Aspect Perception and Philosophical Difficulty

Part of the Nordic Wittgenstein Studies book series (NRWS, volume 5)


This chapter continues the work of ‘On Learning from Wittgenstein’ of articulating an understanding of Wittgenstein’s approach to the understanding and dissolution of philosophical difficulties, and situates in that context Wittgenstein’s invocation of aspect perception, or ‘seeing as’, in the Brown Book, in connection with his discussion of the tendency to conflate the ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ uses of ‘a quite particular’. The chapter also argues for the grammatical and phenomenological inseparability of the aspect from the object that ‘has’ it, or from the object that is perceived ‘under it’, and in this way prepares the ground for the argument, in later chapters, against the tendency to identify Wittgensteinian aspects with, or in terms of, concepts.


Aspect perception Mental states and processes Philosophical difficulty Philosophical therapy The illusion resulting from conflating the ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ uses of ‘a quite particular’ 

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tufts UniversityMedfordUSA

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