Abstract
This chapter reminds us that future uses of nuclear deterrence or coercive diplomacy, including any nuclear crisis management, will take place in a post-Internet and cyber-impacted environment. The establishment of US Cyber Command is testimony to the Pentagon’s recognition that “cyber” or “information” warfare is now a core competency for defense planners in the United States and elsewhere. Cyberwar has the unique feature that it is a domain of warfare (in addition to land, sea, air and space) but also wraps itself around the other domains: all are impacted by cyber technology and therefore, eventually, cyber-defined ways of thinking. For US nuclear planners, an obvious concern is whether nuclear command-control or launch systems can be hacked for purposes of immediate disruption or, equally dangerous, for depositing malware that can be activated on demand by a foreign power to disable systems and confuse personnel. The relationship between nuclear stability and cyber stability may have to be made explicit in doctrine and in policy, but that calls for cooperation between nuclear command channels and cyber experts, each with their own institutional and professional perspectives.
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Notes
- 1.
There is considerable overlap between cyber war and information operations, among other info-related constructs. Sensible discussions and applications appear in: Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “The Cyber Commitment Problem and the Destabilization of Nuclear Deterrence,” Ch. 9 in Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart, eds., Bytes, Bombs and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, 2018), pp. 195–234; Chris C. Demchak, “China: Determined to dominate cyberspace and AI,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, no. 3 (2019), pp. 99–104, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1604857; Andy Greenberg, “What Is Cyberwar? The Complete WIRED Guide,” https://www.wired.com/story/cyberwar-guide/, downloaded September 5, 2019; Gabi Siboni and Hadas Klein, “Guidelines for the Management of Cyber Risks,” in Cyber, Intelligence, and Security, no. 2 (September, 2018), pp. 23–38; David E. Sanger, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age (New York: Crown Publishers, 2018); P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018); Nina Kollars and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Defending Forward: The 2018 Cyber Strategy Is Here,” War on the Rocks, September 20, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/defending-forward-the-2018-cyber-strategy-is-here/; Martin C. Libicki, “The Convergence of Information Warfare,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, no. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 49–65; Matthew Cohen, Chuck Freilich, and Gabi Siboni, “Four Big ‘Ds’ and a Little ‘r’: A New Model for Cyber Defense,” Cyber, Intelligence, and Security, no. 2 (June, 2017), pp. 21–36; and P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- 2.
The relationship between cyber war and nuclear issues is considered in: Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Thermonuclear cyberwar” Journal of Cybersecurity (2017), pp. 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyw017, and Andrew Futter, “The double-edged sword: US nuclear command and control modernization,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 29, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/double-edged-sword-us-nuclear-command-and-control-modernization.html. See also: Futter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies, RUSI Occasional Paper, July 2016), www.rusi.org; and Futter, “War Games Redux? Cyberthreats, U.S.-Russian strategic stability, and new challenges for nuclear security and arms control,” European Security (December 2015), published online, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2015.1112276. Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2009), argues that strategic cyberwar is unlikely to be decisive, although operational cyberware has an important niche role.
- 3.
Catherine A. Theohary, “Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations,” Congressional Research Service, December 18, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov
- 4.
Ibid.
- 5.
Ibid.
- 6.
Dustin Volz, “NSA Forms Cybersecurity Directorate Under More Assertive U.S. Effort,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2019, in Johnson’s Russia List 2019 – #117—July 25, 2019, davidjohnson@starpower.net. See also: Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, “Cyber Combat: Act of War,” Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718.html
- 7.
Catherine A. Theohary and John R. Hoehn, “Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare,” Congressional Research Service, August 13, 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov
- 8.
Kathleen Hicks, “Russia in the Gray Zone,” Aspen Institute, July 19, 2019, in Johnson’s Russia List 2019 – #13 – July 21, 2019, davidjohnson@starpower.net
- 9.
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., “A New Epoch--and Spectrum--of Conflict,” in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), pp. 1–22, and Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago, Ill.: Ivan R. Dee, 2008), esp. Ch. 6–7. See also, on definitions and concepts of information warfare: Martin Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? (Washington: National Defense Univ., ACIS Paper 3, August 1995); Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and other Metaphors (Washington: National Defense Univ., Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies and Information Strategies, February 1997); and David S. Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Seizing the Initiative (Washington: National Defense Univ., Institute for National Strategic Studies, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, April 1996).
- 10.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar,” in In Athena’s Camp, pp. 275–94, and P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018). With regard to the tasks for US Cyber Command (established in 2009) and its implications for the national security decision-making process, see Wesley R. Andrues, “What U.S. Cyber Command Must Do,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 59 (4th Quarter 2010), pp. 115–120.
- 11.
On Russian concepts of information and cyber war and related topics, see: US Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia – Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, www.dia.mil; Timothy L. Thomas, Russia – Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015), esp. Ch. 6–7, 10; Thomas, Recasting the Red Star (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011), esp. Ch. 6–7, 11; and Thomas, Kremlin Kontrol: Russia’s Political-Military Reality (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2017.
- 12.
Kevin Pollpeter, “Towards an Integrative C4ISR System: Informationization and Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army,” Ch. 5 in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell, eds., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2010), pp. 193–235.
- 13.
Original and insightful discussion appears in Jeffrey R. Cooper, New Approaches to Cyber-Deterrence: Initial Thoughts on a New Framework, SAIC, December 29, 2009, Prepared under contract number N65236–08-D-6805, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Joint and Coalition Warfighter Support, Cyber, Information Operations and Strategic Studies Task Order, DWAM80950.
- 14.
Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, p. xvi. See also Cooper, New Approaches to Cyber-Deterrence, pp. 2–4 and passim.
- 15.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberpower,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 60, 1st quarter 2011, pp. 46–53, citation p. 50.
- 16.
Ibid., p. 51.
- 17.
Robert A. Miller, Daniel T. Kuehl, and Irving Lachow, “Cyber War: Issues in Attack and Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly, issue 61, 2nd quarter 2011, pp. 18–23.
- 18.
Ibid., p. 19.
- 19.
Ibid.
- 20.
An alternative minimum deterrent proposal, based on infrastructure targeting and intended as a way station to nuclear zero, is outlined in Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Ivan Oelrich, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, April, 2009), esp. pp. 31–33.
- 21.
According to expert analyst Paul K. Davis, in the modern era the United States should move away from the demand for instant nuclear response because it is unnecessary and dangerous. See Davis, “What Do We Want from the Nuclear Command and Control System?,” draft paper presented at NC3 and Global Security workshop, Stanford University, January 22–23, 2019, pdavis@rand.org
- 22.
An example is noted in: Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn, “The Return of Doomsday: The New Nuclear Arms Race – and How Washington and Moscow Can Stop It,” Foreign Affairs, August 6, 2019, https//www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/Russian-federation/2019-08-06/return-doomsday, also in Johnson’s Russia List 2019 – #124 – August 7, 2019, davidjohnson@starpower.net
- 23.
James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,” International Security, No. 1, Summer 2018, pp. 56–99, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/08/escalation-through-entanglement-how-vulnerability-of-command-and-control-systems-raises-risks-of-inadvertent-nuclear-war-pub-77028
- 24.
Reportedly, the US Air Force plans for an operational capability with its Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon by late 2020 and for a separate and more advanced capability six months later. See John A. Tirpak, “Roper: Hypersonics Capability Less Than Two Years Away,” Air Force Magazine, February 7, 2019, http://www.airforcemag.com/. Russian existing and planned capabilities in hypersonic weapons were touted in a presidential address by Vladimir Putin: see Putin, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, March 1, 2018, in Johnson’s Russia List 2018 – #39 – March 1, 2018, davidjohnson@starpower.net, also http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. See also: Neil MacFarquhar and David E. Sanger, “Putin’s ‘Invincible’ Missile Is Aimed at U.S. Vulnerabilities,” New York Times, March 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/world/europe/russia-putin-speech.html
- 25.
For example, see: David E. Sanger and Nicole Periroth, “U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on Russia’s Power Grid,” New York Times, June 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/us/politics/trump-cyber-russia-grid.html
- 26.
Force structures are heuristic, not predictive of actual deployments. For expert assessments, see: Pavel Podvig, “New START Treaty in numbers,” from his blog, Russian strategic nuclear forces, April 9, 2010, http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml., See also: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, October 2017), www.cbo.gov/publication/53211
- 27.
Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James J. Tritten for use of a model originally developed by him for purposes of this study. Dr. Tritten is not responsible for any analysis or arguments here.
- 28.
For related expert commentary, see: Lawrence J. Korb, “Why it could (but shouldn’t) be the end of the arms control era,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 23, 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/10/why-it-could-but-shouldnt-be-the-end-of-the-arms-control-era.html; Theodore Postol, “Are Trump and Putin Opening Pandora’s Box?,” New York Times, February 19, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/opinion/inf-treaty-missile-defense.html; and Frank Rose, “The end of an era? The INF Treaty, New START, and the future of strategic stability,” Brookings, February 12, 2019, in Johnson’s Russia List 2019 – #21 – February 13, 2019, davidjohnson@starpower.net
- 29.
Andrew Osborn and Katya Golubkova, “Moscow ready to cut time for nuclear strike on U.S. if necessary: Putin,” Reuters, February 2019, in Johnson’s Russia List 2019 – #27 – February 21, 2019, davidjohnson@starpower.net. See also: Andrey Kortunov, “The Domino Effect: America’s Withdrawal from the INF Treaty and its Ramifications,” Valdai Discussion Club, February 4, 2019, in Johnson’s Russia List 2019 – #18 – February 4, 2019, davidjohnson@starpower.net
- 30.
A conceptual model for responding to cyberattacks that draws upon classical principles of military strategy is offered in Cohen, Freilich, and Siboni, “Four Big ‘Ds’ and a Little ‘r’: A New Model for Cyber Defense”.
- 31.
On the role of nuclear weapons in Russian policy and military doctrine, see: Nikolai Sokov, “The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 5, 2010, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm. See also: Text, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” www.Kremlin.ru, February 5, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List 2010 – #35, February 19, 2010, davidjohnson@starpower.net. On Russian approaches to information warfare, see: Hicks, “Russia in the Gray Zone;” Sanger, The Perfect Weapon, pp. 152–170 and passim.; Singer and Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, pp. 106–117; US Defense Intelligence Agency. Russia – Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, pp. 37–41; Thomas, Russia – Military Strategy: Impacting twenty-first Century Reform and Geopolitics, pp. 253–299; Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August 2008,” Ch. 4 in Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz, eds., The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, July 2010), and Thomas, “Russia’s Asymmetrical Approach to Information Warfare,” Ch. 5 in Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., The Russian Military Into the Twenty-first Century (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 97–121.
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Cimbala, S.J. (2020). Cyber War and Nuclear Deterrence: A Manageable Partnership?. In: The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38088-5_8
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