Abstract
Anselm W. Müller maintains that life, thought, and action are teleological concepts. That is, to understand these concepts we have to grasp their inherent teleology. In this context, ethical virtues (other virtues will hardly be mentioned here) are given a prominent place. As embodiments of practical thought, they are, as it were, a hinge between good action and good life. Hence, I shall concentrate on ethical virtue to outline Müller’s ›Aristotelian naturalism‹.
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Notes
- 1.
Müller has worked on various topics: Wittgenstein and Aristotle, moral education, democracy, emotions, on several issues of medical ethics (e.g., reproductive medicine and euthanasia), on virtue ethics, action theory, and rationality. Hence, the following account of Müller’s philosophical oeuvre has to be rather selective.
- 2.
All German quotes will be translated into English by me [TPE].
- 3.
However, one of Müller’s most recent papers suggests that the, shall we say, supportive force of this anthropological knowledge could be very limited. He writes: »Being a naturalist of sorts myself, I believe that Foot is right in maintaining that it is human nature that determines how we ought to live« (2018, 151). But from this kind of naturalism he distinguishes another, which he believes to be suggested in Foots Natural Goodness, namely, that »a correct understanding of the normative implications of human nature gives support to the practicalrecognition of moral requirements« (2018, 152, my emphasis). Müller calls this position »Naturalism« (capitalized) and he is rather sceptical about it. For a detailed discussion of theoretical and practical recognition of normative requirements, see the paper mentioned above.
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- 5.
Anscombe opposes the interpretation of chastity as a mere form of moderation. (See her Contraception, Chastity and the Vocation of Marriage (in Anscombe 2008b, 210)).
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- 7.
See also (2004b, 56–60) for a discussion of this point.
- 8.
Reciprocity does not enter moral motivation. It is not: »I help, so that others will help me too«. Rather, flourishing is to be outlined by reference to structural reciprocity.
- 9.
However, if we accept ›mystical virtues‹, respecting animal’s lives could just be a virtue of this kind.
- 10.
However, Müller does not believe that philosophy can resolve the conflict between individual well-being and life-form-specific perfection. Rather, philosophy must assume »that its own reflections lead to questions to which philosophy itself does not have a satisfactory answer« (2012, 411). Moreover, Müller does not think that virtue is a component of happiness.
- 11.
The willingness to renounce happiness, if necessary, seems to characterize the man of conviction in general; regardless of whether he is virtuous or vicious.
- 12.
Müller himself discusses four aspects to differentiate types of virtues (1998b, 109–117).
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- 14.
A note on terminology: Anscombe speaks of backward-looking motives. This suggests that time is central to this kind of motives. However, this does not seem to be correct (e.g., think of the justification pattern of justice). For this reason, I use the term »circumstance-related pattern«. For a detailed discussion see (2011).
- 15.
Happiness may be an exception. However, happiness is a formal concept. Health, pleasure, etc., on the other hand can surely be aimed at for further goals – e.g., to annoy one’s enemies.
- 16.
Revenge serves Anscombe as an example of a backward-looking motive. In 2011, Müller tries to show to what extent (pace Anscombe) backward-looking motives can be part of a practical syllogism.
- 17.
Whether we should call this »unity« or rather »interdependence« will be left open here.
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- 19.
If there really are virtues whose point is ›mystical‹ (see above), this needs clarification.
- 20.
Müller tries to apply the Aristotelian distinction between poiesis and praxis in different areas: In Detail, he analyses the interplay between poetic and practical teleology using the example of education (cf. 2008b; see also 2007). The teleological structures of poiesis play also a central role both in Müller’s reflections on the moral justifiability of »killing on request« (cf. 1997, pp. 61–128), and (above all) in the evaluation of different methods of reproductive medicine (cf. 2004a, 99–131).
Quoted Works by Anselm W. Müller
(1994). Has moral education a rational basis? In L. Gormally (Ed.), Moral truth and moral tradition: Essays in honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe (pp. 203–225). Blackrock: Four Courts.
(1995). Ende der Moral? Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
(1997). Tötung auf Verlangen – Wohltat oder Untat? Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
(1998a). Einheit der Tugend oder Einheit der Tugenden? Eine aristotelische Alternative zu Nicolai Hartmanns Position. Theologie und Philosophie, 73, 173–195.
(1998b). Was taugt die Tugend? Elemente einer Ethik des guten Lebens. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
(2000). ›Leben lernen durch Philosophie‹: Begründet die Ethik moralische Normen? In J. H. Schneider (Ed.), Ethik – Orientierungswissen? (pp. 45–55). Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
(2003a). Handeln. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 57(3), 325–347.
(2003b). Thesen zum Thema Tugend. Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik, 49, 100–107.
(2003c). Was heißt: Praxis begründen? In K. Rothermund (Ed.), Gute Gründe. Zur Bedeutung der Vernunft für die Praxis (pp. 123–171). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
(2004a). »Laßt und Menschen machen!« Ansprüche der Gentechnik – Einspruch der Vernunft. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
(2004b). Wir Menschen. Zum Moralverständnis der Bioethik. Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik, 9, 35–64.
(2004c). Acting well. In A. O’Hear (Ed.), Modern moral philosophy (pp. 15–47). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(2004d). Aristotle’s conception of ethical and natural virtue. How the unity thesis sheds light on the doctrine of the mean. In J. Szaif & M. Lutz-Bachmann (Eds.), Was ist das für den Menschen Gute? Menschliche Natur und Güterlehre/What is good for a human being? Human nature and values (pp. 18–53). Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
(2006). Der neue Person-Begriff: Dualistischer Wolf im bioethischen Schafspelz. In B. Niederbacher & E. Runggaldier (Eds.), Die menschliche Seele. Brauchen wir den Dualismus? (pp. 75–98). Heusenstamm: Ontos.
(2007). Kompetenz und Charakter. Zum technizistischen Verständnis sozialer Berufe. In C. Hubig, A. Luckner, & N. Mazouz (Eds.), Handeln und Technik – mit und ohne Heidegger (pp. 111−127). Berlin: Lit.
(2008a). Formal and material goodness in action. Reflections on an Aristotelian analogy between cognitive and practical teleology. In U. Meixner & A. Newen (Eds.), Logical analysis and history of philosophy 11 (pp. 213–228). Paderborn: Mentis.
(2008b). Produktion oder Praxis? Philosophie des Handelns am Beispiel der Erziehung. Heusenstamm: Ontos.
(2011). Backward-looking rationality and the unity of practical reason. In A. Ford, J. Hornsby, & F. Stoutland (Eds.), Essays on Anscombe’s intention (pp. 242–269). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
(2012). Leben als teleologischer Begriff. Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 119, 394–411.
(2016). The spiritual nature of man. In L. Gormally, D. A. Jones, & R. Teichmann (Eds.), The moral philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
(2018). ›Why should I?‹ Can foot convince the sceptic? In J. Hacker-Wright (Ed.), Philippa foot on goodness and virtue (pp. 151−186). Cham: Pallgrave Macmillan.
Further Works Quoted
Anscombe, G. E. M. (2008a). Contraception and chastity. In M. Geach & L. Gormally (Eds.), Faith in a hard ground. Essays on religion, philosophy and ethics by G. E. M. Anscombe (pp. 170–191). Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (2008b). Contraception, chastity and the vocation of marriage. In M. Geach & L. Gormally (Eds.), Faith in a hard ground. Essays on religion, philosophy and ethics by G. E. M. Anscombe (pp. 206–213). Exeter: Imprint Academic.
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Ertz, TP. (2020). Rationality and Virtue: Anselm W. Müller on the Teleology of Life, Thought, and Action. In: Hähnel, M. (eds) Aristotelian Naturalism. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37576-8_14
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