountability; (2) strengthening domestic financial systems; and (3) managing international financial crises.
For a fuller discussion on the underlying philosophical principles and legal implications of moving from a state-ordered system of global economic relations to a private, contractually ordered one and its impact on indigenous legal systems, see generally , Salacuse (1999), p. 875.
- 2.
Patrick Honohan, “Financial Development, Growth and Poverty: How Close Are the Links?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3203 (2004), p. 9. See generally, Sudreau and Bohoslavsky (2015), p. 613, assessing in part the need for stakeholder participation on sovereign borrowing transactions. Further, the continuity of sovereign debt obligations from one ruling party to the next also poses a legal and political conundrum for many developing countries. See e.g., Weidemaier and Gulati (2015), p. 395.
- 3.
Demirg-Kunt and Levine (2001), pp. 11–12.
- 4.
Arner (2007), p. 91.
- 5.
Boyd (1988), pp. 461, 464.
- 6.
- 7.
For this type of analysis, see e.g., Frank (1967).
- 8.
For a fuller discussion of borrowing from official lending sources, see generally, Sarkar (2003), Chapter 4, “Mobilization of International Capital: Multilateral and Bilateral Sources of Financing.”
- 9.
Boyd (1988), p. 465.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
Boyd (1988), pp. 466, 467.
- 13.
- 14.
Boyd (1988), pp. 467, 468.
- 15.
Santos (1991), p. 73.
- 16.
World Bank, World Development Report (1988) at 27–29. See also Carrasco and Thomas (1996), p. 550.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
Boyd (1988), p. 472.
- 20.
Id. at 469. See also Buchheit and Reisner (1988), pp. 493, 496, n. 6. The authors point out that the lack of information concerning sovereign borrowers that may be available to commercial lenders contributed to the debt servicing problem. In other words, it was nearly impossible for commercial lenders to gauge whether sovereign borrowers had become overextended without knowing how much credit other banks had extended to the debtor country or to its public enterprises.
- 21.
Lichtenstein (1994), pp. 1943, 1947, writes that: “The [International Monetary] Fund is an exemplar of the theory of familial relations called ‘tough love.’ The Fund will promise the availability of funds, but the applicant country must demonstrate that it will embark on policies that, in the Fund’s view, will enable the applicant country to repay the borrowing as soon as possible. Moreover, the Fund has sought to enforce the applicant’s adherence to the agreed-upon economic policies by dribbling out its loans.”
- 22.
Santos (1991), p. 74.
- 23.
See Asherman (1984), p. 235.
- 24.
Commercial borrowing by developing countries during this time frame was a window of opportunity in terms of unprecedented access to international lenders. Essentially, the loans did not prescribe the uses the loan should be applied to. In other words, there was no conditionality attached. Rather than being used to invest in capital improvements in export-oriented industries, much of the loan proceeds were used to pay deficit accounts of non-performing SOEs. In Mexico’s case, almost half of the funds borrowed in 1981 were expatriated abroad, rather than invested in-country. See Asherman (1984), p. 297, who concludes that, “on the whole, however, the developing nations invested their borrowings in growth oriented industries.”
- 25.
See generally, Head (2010), pp. 43, 80–81, 84–86.
- 26.
- 27.
Cohen (1988), pp. 86, 94–95.
- 28.
- 29.
Lovett (1996), pp. 143, 148.
- 30.
Carrasco and Thomas (1996), p. 558.
- 31.
Power (1996), pp. 2701, 2709 [hereinafter “Sovereign Debt”].
- 32.
Boyd (1988), pp. 475–476.
- 33.
Buchheit (1988a), p. 401.
- 34.
MacMillan (1995a), p. 322.
- 35.
For a fuller discussion of a private commercial debt work-out, see Sarkar (2003), pp. 197–200.
- 36.
Boyd (1988), p. 507. Pari passu clauses simply ensure that all creditors will be treated equally and ratably in the event that the loan is paid by the debtor. In other words, the repayment will be equally shared by all the syndicated lenders in accordance with the percentage of the loan made by each individual lender.
Other clauses that may appear in the original debt instrument also ensure the equal and fair treatment among the lenders, and may include such provisions as: (1) sharing clauses (all creditors share the funds originating from repayment, set-offs, or secured interests); (2) mandatory prepayment clause (each creditor is entitled to a rateable portion of a prepayment of a loan that is paid earlier than contemplated by the loan or rescheduling agreement); (3) cross-default clause (a default of the instant loan agreement may be called if the debtor defaults on another loan to a third party); and, (4) negative pledge clause (prohibits the debtor from granting security interests on its assets or property in favor of third parties).
- 37.
Buchheit and Reisner (1988), pp. 505–506.
- 38.
Ebenroth (1989), pp. 629, 633.
- 39.
- 40.
Monteagudo (1994), p. 62. During the period for restructuring sovereign loan agreements, banks had a general reserve fund called the Allowance for Loan Losses, or the loan-loss reserve (Id. at 65). The loan-loss reserve was considered to be part of the bank’s capital and surplus so that a deduction made against the reserve resulted in a corresponding loss to the bank’s capital.
Under the U.S. law, the International Lending Supervision Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (1988), as may be amended, a special reserve called the Allocated Transfer Risk Reserve (ATRR) was established. The ATRR is not part of the general capital and surplus of the bank but is established with regard to specific loans that are officially classified according to the amount of country risk assessed by the Inter-agency Country Exposure Review Committee. These country risk classification levels are strong, moderately strong, weak, substandard, value-impaired, and loss. (Id. at 65–66). The ATRR must also be established with respect to a specific loan that is past due in interest or principal for more than ninety days. Once a loan is subject to the ATRR, the interest income from the loan, if any, cannot be reported as bank income, which has the same effect as writing down the loan (Id. at 65). See also Buchheit (1988b), pp. 371, 379–381; Lichtenstein (1985), p. 401.
- 41.
Burlock (1985), pp. 543, 549–551.
- 42.
Santos (1991), p. 75.
- 43.
Buchheit (1988b), pp. 374, 375: “The verb ‘invite’ when used to describe a request directed to a commercial bank to participate in a new money loan, is euphemistic. Any bank that flirts with the idea of not participating is reminded that the proceeds of the new money loan will be used largely (if not entirely) to pay current interest due on commercial bank debt.”
- 44.
Buchheit (1989). The author also suggests various approaches to the free rider problem, including, the “scorched earth” policy where the majority lenders exchange their interest in the original loan agreement for a parallel facility that requires their participation in a new financing, thereby leaving the so-called free riders with the basically worthless original loan agreement. Another approach would be to pass an amendment to the loan agreement preventing free riders from assigning their interests, or from charging stiff fees for such assignments. Amending sharing clauses permitting the non-pro rata share of repayments would require the unanimous agreement of all lenders, including the free riders, whose possibilities of being repaid under the loan may become nullified under this arrangement. See also Patton (2014), p. 221.
- 45.
- 46.
The IMF’s policy behind instituting stabilization measures is to “cool an overheated economy” by cutting public expenditures, devaluing the host country’s currency, and reducing the money supply. This generally also meant a drastic cut in public infrastructure growth in terms of building roads, bridges, and dams, laying off state employees, cutting health, education and welfare subsidies which were often disproportionately felt by women, children and minorities in the affected state. This is why the 19080s (especially in Latin America), is often referred to as the “lost decade for development.” See Enrique Carrasco “The 1980s: The Debt Crisis and the Lost Decade,” (July 21, 2008).
- 47.
The section provides, in relevant part: “The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are to give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.” (art. I (v), Articles of Agreement of International Monetary Fund, adopted December 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 20 U.S.T. 2775, 29 U.S.T. 2203, as amended). See also Lichtenstein (1994), p. 1946.
The World Bank also engages in structural adjustment lending, and, while the legal authority for doing so is less clear, the special circumstances exception provided in the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement is relied on for this purpose. (See Levinson 1992, pp. 47, 49–50).
- 48.
Gold (1982), pp. 11–24.
- 49.
- 50.
MacMillan (1995a), pp. 318–319.
- 51.
C. Farnsworth, “A Dramatic Change at the IMF,” New York Times (January 9, 1983).
- 52.
- 53.
- 54.
Santos (1991), p. 76.
- 55.
Boyd (1988), pp. 477–418.
- 56.
“After 32 Years of Democracy, Fears of a Coup in Venezuela,” New York Times (August 10, 1990).
- 57.
Buchheit (1988b), p. 377.
- 58.
See e.g., Sarkar (2003), pp. 206–208 for a fuller discussion of London Club rechedulings.
- 59.
Id. at 200–205 discusses Paris Club reschedulings.
- 60.
Asherman (1984), p. 264 n. 166.
- 61.
Id. at 288.
- 62.
Id. at 288 n. 284, 289.
- 63.
Id. at 236, 245, 254, 271. Asherman severely criticizes the IMF policy of requiring adjustments of deficit countries, but not from surplus countries. Unless surplus nations are required to make adjustment, as well, she suggests that structural adjustments will continue to be “harsher” and ultimately, “destructive of national and international prosperity.” (Id. at 301). See also Mikesell (1994), p. 13. Mikesell, as a former economist in the U.S. Treasury Department, Division of Monetary Research 1942–1947, gives a personal account of the debates surrounding the creation of the Bretton Woods institution, in particular, his personal account of the interaction between Lord Keynes and Harry Dexter White.
- 64.
See Asherman (1984), pp. 245–246.
- 65.
Id. at 271. See also Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (July 22, 1944), 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, reprinted in III The International Monetary Fund 1945-1965, (J. K. Horsefield, ed.) (IMF, 1969) at 8.
- 66.
Asherman (1984), p. 271.
- 67.
Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, has been quite strident in his criticism of how the Bank and the IMF fails the global poor. See generally, Stiglitz (2002); BBC, “IMF Critic Hits Out,” (August 14, 2002).
- 68.
See generally, Enrique Carrasco “The 1980s: The Debt Crisis and the Lost Decade,” (July 21, 2008).
- 69.
Id. See also Buckley (2006), p. 121.
- 70.
UNICEF (1987).
- 71.
It should be noted that structural adjustment programs do not strictly apply to industrialized nations for several reasons. In response to the Kennedy Administration’s proposal in 1961 that it may seek access to IMF resources, the G-10, composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, was formed. The G-10, made up of the most highly industrialized nations, agreed to form the IMF General Arrangement to Borrow in 1961, permitting G-10 members to borrow only short-term credit supplied by other G-10 members in order to overcome currency fluctuations or problems. No conditionality is attached to the General Arrangement to Borrow. See Asherman (1984), pp. 269–270. Thus, G-10 nations are not subject to structural adjustment programs as long as they have access to the General Arrangement.
Second, the United States tends to avoid the General Arrangement preferring to use currency swaps made available by the central banks of other nations, completely outside the rubric of the IMF, in order to overcome any short-term currency problems. (Id. at 270).
Finally, an IMF member can draw up to roughly 25% of its membership quota, a practice known as a reserve tranche drawing. A borrowing above this level is known as a credit tranche drawing and is made under a stand-by arrangement with conditionality attached (Jayagovind 1992, p. 355).
Further, the membership quotas contributed by G-10 countries are significantly higher than those contributed by developing nations. Since borrowings within the quota (or reserve amount) are not subject to adjustment programs, developing countries tend to be subject to adjustment programs whereas fully industrialized nations are not. Asherman (1984), p. 272. Thus, drawings made by developing countries generally exceed their quotas, and are made subject to performance criteria to ensuring repayment of the IMF loan. Notably within this context, developing countries do not have access to the General Arrangement to Borrow, open-ended currency swaps, or unconditioned borrowings from the IMF. Id.
- 72.
J. Kahn, “Argentina Gets US$8 Billion Aid from I.M.F.,” New York Times (August 22, 2001).
- 73.
J. Fuerbringer, “I.M.F. Aid Package Buoys the Argentine Markets, For Now,” New York Times (August 23, 2001). See also J. Kahn, “From No Aid to a Bailout for Argentina,” New York Times (August 23, 2001).
- 74.
See e.g., Tony Smith, “Argentina Threatening to Default on Payment to I.M.F.,” New York Times (March 9, 2004).
- 75.
J. Fuerbringer, “I.M.F. Aid Package Buoys the Argentine Markets, For Now,” New York Times (August 23, 2001). See also J. Kahn, “From No Aid to a Bailout for Argentina,” New York Times (August 23, 2001).
- 76.
“IMF and the World Bank to Learn from Africa,” Fin. Times (February 16, 2001), at 5.
- 77.
- 78.
Boyd (1988), p. 477.
- 79.
Id. at 478.
- 80.
Lee Buchheit, “Comity, Act of State, and the International Debt Crisis: Is There an Emerging Legal Equivalent of Bankruptcy Protection for Nations?” ASIL Proceedings, 79th Annual Meeting (April 25, 1985), p. 135.
- 81.
Santos (1991), p. 76.
- 82.
James Baker III, “Statement,” Treasury News, October 8, 1985, at 9, reprinted in Foreign Debts in the Present and a New International Economic Order , Detlev Dicke, ed. (Westview Press, 1987), p. 291. See also Power (1996), pp. 2701, 2714.
- 83.
- 84.
Santos (1991), p. 77.
- 85.
Id. See also Monteagudo (1994), p. 67.
- 86.
Buchheit (1992b), p. 10, 11.
- 87.
Monteagudo (1994), pp. 67–68.
- 88.
N. Brady, “Remarks to the Brookings Institute and Bretton Woods Conference on Third World Debt,” (March 10, 1989).
- 89.
Buchheit (1990b), p. 2.
- 90.
For a discussion of the treatment of Brady bonds as securities under securities and bank regulatory schemes, see Buckley (1998), p. 47.
- 91.
Power (1996), p. 2720.
- 92.
- 93.
Monteagudo (1994), p. 72. Note also that the LIBOR is no more! For more than 50 years, LIBOR was used by banks and other financial institutions as a global floating reference rate. As a result of well-publicized scandals involving the manipulation of LIBOR by panel banks, the subjective nature of panel bank submissions, and the lack of actual transactions to support LIBOR, in 2014, the Federal Reserve convened the Alternative Reference Rates Committee (AARC) to identify a set of alternative reference interest rates that could serve as an alternative to LIBOR for use in new derivative and other financial contracts that are more firmly based on actual transactions.
In June 2017, AARC selected the Secured Overnight Funding Rate (SOFR), a fully-transactional based rate, as its recommended replacement for the U.S. Dollar LIBOR. The SOFR is a secured rate based upon U.S. Treasury securities. Further, SOFR is an overnight rate only, whereas the U.S. Dollar LIBOR is currently published in seven tenors: overnight, one week, one month, two months, three months, six months and one year. After AARC’s recommendation, in July 2017, the UK Financial Conduct Authority, is planning to phase-out LIBOR by 2021. As LIBOR is phased out and SOFR is phased in, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York began publication of SOFR on April 2, 2018 at the initial rate of 1.80% based upon US$849 billion in overnight transactions from April 1 to April 2. See Lisa Love, “The Phase-Out of Libor and Impact on Financial Transactions,” (May 15, 2018).
- 94.
Buchheit (1990c), p. 81.
- 95.
Power (1996), p. 2721. Certain so-called “stripped” Brady bonds are not collateralized by any security interest in the principal or interest of the original loan that is being converted. (Id. at 2722).
- 96.
Buchheit (1990b), p. 2.
- 97.
“Mexico and Banks Agree on Debt Accord Language,” New York Times (September 14, 1989), at D6.
- 98.
Buchheit (1990c), p. 83.
- 99.
Santos (1991), p. 80.
- 100.
Aggarwal V (1990).
- 101.
Power (1996), p. 2722.
- 102.
P. Truell, “Brazilians Sell 53 Billion of Unsecured 30-Year Debt: Brady Bond Exchange is Well Received,” New York Times (November 27, 1997).
- 103.
Power (1996), p. 2723.
- 104.
Buchheit (2000), pp. 17, 18.
- 105.
Naomi Mapstone, “Ecuador Defaults on Sovereign Bonds,” Fin. Times (December 12, 2008). For a fuller discussion, see Porzacanski (2010), pp. 251–271.
- 106.
Santos (1991), p. 79.
- 107.
Joanna Chung, “Brady Bonds Shrinking Fast,” Fin. Times (February 26, 2006).
- 108.
Id.
- 109.
Carrasco and Thomas (1996), pp. 561, 562 n. 127, 562.
- 110.
Id. at 562–563 nn. 131–32.
- 111.
Id.
- 112.
Lovett (1996), p. 154. See also “Armed Indians Attack Four Towns in Mexico,” Wash. Times (January 2, 1994), at 1.; J. Rice, “Rebels March Into the Heart of Mexico City,” USA Today (March 12, 2001), at 5A.
- 113.
Id.
- 114.
Carrasco and Thomas (1996), pp. 563, 564–566. (See also A. DePalma, “Crisis in Mexico: The Overview with Peso Freed, Mexican Currency Drops 20% More,” New York Times (December 23, 1994), at Al.).
- 115.
Id. at 565.
- 116.
Id. at 567.
- 117.
Id. See also Carrington et al. (1995), p. Al.
- 118.
See Carrasco and Thomas (1996), pp. 567–568.
- 119.
Id. at 568. The Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) , established by Section 10 of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 31 U.S.C. § 5302, as amended, permits the purchase and sale of U.S. dollars to stabilize the U.S. currency and allows that they may also be used for short-term loans to other countries without Congressional approval. The use of the ESF loans, which operate as a revolving account, is limited to a six-month period based on a presidential determination that emergency circumstances warrant such a use (Id. at 568 n. 176). See also Wertman (1995), pp. 19, 22–23; Lichtenstein (1995), p. 1771.
- 120.
Carrasco and Thomas (1996), p. 568 n. 177.
- 121.
Wertman (1995), pp. 9, 13. Proceeds of oil exports from PEMEX and its two subsidiaries, PMI Comercio Internacional S.A. de C.V. and PMI Trading Ltd., were deposited into the same special account.
- 122.
Wertman (1995), pp. 15, 20.
- 123.
Those additional agreements are: (1) the Medium-Term Exchange Stabilization Agreement (Feb. 21, 1995); (2) the Guarantee Agreement (Feb. 21, 1995); (3) the North American Framework Agreement (Apr. 26, 1994); (4) the Exchange Stabilization Agreement (Apr. 26, 1994); and (5) the Temporary Exchange Stabilization Agreement (Jan. 4, 1995) (Wertman 1995, pp. 20–21).
- 124.
- 125.
Wessel and Torres (1997), p. A10.
- 126.
Carrasco and Thomas (1996), p. 570.
- 127.
Securities markets provide liquidity to both investors and corporate enterprises, and facilitate efficient prices in economic and financial terms. For a discussion of how law impacts the creation of strong securities markets viz, the definition of property rights, the enforcement of contracts, the protection of minority shareholders, see Ahdieh (2003), pp. 277, 284, 322–328.
For a further discussion on the “law matters” theory of securities markets formation and regulation, see Paredes (2004), pp. 1055, 1072–1074, who explicitly warns that, “U.S. corporate law might be inappropriate for promoting equity markets in developing countries. Transplanting the law of the United States, or any other country, has the benefit of being relatively easy and inexpensive, in comparison to crafting statutes, rules, and regulations from scratch. There are, however, dangers with legal transplants. As a result of any number of differences between the ‘importing’ and ‘origin’ countries, including different economies, political systems, and social structures, as well as unique value systems and priorities, an ‘importing’ country might not be ready to receive the transplant. Further, the ‘importing’ country simply might not understand the law it is importing and how it is supposed to work. As a result, the transplant might not take root or might evolve differently in the ‘importing’ country than in the ‘origin’ country. In any case, the transition to a new regime can be socially disruptive and is likely to be rife with ongoing challenges and unanticipated consequences for better and for worse. … To recast this point, a market-based model of corporate governance will not adequately protect shareholders in developing countries unless a host of other institutions exist that complement the law holding insiders accountable. If the entire U.S. governance system, or something approaching it, cannot be recreated, simply transplanting one piece of it (i.e., the law) might do more harm than good especially when the ‘importing’ country’s foregone the opportunity to adopt a different regime is considered. … When developing a corporate governance reform agenda, focusing on a simplified model of governance that emphasizes formal legal rules is problematic.” Id., at 1072–1074.
For a discussion on the dilemmas facing emerging capital markets and economies in terms of regulating capital market growth, including addressing the need for substantive legal rules, the effective enforcement of judgments, and the choice of law, see Guzman (1998), p. 607.
- 128.
Carrasco and Thomas (1996), p. 576.
- 129.
Id. at 563.
- 130.
Vernava (1996), pp. 89, 112. Mexico rewrote its investment law by legislation effective on January 1, 1994, eliminating, inter alia: (1) the need for advance approvals on certain types of transactions; (2) restrictions on the movement of investment capital in and out of Mexico; and (3) controls on the repatriation of earnings on capital.
- 131.
Carrasco and Thomas (1996), pp. 579–582.
- 132.
David Sanger, “Treasury Chief Rules Out U.S. Move to Rescue Asian Economies,” New York Times (October 27, 1997), at A8.
- 133.
See e.g., Schwarcz (2012), p. 95, where a contractual or “free market” approach is contrasted to a statutory means of doing sovereign debt reschedulings through the adoption of an international treaty or convention in order to bind sovereign debtors and their creditors. See also Anne Krueger, “A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructung,” IMF (November 27, 2002) , giving a proposed IMF model in 2002 that would take a two-prong approach. First, a statutory approach that would create a legal framework allowing a qualified majority of a country’s creditors to approve a restructuring agreement which would be binding on all. In order to make the agreement binding on all creditors, the enactment of a universal statutory framework would be necessary. And second, an approach that would incorporate comprehensive restructuring clauses, so-called “collective action clauses,” in debt instruments. Collective action clauses, found in sovereign bond contracts, limit the ability of dissident creditors to block a widely-supported restructuring on an individual bond issue.
- 134.
Steve Erlanger, “To Ease Crisis, I.M.F. Makes Philippines Emergency Loan,” New York Times (July 21, 1997), at Al.
- 135.
See e.g., Chickako Oka, “Anticipating Arrears to the IMF: Early Warning Systems” (IMF Working Paper WB/03/19, 2003).
- 136.
For another perspective on the ramifications of the Mexican bailout on IMF policies (to wit, turning the IMF into a debt management agency), see Ian Velázquez, “A Retrospective on the Mexican Bailout,” 21 Cato J. (Winter 2002). Moreover the consequences of Mexico’s debt crisis are still being felt. Opposition politicians (and other critics) in Mexico are accusing the Mexican government of supporting the local political elite since the government will not release the names or identities whose unpaid loans have been bailed out by the government following the peso devaluation in 1994 (See S. Dillon, “The Debate on Banks Gets Nasty in Mexico,” New York Times (August 7, 1998), at A7.
- 137.
Dick Nanto, “The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis,” CRS Report (February 6, 1998). This report gives a day-by-day overview of significant developments in the crisis.
- 138.
Buchheit (1990b), p. 3.
- 139.
Id.
- 140.
E. Gargan, “The Thai Slump at Ground Level,” New York Times (September 19, 1997). See also “Many Asian Stock Markets Fall Sharply: Currencies Also Lower; Trading Rule Change by Malaysia Faulted,” New York Times (August 29, 1997), at C2. By August 21, 1997, the Thai baht had dropped in value by over 20 percent. See David Sanger, “First Part of Thai Bailout Is Authorized by the I.M.F.: US$4 Billion Loan to Stem the Currency Crisis,” New York Times (August 21, 1997), at D2.
- 141.
“A combination of inadequate financial sector supervision, poor assessment and management of financial risk, and the maintenance of relatively fixed exchange rates led banks and corporations to borrow large amounts of international capital, much of it short-term, denominated in foreign currency, and unhedged. As time went on, this inflow of foreign capital tended to be used to finance poorer-quality investments.” Fact sheet, “The IMF’s Response to the Asian Crisis,” (July 21, 2008).
- 142.
“Many Asian Stock Markets Fall Sharply: Currencies Also Lower; Trading Rule Change by Malaysia Faulted,” New York Times (August 29, 1997), at C2. (See also E. Gargan, “The Thai Slump at Ground Level,” New York Times (September 19, 1997).
- 143.
Ibid. See also David Sanger, “The Overfed Tiger Economies,” New York Times (August 3, 1997). See also David Sanger, “First Part of Thai Bailout Is Authorized by the I.M.F.: US$4 Billion Loan to Stem the Currency Crisis,” New York Times (August 21, 1997), at D2.
- 144.
David Sanger, “First Part of Thai Bailout Is Authorized by the I.M.F.” New York Times (August 21, 1997) at D2. However, the IMF's role in the Thai financial crisis has been sharply criticized by observers who claim that the IMF’s prescription to Thailand to devalue its currency was a “poison pill” that started the Asian financial crisis. See S. Forbes, “Be Wary of Bailing Out the IMF,” Wash. Times (July 27, 1998) at A19. Mr. Forbes argues that when a country will not defend its currency, the currency effectively collapses, causing rampant inflation, wages reduced in value by one-half, bankruptcy, unemployment, and a precipitous rise in political and ethnic tensions. Further, he urges that the IMF’s cut-off of social safety nets, including food and other subsidies, can be calamitous for the people living in the affected economy. He urges strict adherence to four cardinal principles: sound money, low taxes, the rule of law, and restricted bureaucratic interference with running businesses, along with eliminating all tax-free incomes for IMF employees.
- 145.
“Many Asian Stock Markets Fall Sharply: Currencies Also Lower; Trading Rule Change by Malaysia Faulted,” New York Times (August 29, 1997), at C2.
- 146.
Jeffrey Sachs, “The Wrong Medicine for Asia,” New York Times (November 3, 1997), at A30.
- 147.
A. Pine, “Unsettled Markets: U.S. to Join the IMF Rescue of Indonesia Asia: Its US$3 Billion Contribution is part of a US$22-Billion Contingency Package,” LA Times (October 31, 1997), at Dl. See also J. Burton, “Korean Pride Battered by Plea for US$20bn IMF Rescue,” Fin. Times (November 22, 1997), at 3.
- 148.
T. Smart, “Money Flowing Out of Global Mutual Funds,” Wash. Post (October 31, 1997), at Cl. See also S. Pearlstein, “At Economic Summit on Asia, A Search for the ‘Right’ Policy,” Wash. Post (November 21, 1997), at Cl.
- 149.
See Fact sheet, “The IMF’s Response to the Asian Crisis,” (July 21, 2008).
- 150.
R Lewis, “For Asia, Austerity and Exports: Seeing Mexican Parallel, Economists Stress Market Freedom, New York Times (September 9, 1997), at D3. Robert Rubin, former Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, also suggested that central banks in developing countries disclose financial information concerning their activities in currency markets. See David Sanger, “Asia’s Economic Tigers Growl at World Monetary Conference: Say Opening of Markets Hands Wall Street Too Much Power,” New York Times (September 22, 1997), at Al. Secretary Rubin also suggested that commercial banks also report their non-performing loans. See David Sanger, “Rubin to Press Central Banks to Disclose Financial Data,” New York Times (September 19, 1997), at C5, citing that Japan’s failure to do so resulted in a crisis of failing banks which had to be closed.
- 151.
P. Lewis, “For Asia, Austerity and Exports: Seeing Mexican Parallel, Economists Stress Market Freedom,” New York Times (September 9, 1997), at D3.
- 152.
Observers of China’s economic scene argue that further devaluation is unlikely. See Seth Faison, “Even as Asians Worry, China is Unlikely to Devalue,” New York Times (August 11, 1998), at D4.
- 153.
In the view of the IMF, the Southeast Tigers include Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. See David Burton, et al, “Asia’s Winds of Change,” 43 Fin. & Dev. (June 2006).
- 154.
“Asian Economies: More Myth Than Miracle? New Problems Causing Some of Region’s Nations to Rethink Reliance on Japanese Model,” Wash. Post (November 25, 1997), at Al.
- 155.
Jeffrey Sachs, “The Wrong Medicine for Asia,” New York Times (November 3, 1997), at A30.
- 156.
David Sanger, “Asia’s Economic Tigers Growl at World Monetary Conference: Say Opening of Markets Hands Wall Street Too Much Power,” New York Times (September 22, 1997), at Al.
- 157.
David Sanger, “Rubin to Press Central Banks to Disclose Financial Data,” New York Times (September 19, 1997), at C5. Secretary Rubin also urged the Thais to follow the IMF’s prescriptions for economic recovery. While acknowledging that such measures will cause enormous hardships on the Thai people, Secretary Rubin attributed such difficulties to the financial crisis itself rather than to IMF-backed reforms. See M. Landler, “Rubin Hoping Thais Back Requirements of the I.M.F.,” New York Times (July 1, 1998), at A9. For a discussion of the merits of requiring the U.S. Congress to pass domestic legislation that would require detailed disclosures by overseas mutual funds on the types of equities being invested in along with a requirement that all portfolio assets meet accounting and reporting standards established by the International Accounting Standards Committee, see Krider (1998), p. 427. For a discussion on enhancing the quality of financial systems as a means of preventing future financial crises, see Douglas Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role of Law, supra, at 71–88.
- 158.
“IMF Proposes Plan for Early Warning of Economic Crises,” Wall St. J. (February 12, 1996), at C18.
- 159.
See Fact sheet, “The IMF’s Response to the Asian Crisis,” (February 11, 2009).
- 160.
Id.
- 161.
Id. The IMF details its responses to the crisis, including establishing the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) for use when the IMF’s members experience exceptional balance of payments difficulties owing to a large short-term financing need resulting from a sudden loss of market confidence. The IMF also issues certain admonitions for the future in order to avert such crises from reoccurring.
- 162.
Id. at 2–3.
- 163.
See Fareed Zakaria, “Will Asia Turn Against the West?” New York Times (July 10, 1998), at A17.
- 164.
L. Rohter, “Brazilians Uneasy Despite Help by I.M.F.,” New York Times (August 6, 2001), at A1. See also P. Blustein, “Rubin Heads Home After Prescribing Bitter Medicine for Asia,” Wash. Post (July 2, 1998), at El.
- 165.
Elson (2006).
- 166.
Lowell et al. (1998).
- 167.
Id.
- 168.
See e.g., Head (2010), p. 43.
- 169.
Dodd and Mills (2008), p. 14.
- 170.
Id. at 15.
- 171.
Hannes Androsch, “The financial contagion now spreading worldwide,” Europe’s World (Summer 2008), at 23.
- 172.
Dodd and Mills (2008), p. 17, who note that the then two largest credit rating agencies, Ambac and MBIA were estimated to have lost US$23 billion.
- 173.
Peter Hatges, “Containing the Financial Contagion,” CA Magazine (January-February 2009).
- 174.
Hannes Androsch, “The financial contagion now spreading worldwide,” supra. In fact, the former Austrian Finance Minister, Hannes Androsch, argues that unsuitable financial products were sold to unsuspecting customers.
- 175.
Dodd and Mills (2008), p. 17.
- 176.
Id.
- 177.
See e.g., Ashley Seager, “US Mortgage Giants Taken into Public Ownership,” The Guardian (September 7, 2009).
- 178.
“G-20 heads of state meeting 15th November 2008: summary and analysis of Washington meeting,” Bretton Woods Project (November 17, 2008).
- 179.
Lex Rieffel, “The G-20 Summit: What’s It All About?” Brookings (October 27, 2008).
- 180.
See Ed Pilkington, “The G 20: Who is there and how desperate are they?” The Guardian (November 15, 2008).
- 181.
Statement for G-20 Summit, November 2008, Council on For. Rels. (November 15, 2008).
- 182.
“International economic architecture: cleaning up the mess?” Bretton Woods Project (November 27, 2008).
- 183.
Zacharia (2008).
- 184.
Haass (2008).
- 185.
“G-20 heads of state meeting 15th November 2008: summary and analysis of Washington meeting,” supra.
- 186.
Id.
- 187.
- 188.
Power (1996), p. 2715.
- 189.
Buchheit L (1991), pp. 13, 14.
- 190.
Id.
- 191.
Id. at 14.
- 192.
Vernava (1996), pp. 89, 96.
- 193.
See generally, Power (1996), pp. 2718–2719.
- 194.
Chamberlin et al. (1994), pp. 525, 533.
- 195.
Power (1996), p. 2719.
- 196.
- 197.
Monteagudo (1994), p. 72.
- 198.
For a discussion on the 1988 Morgan Guaranty/Mexican Plan to securitize Mexican foreign debt holdings by issuing U.S. Treasury zero-coupon notes and various “junk bond” schemes, see Plehn (1989), p. 161.
- 199.
Buchheit (1988b), p. 395.
- 200.
MacMillan (1995b), pp. 57, 67.
- 201.
Id. at 384. See also M. Stumpf & W. Debevoise, “Overview of Techniques: Raising New Money, Growth Facilities, Cofinancing and Collateralized Borrowings,” in International Borrowing: Negotiating and Structuring International Debt Transactions, supra, at 522.
- 202.
Buchheit (1988b), pp. 396–397.
- 203.
Id. at 387–388.
- 204.
See Ebenroth (1989), p. 649.
- 205.
MacMillan (1995b), pp. 57, 67. See also M. Stumpf & W. Debevoise, “Overview of Techniques: Raising New Money, Growth Facilities, Cofinancing and Collateralized Borrowings,” in International Borrowing: Negotiating and Structuring International Debt Transactions, supra, at 522.
- 206.
See S. Claessens et al., “Market-Based Debt Reduction for Developing Countries: Principles and Prospects,” World Bank Paper No. 16 (1990).
- 207.
See generally, Newfield (2016), p. 175. The case involved the economic crisis in 2001, where the Republic of Argentina (Argentina) failed to make payments on bonds owned by foreign investors. One bondholder, NML Capital, Ltd. (NML), later prevailed in several actions it filed against Argentina in federal district court, which entered judgments totaling more than US$2 billion in NML's favor. In order to execute the judgments against Argentina, NML served subpoenas on two banks requesting information about Argentina’s assets held worldwide. Argentina moved to quash the subpoenas and argued that they violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) by requiring the disclosure of assets that are immune from collection by NML. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while NML and Argentina may disagree as to whether property within the United States is covered by the FSIA’s immunity, the fact that some property may be immune from attachment does not mean the property is also immune from discovery. As the scope of FSIA only grants immunity to property held within the United States, NML may be able to find foreign property held outside the United States that is attachable under the law of the foreign jurisdiction, but that would be immune from attachment if held in the United States. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S.Ct. 2250 (2014). (See also “Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.” Oyez, 5 June 2018).
- 208.
Hurlock (1994), pp. 347–350, 356.
- 209.
It is unlikely that such local currency deposits could be securitized by issuing Treasury-like bonds denominated in local currency. The sales of such bonds to local pension funds or institutional investors would only generate additional local currency and create inflationary conditions, or result in worthless bonds. See Hurlock (1994), pp. 347–350, 356.
- 210.
See Jobs Through Exports Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-549, § 602(a), 106 Stat. 3664 (1992), as codified, and as amended, at 22 U.S.C. § 2430, et seq.
- 211.
Sanford (1995), p. 372.
- 212.
Id. at 389–390.
- 213.
Levinson (1992), pp. 47, 48.
- 214.
E. Stern, “Prospects of Development Financing in the 1980’s,” supra, at 152–153.
- 215.
For a scathing critique on the failure of African trading regions or areas, see Matua (1995), pp. 1113, 1170–1175.
- 216.
Sanford (1995), p. 353.
- 217.
Boyd (1988), p. 485, n. 123.
- 218.
Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388–1610 (1990), codified as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 661 (Supp. V 1994).
- 219.
2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(B), as may be amended. In other words, below-market interest rates and long maturity periods (both reflecting the concessionality element in loans) decrease the overall present net value of the debt. The concessionality element, in combination with the debtor country’s inability to pay, further decreases the value of the debt and, in effect, increases the discount on the debt.
- 220.
Sanford (1995), p. 363. The author gives a detailed description of the terms of debt forgiveness to these countries and their relationships to Paris Club reschedulings and to structural adjustment requirements.
- 221.
Section 579(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 2045 (1990), as may be amended. See also Sanford (1995), p. 387, 388.
- 222.
Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-87, title II, 107 Stat. 931 (1993), as may be amended.
- 223.
Sanford (1995), p. 387.
- 224.
Id. at 390.
- 225.
Non-Paris Club creditors include China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. See A. Boote & K. Thugge, “Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries and the HIPC Initiative,” IMF Working Paper No. 24 (March 1997), at 19, n. 2 and chart.
- 226.
Sanford (1995), pp. 359–360.
- 227.
Sanford (1995), p. 400, n. 276. Ernest Stern points out that the World Bank’s lending ratio is extremely conservative since its outstanding and disbursed loans cannot exceed its capital reserves. This may need to be re-examined in forging new means of addressing the debt question. See also E. Stern, “Prospects of Development Financing in the 1980’s,” supra, at 151.
- 228.
World Bank Policy Research Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 5, Debt Reduction Facility .
- 229.
P. Blustein, “Debt Relief for Poor Nations Weighed,” Wash. Post (September 15, 1995), at F3.
- 230.
World Bank, The HIPC Debt Initiative webpage. See also A. Boote & Kamau Thugge, “Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries and the HIPC Initiative,” IMF Working Paper No. 24 (March 1997).
- 231.
See IMF, Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) Fact Sheet.
- 232.
A. Boote & Kamau Thugge, “Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries and the HIPC Initiative,” supra, at 22.
- 233.
See generally, IMF, The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) Fact Sheet (July 31, 2009).
- 234.
See generally World Bank, Fact Sheet, “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ (HIPC) Initiative.”
- 235.
IMF, “Overview: Transforming the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF ) and the Debt Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs),” (February 9, 2000).
- 236.
Id.
- 237.
Id. See also IMF Board Discusses the Enhanced HIPC Initiative Creditor Participation Issues, Public Information Notice (PIN No.03/44)(April 3, 2003). MDRI Annual Report (August 4, 2017).
- 238.
World Bank Brief, “Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative,” (January 9, 2018). See also World Bank, HIPC Initiative and MDRI Annual Report (August 4, 2017).
- 239.
See IMF & IDA, “Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative–Status of Non–Paris Club Official Bilateral Creditor Participation,” (September 10, 2007).
- 240.
Id. See also IMF, Update on the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Debt Relief to Low-Income Member Countries,” (September 12, 2007).
- 241.
African Development Bank Group, “Zambia Reaches Completion Point in HIPC Initiative: Obtains major debt relief from the AfDB,” (July 7, 2005).
- 242.
“Zambia has resolved to suspend new non-concessional borrowing-Mutati,” Lusaka Times (November 24, 2017).
- 243.
IMF Fact Sheet, “Joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries,” (March 19, 2019).
- 244.
Id.
- 245.
References
Aggarwal V (1990) Foreign debt: the mexican experience. Relazionio Internationali, pp. 26–33
Ahdieh R (2003) Making markets: network effects and the role of law on the creation of strong securities markets. Calif Law Rev 76:277, 284, 322–328
Arner D (2007) Financial stability, economic growth, and the role of law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 91
Asherman J (1984) The international monetary fund: a history of compromise. Int Law Policy 16:235
Boyd B (1988) The development of a global market-based debt strategy to regulate private lending to developing countries. Ga J Int Comp. Law 18:461, 464
Buchheit L (1988a) The capitalization of sovereign debt. Univ Ill Law Rev, p 401
Buchheit L (1988b) Alternative techniques in sovereign debt restructuring. Univ Ill Law Rev 371, 379–381
Buchheit L (1989) Unseating free riders. Int Financial Law Rev, p 14
Buchheit L (1990a) Securitization and original sin. Int Financial Law Rev, p 21
Buchheit L (1990b) The background to Brady’s initiative. Int Financial Law Rev, p 2
Buchheit L (1990c) Overview of the four debt reduction programs: Mexico, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and Venezuela. In: Reisner R, Cardenas E, Mendes A (eds) Latin American sovereign debt management: legal and regulatory aspects. Inter-American Development Bank, pp 77, 81
Buchheit L (1991) Exchanging places. Int’I Fin L Rev, pp. 13, 14
Buchheit L (1992a) You’ll never eat lunch in this conference room again. Int Financ Law Rev, p 11
Buchheit L (1992b) The evolution of debt restructuring techniques. Int Financ Law Rev, p 10, 11
Buchheit L, Reisner R (1988) The effect of the sovereign debt restructuring process on inter-creditor relationships. Univ Ill Law Rev, p 493, 496
Buckley R (1998) The regulation of the emerging markets loan market. Law Policy Int Bus 20:47
Buchheit L (2000) How Ecuador escaped the Brady Bond Trap. Int Financ Law Rev, p 17, 18
Buckley R (2006) Why some developing countries are better placed than the international monetary fund to develop policy responses to the challenges of global capital. Tulane J Int Comp Law 15:121
Burlock J (1985) Legal implications of interest rate caps on loans to sovereign borrowers N Y Univ J Int Law Policy 17:543, 549–551
Carrasco E, Thomas R (1996) Encouraging relational investment and controlling portfolio investment in developing countries in the aftermath of the Mexican financial crisis. Columbia J Transnatl Law 34:539, 550
Carrington T et al (1995) Quick fix: Clinton hastily drops Mexican Rescue plan, gives new aid instead. Wall St J, p Al
Chamberlin M, Gruson M, Welschek P (1994) Sovereign debt exchanges. In: Bradlow D (ed) International borrowing: negotiating and structuring international debt transactions, 3rd edn. International Law Institute, pp 525, 533
Cohen S (1988) Give me equity or give me debt: avoiding a Latin American debt revolution. Univ Penn J Int Law 10:86, 94–95
Demirg-Kunt A, Levine R (eds) (2001) Financial structure and economic growth: a cross-country comparison of banks, markets, and development. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 11–12
Dodd R, Mills P (2008) Outbreak: U.S. subprime contagion. Finance Dev, p 14
Ebenroth CR (1989) The changing legal framework for resolving the debt crisis: a European’s perspective. Int Lawyer 23:629, 633, 649
Elson A (2006) What happened? Why East Asia surged ahead of latrine America and some lessons for economic policy. Financ Dev, p 43
Frank AG (1967) Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. Monthly Review Press, New York, Revised edn 1969, (Penguin Books, London, 1971)
Frank AG, Cockcroft J (1972) Dependence and underdevelopment: Latin America’s political economy. Anchor Books
Gold J (1982) Financial assistance by the international monetary fund, law and practice, 2nd edn. IMF Pamphlet Series No. 27. IMF, pp 11–24
Gold J (1983) Relations between banks’ loan agreements and IMF stand-by arrangements. Int Financial Law Rev, p 28
Guzman A (1998) Capital market regulation in developing countries. Va J Int Law 39:607
Haass R (2008) The age of nonpolarity: what will follow U.S. dominance? Foreign Aff (May/June 2008)
Head J (2010) The global financial crises of 2008–2009 in context–reflections on international legal and institutional failings, fixes and fundamentals. Pac McGeorge Global Bus Dev Law J 23:43, 80–81, 84–86
Hurlock M (1994) New approaches to economic development: the World Bank, the EBRD, and the negative pledge clause. Harv Int Law J 35:347–350, 356
Jayagovind A (1992) The financial facilities of the IMF: development dimensions. In: The right to development in international law. Kluwer Law International, pp 353, 355
Jova J (1975) Private investment in Latin America: renegotiating the Bargain. Texas Int Law J 10:470–473
Kahn M, Knight M (1985) Do fund supported adjustment programs retard growth? Financ Dev, p 30
Krider T (1998) Taking another look at the regulation of mutual funds in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Pac Rim Law Policy 7:427
Levinson J (1992) Multilateral financing institutions: what form of accountability? Am Univ J Int Law Policy 8:47, 49–50
Lichtenstein C (1985) The U.S. response to the international debt crisis: the international lending supervision act of 1983. Va J Int Law 25:401
Lichtenstein C (1994) Aiding the transformation of economies: is the fund’s conditionality appropriate to the task? Fordham Law Rev 62:1943, 1949
Lichtenstein C (1995) The Mexican crisis: who should be a country’s lender of last resort? Fordham Int Law J 10:1771
Link T (1984) The value of bank assets subject to transfer risk. Columbia J Transnatl Law 23:75
Lovett W (1996) Lessons from the recent peso crisis in Mexico. Tulane J Int Comp Law 4:143, 148
Lowell J et al (1998) Financial crises and contagion in emerging market countries. RAND Corporation
MacMillan R (1995a) The next sovereign debt crisis. Stanford J Int Law 31:305, 311
MacMillan R (1995b) Towards a sovereign debt work-out system. Northwestern J Int Law Bus 16:57, 67
Maktouf L (1989) Some reflections on debt-for-equity conversions. Int Lawyer 23:909
Matua Mw (1995) Why redraw the map of Africa. Mich J Int Law 16:1113, 1170–1175
Mikesell R (1994) The Bretton woods debates: a memoir. In: Essays in International Finance, No. 192. Department of Economics, Princeton University, p 13
Monteagudo M (1994) The debt problem: the baker plan and the Brady initiative: a Latin American perspective. Int Lawyer 28:59, 62
Newfield D (2016) “Pari Passu as a weapon and the changes to sovereign debt boilerplate after Argentina v. NML. Univ Miami Bus Law Rev 24:175
Ngenda B (1995) Comparative models of privatization: a commentary on the African experience. Brooklyn J Int Law 21:179
Paredes T (2004) A systems approach to corporate governance reform: why importing U.S. corporate law isn’t the answer. William Mary Law Rev 45:1055, 1072–1074
Patton J (2014) Mitigating the problem of vulture holdout: international certification board for sovereign debt restructurings. Texas Int Law J 49:221
Plehn R (1989) Securitization of third world debt. Int Lawyer 23:161
Porzacanski A (2010) When bad things happen to good sovereign debt contracts: the case of Ecuador. Law Contemp Probl 73:251–271
Power P (1996) Sovereign debt: the rise of the secondary market and its implications for future restructurings. Fordham Law Rev 64:2701, 2709
Prebisch R (1971) Change and development Latin America’s great task. Praeger/Pall Mall, New York/London
Rajagopal B (1993) Crossing the Rubicon: synthesizing the soft international law of the IMF and human rights. Boston Univ Int Law J 11:81
Salacuse JW (1999) From developing countries to emerging markets: a changing role for law in the third world. Int Lawyer 33:875
Sanford J (1995) Foreign debts to the U.S. Government: recent reschedulings and forgiveness George Wash J Int Law Econ 28:345, 359–360
Santos A (1991) Beyond baker and Brady: deeper debt reduction for Latin American sovereign debtors. N Y Univ Law Rev 66:66, 73
Sarkar R (2003) Transnational business law: a development law perspective. Kluwer Law International
Schirano A (1985) A Banker’s view. In: Eskridge W Jr (ed) A dance along the precipice: the political and economic dimensions of the international debt problem. Lexington Books, pp 17, 20
Schwarcz S (2012) Sovereign debt restructuring options: an analytical comparison. Harv Bus Law Rev 2:95
Sheng A (1999) The new international architecture: is there a workable solution? Int Lawyer 33:855, 857
Sperber S (1988) Debt-equity swapping: reconsidering accounting guidelines. Columbia J Transnatl Law 26:377
Stiglitz J (2002) Globalization and its discontents. W.W. Norton & Company
Sudreau M, Bohoslavsky J (2015) Sovereign debt, governance, legitimacy, and the sustainable development goals: examining the principle of responsible sovereign lending and borrowing. Wash Int Law J 24:613
Sweezy P (1942) The theory of capitalist development. Oxford University Press
Tanzi V (1986) Fiscal policy responses to exogenous shocks in developing countries. Am Econ Rev 76:88–90
UNICEF (1987) In: Comia GA, Jolly R, Stewart F (eds) Adjustment with a human face: protecting the vulnerable and promoting growth, vol 1. Clarendon Press
Vernava A (1996) Latin American finance: a financial, economic and legal synopsis of debt swaps, privatizations, foreign direct investment law revisions and international securities issues. Wis Int Law J 15:89, 96, 112
Weidemaier WM, Gulati M (2015) The relevance of law to sovereign debt. Am Rev Law Soc Sci 11:395
Wertman P (1995) The Mexican support package: a survey and analysis. Mex Trade Law Rep 5(9):19, 22–23
Wessel D, Torres C (1997) Mexico will close out its debt to U.S.: earlier repayment marks both livelier economy, access to bond markets. Wall St J, p A10
Zacharia F (2008) The future of American power: how America can survive the rise of the rest. Foreign Aff
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sarkar, R. (2020). Sovereign Borrowing and Debt: Legal Implications. In: International Development Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40071-2_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40071-2_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-40070-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-40071-2
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)