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Natural Resource Abundance: A Hidden Drag on Africa’s Development?

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The Palgrave Handbook of African Political Economy

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Abstract

Africa is abundantly endowed with oil and mineral resources but paradoxically remains the poorest continent. Despite being home to approximately 30 percent of the earth’s remaining mineral resource deposits, however, the continent has hitherto failed to transform this coveted advantage into economic development for its populations. Instead of bringing prosperity, the exploitation of natural resources has often been a source of violent conflicts and environment degradation in various corners of the continent, often by the influence of powerful foreign corporations. Whereas the resource curse literature has suggested economic and social factors to explain this paradox of plenty, the role played by foreign corporations in the nexus between the exploitation of African resources and poor economic performance has been virtually absent from the academic debate. This chapter explores the nexus between resource abundance and poor economic performance in various resource-rich African countries in light of the influence of foreign powers and their corporations on violent conflicts and capital flight.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Africa contains 40 percent of the world’s diamond reserves, almost all of the world’s chromium reserves; and more than 50 percent of global cobalt reserves are in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) alone (US Geological Survey 2017): http://science.jrank.org/pages/115/Africa-Minerals-resources.html

  2. 2.

    Wantchekon’s (1999) analysis was based on examining data related to 141 countries between 1950 and 1990. Similar conclusions were reached by Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) who focused on Africa and found that resource-abundant countries in this region were more likely to be authoritarian and experience breakdowns in democracy after the democratic transition.

  3. 3.

    The role of foreign corporation is explicitly illustrated by Ross (2004), who identifies payments USD 150 million made by French oil company Elf (now Total) to Sassou Nguesso to help him defeat the incumbent president, Pascal Lissouba, in exchange for future access to oil extraction contracts. Ross (2004) also refers to the financing of the 1996–1997 civil war in then Zaire, through a contract worth USD 885 million signed in April 1997 between Kabila and American Mineral Fields, a U.S. firm that intended to exploit Congolese copper, cobalt and zinc.

  4. 4.

    Despite the formal independence obtained from France in 1960, the former colonial power has kept a tight control over the country’s rich natural resources. The French nuclear energy giant earns billions from its operations in Niger while causing increasing pollution and health woes for local community members, but the host country has seen little profit from all this wealth.

  5. 5.

    The massive support supplied by the U.S., EU, and Israel through the years to the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) and other militias opposed to the Sudanese government was intended for dividing Sudan and gaining a stronger influence on the oil-rich South Sudan (Tchokonte 2013).

  6. 6.

    Péan (2010: p. 443) asserts that US agent Roger Winter requested during a press conference held at the US Institute of Peace on September 17, 1997 “the total support of the US government to a war aimed to bring down the Khartoum government, even though he knows that such a war will provoke a humanitarian catastrophe. It would be a war through proxies, using Ugandan and Eritrean troops with American weapons, ammunitions logistics and training.”

  7. 7.

    Gilens and Page (2014) find economic elites and business interests to have the highest independent and significant influence on policy making in the United States.

  8. 8.

    See http://allafrica.com/stories/201012260015.html

  9. 9.

    This figure is a very conservative one, since it only includes resources listed by some of these companies.

  10. 10.

    According to Curtis (2016), one of the major Anglo-Irish oil companies has control over 307 million barrels of oil in 12 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, while Royal Dutch Shell has license enabling it to control 691 million barrels, mainly in Nigeria. Commodity trade giant Glencore, incorporated in Jersey, controls 175 million barrels of oil in Cameroon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea. Some other less known companies hold massive oil interests amounting to 1.7 billion barrels in western Madagascar and 900 million barrels in offshore Mauritaniaand Namibia.

  11. 11.

    Jersey-based Randgold owns and operates five gold mines in Africa, containing 24.6 million ounces of gold worth USD 36.9 billion, according to War on Want. It has additional exploration projects in Senegal, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC (Curtis 2016).

  12. 12.

    Via its subsidiary De Beers, Anglo-American controls 316 million carats of diamonds through its African operations, while Petra Diamonds incorporated in Bermuda, controls 309 million carats of diamonds from four producing mines in South Africa and one in Tanzania (Curtis 2016).

  13. 13.

    From its 12 mines in South Africa, Anglo-American controls 200 million ounces of platinum and supplies 40% of world’s total production, while Lonmin controls almost 43 million ounces from its infamous Marikana mine in the North West Province (Curtis 2016).

  14. 14.

    For example, Areva is the world’s largest uranium producer and leading company to provide civil and military nuclear power systems, but reported only 2% of its earning to come from its operations in Africa in 2006 (Ecumenical Network of Central Africa 2011).

  15. 15.

    The British government, for example, announced in November 2013 the High Level Prosperity Partnerships (HLPP) as a new vehicle for enabling access by British companies to African raw materials, to be facilitated by British aid. The HLPP is a joint initiative of the Foreign Office and the Department for International Development (DFID) to support prominent British oil and mining companies in finding new markets.

  16. 16.

    The static gain is the rise in economy-wide labor productivity as workers are employed in more productive sectors, whereas dynamic gains are due to skill upgrading and positive externalities that, over time, result from workers accumulating technical skills and having access to better technologies.

  17. 17.

    As pointed out by Berthélemy and Varoudakis (1996), countries need to reach a threshold level of financial depth before financial development has a significant effect on growth.

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Habiyaremye, A. (2020). Natural Resource Abundance: A Hidden Drag on Africa’s Development?. In: Oloruntoba, S.O., Falola, T. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of African Political Economy. Palgrave Handbooks in IPE. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38922-2_38

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