Abstract
Treasures from the history of philosophy often help to solve contemporary problems. As this chapter argues, this is also true for the problem of time and relativity theory. Contributions from Aristotle, Francisco Suárez and Augustine to understanding key issues such as the relationship between time and change, the relative duration of changes, temporal measurement and temporal asymmetry are considered. In a next step, the relationship between change, time and identity is examined through the lens of the Leibniz principle of the identity of indiscernibles and its converse. Finally, objections to explaining time in terms of change are considered, which will set the agenda for the chapters that follow.
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Notes
- 1.
M. Čapek, “Time in relativity theory: Arguments for a philosophy of becoming”, in J. T. Fraser (ed.) The Voices of Time (1981), here pp. 443–444. Emphases in the original.
- 2.
Physica, 219b, 1–2.
- 3.
K. Prantl, Aristoteles’ Werke, vol. I (1978), p. 475.
- 4.
Physica, 218b, 8 – 219b, 4.
- 5.
219a, 18–20.
- 6.
Disputationes metaphysicae, L, sect. I, 8.
- 7.
“Certum est dari in rebus huiusmodi realem durationem successivam … inter entia dantur quaedam successiva, quae ita existunt ut necessario per aliquam moram in suo esse permaneant … Sicut ergo esse rei successivae non ita durat ut idem omnino permaneat in tota mora suae durationis, sed ita ut pars eius post partem adveniat, ita duratio talis esse non habet permanentiam stabilem, sed fluentem, si tamen nomen permanentiae meretur; late tamen loquendo permanet seu durat, quamdiu fluxus eius non cessat aut finitur. Patet consequentia ex generali etiam principio supra posito quod duratio comitatur esse, vel in re potius est idem cum illo … aliae [durationes] habent propriam permanentiam in eodem esse in quo vel ex se sunt, vel ab alio conservantur; haec [duratio] vero potius nunquam permanet in eodem esse secundum idem, sed continue variatur secundum novas partes.” Disputatio L, sect. VIII, 3.
- 8.
“Duratio ut sic supponit saltem ordine rationis esse cuius est duratio, et extra illud non reperitur; sed in rerum natura nullum est ens successivum quod supponi possit ad durationem successivam, nisi motus; ergo haec duratio non potest esse nisi motus … Et ratio est quia nihil est per se in continua successione, nisi quatenus est in fieri.” Ibid., sect. VIII, 4.
- 9.
Sect. VIII, 1 and 6.
- 10.
“Duratio in re non distinguitur ab illo esse cuius est duratio; sed tempus est duratio motus; ergo in re non distinguitur ab ipso motu, sed tantum ratione.” Sect. IX, 1.
- 11.
“Respondetur primo aliud esse in aliquo motu esse plus vel minus durationis realis, aliud vero quod motus ipse plus vel minus duret, secundum coexistentiam ad aliud tempus extrinsecum … Nam in eodem motu, verbi gratia, unius circulationis caeli, eadem est realis duratio, quia idem est reale esse talis motus, et consequenter eadem est realis permanentia eius, quamquam tota illa duratio per comparationem ad extrinsecum tempus, vel ad successionem imaginariam, magis vel minus durare posset iuxta velociorem vel tardiorem transitum illius motus.” Sect. IX, 4.
- 12.
“Cur enim non potius omnium corporum motus sint tempora?” Confessiones, XI, 23.
- 13.
“Corpus nullum nisi in tempore moveri audio … Non est ergo tempus corporis motus.” Ibid., 24.
- 14.
“For where there is no creature, by whose changeable motions times are brought about, there can be absolutely no times … Time … passes due to changeableness.” In the original: “Ubi enim nulla creatura est, cuius mutabilibus motibus tempora peragantur, tempora omnino esse non possunt … tempus … mutabilitate transcurrit.” De civitate Dei, XII, 15,2.
- 15.
Confessiones, XI, 24–26.
- 16.
Ibid., 27.
- 17.
Ibid., 1–18.
- 18.
“Dicturus sum canticum, quod novi: antequam incipiam, in totum exspectatio mea tenditur, cum autem coepero, quantum ex illa in praeteritum decerpsero, tenditur et memoria mea, atque distenditur vita huius actionis meae in memoriam propter quod dixi et in exspectationem propter quod dicturus sum.” Ibid., 28.
- 19.
“Praesens intentio futurum in praeteritum traicit.” Ibid., 27.
- 20.
See G. Schwarz, Raum und Zeit als naturphilosophisches Problem (1992), pp. 191–192.
- 21.
“[Die] moderne Physik … indem [sie] die Zeit vom Verfahren der Zeitmessung her bestimmt und dabei eine als Maß dienende Bewegungseinheit—in der Relativitätstheorie die Lichtgeschwindigkeit—zugrunde legt, folgt sie der aristotelischen Tradition der Zeitauffassung.” Systematische Theologie, vol. II (1991), p. 114.
- 22.
Cf. E. Runggaldier, C. Kanzian, Grundprobleme der analytischen Ontologie (1998), pp. 154–167.
- 23.
On this point, cf. also D. H. Mellor’s discussion of the causation of stasis in Real Time II (1998), pp. 100–101. According to Mellor, a thing a remaining unchanged between two times t and t′ is only an instance of “factual causation”: “a is F at t′ because it is F at t.” But since there is no change of a between these two times, “in stasis, if not in change, there is no particular causation”.
- 24.
For example, according to H. Margenau, “Single events of great magnitude cannot be said to have the picturesque single-event causes which classical mechanics envisaged: even though I know the exact state of a neutron (having a sharp energy) that is capable of setting off an atomic bomb, and know precisely the location of the block of plutonium that is ready to be exploded, I cannot predict whether the disaster will occur. The fate of the globe, as a single event, may hide itself within atomic uncertainty.” The Nature of Physical Reality (1950), p. 420. As in Chap. 3, I assume the standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which all accessible information about the state of a quantum mechanical system is contained in its wave function Ψ.
- 25.
Cf. the quote from E. J. Lowe on the identity conditions of electrons in Sect. 3.5.
- 26.
In the words of E. J. Zimmerman: “‘Time’ which appears in the equations [of quantum mechanics] is not a quantum mechanical observable, which would be represented in the theory by an operator, but rather a parameter external to the microscopic system … Space and time are not concepts which can be meaningfully applied to single microscopic systems. Such systems are to be described by abstract concepts (charge, spin, mass, strangeness, quantum numbers) which make no reference to space and time. These microscopic systems interact in ways that must also be described abstractly, that is without reference to space and time. When a vast number of such microscopic systems so interact, the simplest and most fundamental result is the creation of a space-time framework which gives validity to the classical notions of space and time, but on the macroscopic level only.” “Time and quantum theory”, in J. T. Fraser (ed.) The Voices of Time (1981), here pp. 492 and 496.
- 27.
M. Dorato, “On becoming, cosmic time and rotating universes”, in C. Callender (ed.) Time, Reality and Experience (2002), here p. 258; q. v. for a detailed discussion of this view of change in Gödel’s work.
- 28.
“The basic difficulty confronting the causal theory is that the very essence of time lies in temporal succession … unless the existence of successive states of phenomena is tacitly assumed it is impossible for the theory to yield temporal succession.” The Natural Philosophy of Time (1963), p. 275.
- 29.
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd edn (1787), AA 57-8. In the translation of Meiklejohn (1855, p. 28), the relevant passage reads: “Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions. With regard to phaenomena in general, we cannot think away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time, but we can quite well represent to ourselves time void of phaenomena. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all reality of phaenomena possible. These may all be annihilated in thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be so annulled.” In the original: “Die Zeit ist eine nothwendige Vorstellung, die allen Anschauungen zum Grunde liegt. Man kann in Ansehung der Erscheinungen überhaupt die Zeit selbst nicht aufheben, ob man zwar ganz wohl die Erscheinungen aus der Zeit wegnehmen kann. Die Zeit ist also a priori gegeben. In ihr allein ist alle Wirklichkeit der Erscheinungen möglich. Diese können insgesammt wegfallen, aber sie selbst (als die allgemeine Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit) kann nicht aufgehoben werden.”
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Saudek, D. (2020). Understanding How Change Relates to Time. In: Change, the Arrow of Time, and Divine Eternity in Light of Relativity Theory. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38411-1_7
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