Abstract
This chapter deals with the phenomena of rule of law within the constitutional edifice of European Union. The aim is to determine its content and scope and to elaborate its promotion and enforcement in practice. A traditional approach sees this principle mostly as one-way-street focused only on Member States and as political requirement enforceable by the political procedures (Article 7 TEU). This chapter covers the rule of law as two-way proviso addressed to the EU itself and the Member States and discusses alternatives of its promotion. The key hypothesis is that operability of the rule of law concept requires its diagonal application, depoliticisation and judicialisation and concretisation via visible list of contents (in our proposal the EU Charter).
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Notes
- 1.
It is worth to mention that upholding of rule of law plays a key role in political agenda of newly elected President of the European Commission Mrs. Ursula von der Leyen. See: “A Union that strives for more—My agenda for Europe” available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf.
- 2.
Konstadinides (2017).
- 3.
Schroeder ed. (2019).
- 4.
Sehnálek (2016).
- 5.
Müller-Graff (2014).
- 6.
Nagy (2018).
- 7.
Šišková (2018).
- 8.
Elbert (2015).
- 9.
Jakab (2016).
- 10.
See in detail section 4.1 enforcing rule of law requirements in relation to Member States—call for judicialisation, further in this chapter.
- 11.
Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
- 12.
Adam and Tizzano (2017).
- 13.
294/83 Les Verts v. Parlament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166., para 23: ‘It must first be emphasized in this regard that the European Economic Community is a community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member states nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’. The expression, which has now replaced that of ‘community based on the rule of law’ can be traced back to the judgement of the Court of Justice of 27th February 2018, C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, para 31.
- 14.
Opinion of the Court of Justice of 18th December 2014, 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
- 15.
Fumagalli (2014).
- 16.
Kerikmäe et al. (2019).
- 17.
Lenaerts and Cambien (2009).
- 18.
Troitiño (2017).
- 19.
von Bogdandy and Spieker (2019).
- 20.
The so-called Solange reservation was formulated decades ago by the German Constitutional Court in connection with the deficits in protection of fundamental rights at European Community level.
- 21.
Jacobs (2008).
- 22.
Kerikmäe (2014).
- 23.
The most discussed are these five: 1. Limited application in relation to Member States (art. 51/1); 2. Charter of different speed? (Protocol No. 30); 3. National torpedoes and mines! (art. 52/4, art. 53 and national conditionality clauses); 4. Provisions of different weight or the rationale for the inclusion of toothless “principles” (art. 52/5); 5. No special procedural mechanisms.
- 24.
de Búrca (2013).
- 25.
So from the Platonic legal heaven to reality, as pointed out by the AG Mazák Opinion in case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa, ECLI:EU:C:2007:106.
- 26.
von Bogdandy et al. (2016).
- 27.
C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, para 36.
- 28.
C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, para 48.
- 29.
Closa and Kochenov eds. (2018).
- 30.
Hegedüs (2019).
- 31.
The reference is to the incidents that have involved and continue to involve mainly two EU Member States, Poland and Hungary. In addition, there are recent concerns about violations in Slovakia and Malta: on this point, it is permitted to recall to Circolo (2019).
- 32.
- 33.
Kumm (2013).
- 34.
Šišková (2018).
- 35.
Mori (2016).
- 36.
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council—a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM (2014) 158, 11th April 2014.
- 37.
For example, moving from unanimity to qualified majority voting.
- 38.
It would be an independent body responsible only for supervising respect for the values referred to in Article 2 TEU, a sort of small Commission formed by eminent political figures, such as former Heads of State, former Presidents of Parliaments, etc., and endowed with various sanctioning powers.
- 39.
There are many doubts about its possible contrast with the ‘hard core’ of the Treaties, which is considered unchangeable even with Article 48 TEU.
- 40.
It is conceived as a part of the Commission (but administratively and economically independent, in the wake of OLAF). This is a fascinating thesis, since it goes beyond the impediment of the revision procedure—needed for the Copenaghen Commission—through the use of the flexibility clause of Article 352 TFEU, considering that the protection of the values of Article 2 TEU falls within the scope of application of the competences of the Union. Nevertheless, it is not acceptable, since it would be a question of establishing not a simple committee, but a supervisory body with several powers over the status of a Member State, a change that could only be made during the revision (von Bogdandy et al. 2016).
- 41.
Entrusted, for example, to the Venice Commission. If this scenario silences the risk of instrumental political persecution against certain Member States in alleged violations of the principle of the equality of States (Article 4(2) TEU), it is not clear how an authority outside the Union can impose its conclusions on the parties concerned in a binding manner.
- 42.
See the European Parliament Resolution of 13 December 2016 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2015 [2016/2009(INI)]. It is a proposal to conclude an inter-institutional agreement, under Article 295 TFEU, between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission for the launch of monitoring procedures to defend these values, including the publication of an annual report on the state of the art of compliance with these rights.
- 43.
European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, COM(2018) 324 final 2018/0136 (COD), 2nd May 2018. The proposal, which was recently adopted at first reading in the EP (P8_TA(2019)0349, 4th April 2019), would allow the Commission, assisted by a group of independent experts, to identify ‘generalised deficiencies regarding the rule of law’ and to decide on the most appropriate financial measures to be implemented (i.e. suspension of payments for EU programmes). These sanctions can only be applied after approval by the Council. If it is true that this mechanism seems to be effective from the point of view of safeguards, it also raises more than a few doubts as to its compatibility with the Treaties. The connection to the legal basis is indeed indirect and forced. Even from a mere reading of the rule, it emerges that Article 322 TFEU only allows to establish financial rules on the modalities of implementation of the budget; certainly not, on the contrary, to protect the expenditure of the Union against the generalised deficiencies of the rule of law. Bending the legal basis in this direction would lead to the violation of another fundamental principle of EU law, namely the prohibition of abuse of rights, which prevents the exploitation of a benefit resulting from formal compliance with a rule, since its use goes beyond the objectives of the rule itself. This regulation would in fact censure: the same violations (systemic violations and not one-off); of the same principle (the rule of law); in the same way (the suspension of payments is nothing more than a suspension of a right deriving from the Treaties, the same rights that the Council may suspend according to Article 7 TEU). It is therefore not clear how and when one mechanism should be preferred to the other. In the end, it seems to be an escamotage to circumvent the revision of the Treaties and the unanimity needed to reform the existing protection mechanism.
- 44.
Ramiro Troitino and Pando Ballesteros (2017).
- 45.
Porchia (2018).
- 46.
Hamuľák (2016).
- 47.
Compare with the judgement of the Court of Justice of 16th December 2004, case C-293/03, Gregorio My/Office national des pensions, ECLI:EU:C:2004:821, para 29 (Gormley 2017).
- 48.
Miglio (2018).
- 49.
Hillion (2016).
- 50.
Supra, footnote 3. It was pointed out that: ‘The Court took advantage of this case to emphasise the potential of EU law to consolidate and defend the rule of law structures in the Member States. The Court discovered a justiciable rule of law clause in Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, which enshrines the principle of effective judicial protection before national courts. This provision makes the enforcement of rule of law standards vis-à-vis the Member States more straightforward as compared to the enforcement of Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. In the future, Art. 19, para. 1, TEU could be enforced by means of infringement proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU to counteract the undermining of judicial independence at the national level’ (Krajewski 2018).
- 51.
- 52.
Parodi (2018).
- 53.
Cannizzaro (2018).
- 54.
Hamuľák (2018).
- 55.
Ward (2017).
- 56.
See C-8/15 P Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB, ECLI:EU:C:2016:701, p. 67.
- 57.
The most prominent example is the so-called Kadi saga: C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461; Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. For a brief commentary on the Kadi jurisprudence see eg: Lentner (2013). And succeeding case law (T-208/11 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2014:885; T-384/11 Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2014:986; T-316/14 Kurdistan Workers’ Party v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2018:788; T-240/16 Klyuyev v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2018:433; C-530/17 P Azarov v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1031; AG Opinion in case C-225/17 P Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2018:720.).
- 58.
To mention the most significant, we could refer to the cases: C-236/09 Test-Achats, ECLI:EU:C:2011:100; C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238; C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
- 59.
C-411/15 P Timab Industries a CFPR v. Komise, ECLI:EU:C:2017:11; C-603/13 P, Galp Energía España a další v. Komise, ECLI:EU:C:2016:38.
- 60.
Ward (2017).
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Hamuľák, O., Circolo, A. (2020). Challenges and Possibilities of Enforcing the Rule of Law within the EU Constitutional Edifice—The Need for Increased Role of Court of Justice, EU Charter and Diagonality in Perception. In: Ramiro Troitiño, D., Kerikmäe, T., de la Guardia, R., Pérez Sánchez, G. (eds) The EU in the 21st Century. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38399-2_10
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