Is There More to Social Justice Than Efficiency?

Melkevik, Åsbjørn

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-37908-7_3

Is There More to Social Justice Than Efficiency?

Åsbjørn Melkevik⁴

Chapter
First Online: 29 March 2020

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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism ((PASTCL))

Abstract

In this chapter criticizes the primacy Pareto superiority has often enjoyed in the classical liberal tradition. It is important that we see how efficiency can complement other classical liberal objectives, such that there is no one form of market capitalism. There are rather many ways of designing, say, the rules of property and contract. We can design market capitalism with broadly egalitarian goals in mind, like, for example, ameliorating poverty or limiting inequality. This chapter counters a possible objection to the rule egalitarian program, namely that it would simply make everyone worse-off, and therefore that we should not entertain such a leveling-down position. Arguing against Jason Brennan, it shows that the case for Pareto superiority has its limits.

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Notes

1.
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2.
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11.
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29.
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30.
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31.
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32.
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33.
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34.
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36.
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37.
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40.
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41.
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42.
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43.
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44.
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45.
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46.
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47.
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48.
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49.
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50.
David Friedman, Hidden Order, New York, Harper Business, 1996, p. 222.

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University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
Åsbjørn Melkevik

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Melkevik, Å. (2020). Is There More to Social Justice Than Efficiency?. In: If You’re a Classical Liberal, How Come You’re Also an Egalitarian?. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37908-7_3

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37908-7_3
Published: 29 March 2020
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-37907-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-37908-7
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