Appeasement or Radicalism: A Game Between Intruders and Occupiers

Lao, Yehui; Dong, Zhiqiang

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8_3

Yehui Lao¹⁷ &
Zhiqiang Dong¹⁷

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 1009))

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Abstract

This paper pursues the theory of Dong and Zhang (2016) with compromise of occupier. It suggests that security of natural property rights can not be traded with compromise of occupier and the appeasement will be failed.

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Notes

1.
There are three roots of \(1+2\alpha +\alpha ^2-\alpha ^3=0\). Because \(\alpha \ge 1\), the only one root is 2.1479.
2.
Due to the occupier with strong endowment effect must fight the intruder, we discussion the occupier with weak endowment effect (\(\alpha \in [1,2.14]\)) in this section.

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Acknowledgement

This work is supported in part by the scholarship from China Scholarship Council (CSC) under the Grant CSC NO. 201606750015.

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Authors and Affiliations

South China Normal University, Guangzhou, 510631, Guangdong, China
Yehui Lao & Zhiqiang Dong

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Yehui Lao
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Zhiqiang Dong
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Correspondence to Yehui Lao .

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Editors and Affiliations

Department of Philosophical, Pedagogical and Economic-Quantitative Sciences, Section of Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Chieti-Pescara, Pescara, Italy
Edgardo Bucciarelli
AI-ECON Research Center - Department of Economics, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan
Shu-Heng Chen
Edificio Parque Científico Universidad de Valladolid, AIR Institute, Salamanca, Spain
Juan Manuel Corchado

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Lao, Y., Dong, Z. (2020). Appeasement or Radicalism: A Game Between Intruders and Occupiers. In: Bucciarelli, E., Chen, SH., Corchado, J. (eds) Decision Economics: Complexity of Decisions and Decisions for Complexity. DECON 2019. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1009. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8_3

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8_3
Published: 08 February 2020
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-38226-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-38227-8
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