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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism ((PASTCL))

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Abstract

Any liberal theory that would take seriously the question of equality before the law is bound to engage with discrimination-related matters, and so long as one is a liberal, one should oppose all discrimination coming from the state. This, however, may be a double-edged sword since many classical liberals have quite readily opposed progressive taxation by invoking its discriminatory nature. Some liberals conclude that one cannot establish different tax brackets, lest taxation be illiberal. This chapter refutes this assumption. Progression is compatible with the classical liberal concern for the rule of law, provided legislative discretion on tax-related matters is duly limited by the principle of generality and by a certain standard of reasonable lawmaking.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Åsbjørn Melkevik, “No Progressive Taxation Without Discrimination? On the Generality of the Law in the Classical Liberal Tradition”, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2016, pp. 418–434.

  2. 2.

    Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, London, Routledge, 2013, p. 476.

  3. 3.

    Richard Epstein, “Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?”, Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2002, pp. 140–171.

  4. 4.

    H. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 65.

  5. 5.

    Barbara H. Fried, “The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation”, Chapman Law Review, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 157–195.

  6. 6.

    F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 314.

  7. 7.

    M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 174f.

  8. 8.

    Erik Lindahl, “Just Taxation––A Positive Solution”, in R. Musgrave and A. Peacock (eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1958, pp. 168–176, which proposed that people pay for public goods according to their marginal benefits.

  9. 9.

    James Buchanan and Roger Congleton, Politics by Principle, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 85ff.

  10. 10.

    Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, Auburn, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998, p. 803.

  11. 11.

    Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, Auburn, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998, pp. 805ff.

  12. 12.

    John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 246.

  13. 13.

    Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 320ff. Also, “There are no taxes”, said Ricardo, “which have not a tendency to lessen the power to accumulate.” David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, London, J.M. Dent & Sons, 1911, p. 95.

  14. 14.

    F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 314.

  15. 15.

    Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, New York, Wolters Kluwer, 2011, p. 682.

  16. 16.

    M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 175.

  17. 17.

    James Buchanan and Roger Congleton, Politics by Principle, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. xi.

  18. 18.

    M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 174f.

  19. 19.

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  20. 20.

    Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 114.

  21. 21.

    F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 154.

  22. 22.

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  23. 23.

    James Buchanan and Roger Congleton, Politics by Principle, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 129.

  24. 24.

    John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 113f, 117.

  25. 25.

    Gordon Tullock, The Logic of the Law, New York, Basic Books, 1971, pp. 11f.

  26. 26.

    James Buchanan and Roger Congleton, Politics by Principle, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. xii.

  27. 27.

    Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776, V.ii.III.3, G.ed. p. 825, London, Ward, Lock, and Tyler, 1812, p. 654.

  28. 28.

    Richard Epstein, “Taxation in a Lockean World”, Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1986, p. 74.

  29. 29.

    F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 310.

  30. 30.

    Alf Ross, On Law and Justice, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974, p. 272.

  31. 31.

    Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, London, Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 157ff.

  32. 32.

    Sophia Moreau, “What Is Discrimination?”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2010, pp. 143–179.

  33. 33.

    F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 314.

  34. 34.

    F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 314f.

  35. 35.

    John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 117.

  36. 36.

    Paul Gowder, “Equal Law in an Unequal World”, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 99, 2014, p. 1048.

  37. 37.

    R. Epstein, The Classical Liberal Constitution, Cambridge, Harvard U. Press, 2014, p. 206.

  38. 38.

    Allnut v. Inglis, 104 E.R. 206, 209 (K.B. 1810). Richard A. Epstein, “The Reflections and Responses of a Legal Contrarian”, Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2009, pp. 669f. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).

  39. 39.

    F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 154.

  40. 40.

    T. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Harvard U. Press, 2000, p. 192.

  41. 41.

    James Buchanan and Roger Congleton, Politics by Principle, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 85.

  42. 42.

    Friedrich Hayek, in a videotaped interview with James Buchanan, 28 October 1978.

  43. 43.

    R. Epstein, “Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?”, Soc. Phil. Policy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2002, p. 147.

  44. 44.

    F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 307.

  45. 45.

    Carle C. Zimmerman, “Ernst Engel’s Law of Expenditures for Food”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1932, p. 80.

  46. 46.

    John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, V.ii.3, edited by Sir W. J. Ashley, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1909, p. 808, n. 2.

  47. 47.

    Frédéric Bastiat, “The Law”, in Selected Essays on Political Economy, Irvington, Foundation for Economic Education, 1995, p. 61.

  48. 48.

    J. Heath, Morality, Competition, and the Firm, Oxford, Oxford U. Press, 2014, pp. 236–238.

  49. 49.

    Roger Congleton, “On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs”, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 18, 2007, pp. 145–159.

  50. 50.

    M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 163.

  51. 51.

    See also, David Friedman, Hidden Order, New York, HarperBusiness, 1996, pp. 212f.

  52. 52.

    J. Heath, Morality, Competition, and the Firm, Oxford, Oxford U. Press, 2014, p. 237.

  53. 53.

    Richard Epstein, “Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?”, Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2002, pp. 161f.

  54. 54.

    Richard Epstein, Takings, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 297.

  55. 55.

    Roger Congleton, “On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State”, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 18, 2007, pp. 145–159.

  56. 56.

    Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 148.

  57. 57.

    It can also be translated as, “The just, therefore, is a certain proportion.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1131a30, translated by R. Bartlett and S. Collins, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2011, pp. 95f.

  58. 58.

    M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 191–194.

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Melkevik, Å. (2020). No Progressive Taxation Without Discrimination?. In: If You’re a Classical Liberal, How Come You’re Also an Egalitarian?. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37908-7_6

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