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Games with Multiple Alternatives Applied to Voting Systems

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Decision Economics: Complexity of Decisions and Decisions for Complexity (DECON 2019)

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 1009))

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Abstract

We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary organizations. These mechanisms are base on the so-called power indices of simple games with alternatives. The classical power indices applied to simple games just consider two options, yes/agree or not/reject. Here we also consider the abstention option, whose condition is allowed in most voting rules. In fact, we consider the extended Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices to measure the power of the player/voter or the coalition in real voting systems.

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Acknowledgements

X. Molinero has been partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and the European Union (FEDER funds) under grants MTM2015-66818-P (VOTA-COOP) and MDM-2014-044 (BGSMath).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Barcelona School of Informatics, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, BarcelonTech, Barcelona, Spain

    Joan Blasco

  2. Mathematics Department, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, BarcelonTech, Barcelona Graduate School of Mathematics, Barcelona, Spain

    Xavier Molinero

Authors
  1. Joan Blasco
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  2. Xavier Molinero
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Correspondence to Xavier Molinero .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophical, Pedagogical and Economic-Quantitative Sciences, Section of Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Chieti-Pescara, Pescara, Italy

    Edgardo Bucciarelli

  2. AI-ECON Research Center - Department of Economics, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan

    Shu-Heng Chen

  3. Edificio Parque Científico Universidad de Valladolid, AIR Institute, Salamanca, Spain

    Juan Manuel Corchado

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Blasco, J., Molinero, X. (2020). Games with Multiple Alternatives Applied to Voting Systems. In: Bucciarelli, E., Chen, SH., Corchado, J. (eds) Decision Economics: Complexity of Decisions and Decisions for Complexity. DECON 2019. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1009. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8_14

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