Abstract
In this chapter, we ask whether the United States might prefer a strategic posture of nuclear minimalism. Nuclear minimalism offers a middle way, between nuclear abstinence and nuclear plenty. Nuclear minimalism would essentially accept the current New START-compliant US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals as points of reference going forward. In a best case, these limits would be extended to 2026 by mutual agreement and perhaps further into the future. A stabilized Russian-American strategic nuclear relationship at New START or lower levels is the necessary condition for other nuclear power cooperation on arms limitation, nonproliferation and nuclear risk reduction. The possibility of moving from the current US-Russian plateau of mutual assured destruction as the basis for their nuclear relationship, toward minimum deterrence or some other alternative, is very low indeed in the current (2019) poisoned climate of political relations between Washington and Moscow. Nevertheless, an exploratory discussion of nuclear-strategic stability based on lower numbers of weapons is important, not only in case political relations take a more permissive turn, but also because the idea of minimum deterrence might be extended to include other nuclear weapons states.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Advanced conventional weapons include information and nonlethal weapons. See John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008).
- 2.
For example, see: Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), and Keith B. Payne, “Nuclear Deterrence in a New Era: Applying ‘Tailored Deterrence’,” Fairfax, Va., National Institute for Public Policy, Issue No. 431, May 21, 2018 www.nipp.org
- 3.
For important arguments and pertinent citations in recent studies, see: James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman and Gary Schaub Jr., “Minimum Deterrence and Its Critics,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, No. 4 (Winter, 2010), pp. 3–12; Forsyth, Saltzman and Schaub, “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, No. 1 (Spring, 2010), pp. 74–89; and Stephen M. Walt, “All the nukes you can use,” foreignpolicy.com, May 24, 2010, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/24/all_the_nukes_that_you_can_use
- 4.
See, for example: George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13. See also: Thomas C. Schelling, “A world without nuclear weapons?” Daedalus (Fall, 2009), no. 4, pp. 124–129; Jonathan Schell, The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2007), esp. pp. 201–223; Lawrence Freedman, “Eliminators, Marginalists, and the Politics of Disarmament,” Ch. 4 in John Baylis and Robert O’Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 56–69; and Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), Ch. 4, esp. pp. 82–85.
- 5.
Minimum deterrence has, in fact, a considerable pedigree, dating back to some of the earliest US debates on nuclear strategy and deterrence. “Minimum deterrent” strategies have variations and are sometimes referred to as “deterrence only” or “finite deterrence” strategies. See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Second Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 7–13; and Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 281–284. See also: John Baylis, “Nuclear Weapons, Prudence, and Morality: The Search for a ‘Third Way’,” Ch. 5 in Baylis and O’Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures, pp. 70–86 inclusive, esp. pp. 78–81.
- 6.
For example, an expert assessment in 1999 concluded that nuclear abolition was impractical of realization, leaving open the question whether the United States could or should reduce its arsenal to hundreds of nuclear weapons any time in the next two or three decades. See: Center for Nonproliferation Research—National Defense University and Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), esp. pp. 3.15–3.18.
- 7.
For assessments of deterrence before and after the Cold War, see: Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters; Andrew Futter, The Politics of Nuclear Weapons (London: Sage Publications, 2015); Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Henry Holt – Times Books, 2012); Michael Krepon, Better Safe than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009); Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, Third Edition, 2003); Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2001); and Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
- 8.
On this point, see Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. 164.
- 9.
Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters, p. 204.
- 10.
See Stephen J. Blank, Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration? (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009), for an contemporaneous assessment of possible areas of US-Russian cooperation and pertinent obstacles. Important trends in Russian security and defense policy are traced in Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2009), Ch. 5, esp. pp. 162–174.
- 11.
Possible scenarios are examined in George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). On the concept of a nuclear taboo, see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 327–360.
- 12.
As Colin Gray has noted, a small nuclear war is an oxymoron. See Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, pp. 93–97.
- 13.
I gratefully acknowledge Gregory Treverton for this felicitous phrase. He bears no responsibility for its use here.
- 14.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” Ch. 1 in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 1–45.
- 15.
Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” Ch. 2 in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 47–91. See also on these points: Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
- 16.
On this point, see especially Desmond Ball, “The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” Ch. 3 in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 57–83; and Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?,” in Steven E. Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 215–244.
- 17.
I am grateful to Dr. James Scouras for use of his AWSM@ model for making calculations and drawing graphs. He is not responsible for its use here, nor for any arguments or opinions in this study. For additional information on pertinent methodology, see Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras, A New Nuclear Century (Westport, Ct.: Praeger Publishers, 2002).
- 18.
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, no. 2 (Fall, 2015), pp. 7–50, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00215. See also: Dean Cheng, “Chinese Views on Deterrence,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 60, 1st quarter 2011, pp. 92–94.
- 19.
Deterrence studies have not infrequently disappointed even some of their most important contributors. For example, according to Patrick Morgan, “Neither purveyors of rational deterrence nor their critics provide a reassuring theory for guiding policy. As a result, debates about deterrence strategy never get resolved”. Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. 167.
- 20.
Pessimism about the climate for US-Russian nuclear arms control is underscored by experts. See: Steven Pifer, “With US-Russian arms control treaties on shaky ground, the future is worrying,” Brookings, April 25, 2019, in Johnson’s Russia List 2019 – #72 – April 29, 2019, davidjohnson@starpower.net; and, Paul R. Pillar, “Trump’s Demolition of Arms Control,” The National Interest, May 1, 2019, in Johnson’s Russia List 2019 – #74 – May 2, 2019, davidjohnson@starpower.net
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cimbala, S.J. (2020). Toward Nuclear Minimalism? Minimum Deterrence and Its Alternatives. In: The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38088-5_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38088-5_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-38087-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-38088-5
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)