The Political Economy of Foreign Intervention

Part of the Mercatus Studies in Political and Social Economy book series (MSPSE)


The US government relies heavily on military intervention to address a wide range of potential and actual crises abroad. This integrated approach to military intervention often includes rebuilding the economic, legal, social, and political aspects of societies using the tools of defense, diplomacy, and development. Drawing on research in Austrian economics and public choice economics, this chapter explores the limits of military intervention. Given the institutionalized reliance on military as a means to address crises abroad, understanding the limitations of what it can, and cannot accomplish, is of the utmost importance.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA
  2. 2.F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and EconomicsMercatus Center at George Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsVirginia Wesleyan UniversityVirginia BeachUSA

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