Abstract
Europe’s security is heavily dependent on the United States. Even beyond NATO, the United States is a key player in European security through its bilateral engagement with numerous European states. Against that backdrop, a changing transatlantic relationship has considerable implications for European security. This is the context in which European defense cooperation will need to find answers to an ever more challenging security environment. Yet there is no single “European” reading of the situation. Instead, Europeans are stuck in debates with various capitals talking past each other, rather than addressing the Grand Strategy issues at hand. This chapter intends to provide an overview of these implications and debates and seeks to identify the issues that ought to be on Europe’s (future) agenda.
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Notes
- 1.
As just one illustration of that point, see Azita Raji, “Trump’s Tariffs and the Future of Transatlantic Ties,” War on the Rocks, June 5, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/trumps-tariffs-and-the-future-of-transatlantic-ties/.
- 2.
US nuclear weapons are stationed in five non-nuclear NATO member states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.
- 3.
See US European Command Public Affairs Office, “FY 2020 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Fact Sheet,” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=2ahUKEwiSpufQ8PLjAhUG_aQKHb_RAGUQFjAFegQIBRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eucom.mil%2Fmedia-library%2Fdocument%2F39550%2Ffy-2020-european-deterrence-initiative-edi-fact-sheet&usg=AOvVaw0ljA7ZqaxOU9xgaUxJc2Ee.
- 4.
For instance, the entire Nordic Baltic region is seeking to establish closer ties with the United States, as for instance illustrated by the US Defense Secretary attending a meeting of the so-called Northern Group, see US Department of Defense, “Mattis to Visit Europe for NATO, Northern Group Meetings,” November 3, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1362725/mattis-to-visit-europe-for-nato-northern-group-meetings/. Further south, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Donalt Trump issued a joint statement in August 2019, in which they declared “Our militaries stand shoulder to shoulder in defense of freedom and look to bolster our defense and deterrence posture on NATO’s Eastern Flank, including in the Black Sea, which is of strategic importance for transatlantic security.” See White House, “Joint Statement from President of the United States Donald J. Trump and President of Romania Klaus Iohannis,” August 20, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-united-states-donald-j-trump-president-romania-klaus-iohannis/.
- 5.
For further details, see Barbara Kunz, “Northern Europe’s Strategic Challenge from Russia. What Political and Military Responses?” Russie.NEI.Visions 111, Ifri, October 2018, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/northern-europes-strategic-challenge-russia-what.
- 6.
See Statista, “Where U.S. Military Personnel Is Stationed Abroad,” March 13, 2019, https://www.statista.com/chart/17355/us-military-overseas/.
- 7.
For example, the US Air Force supports France with refueling tankers deployed in Operation Juniper Micron, see Lawrence Sena, US Air Forces in Europe & Air Forces Africa, “Fairchild KC-135s, Airmen Support Operation Juniper Micron,” October 3, 2018, https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1653862/fairchild-kc-135s-airmen-support-operation-juniper-micron/.
- 8.
See Mikkel Runge Olesen, “Det dansk-amerikanske forhold efter den kolde krig i lyset af valget af Trump,” Internasjonal Politikk 75, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 28–35.
- 9.
This is clearly reflected in the respective countries’ strategic documents and posture reviews. At a political level, the four Nordic defense ministers as well as the Icelandic minister of foreign affairs for example qualified Russia’s actions as the “biggest challenge for the European security situation” in a joint op-ed (see Peter Hultqvist, Nicolai Wammen, Gunnar B. Sveinsson, Ine Eriksen Søreide, and Carl Haglund, “Vi utdyper det nordiske forsvarssamarbeidet” [We Are Deepening Nordic Desence Cooperation], Norwegian Government, April 10, 2015, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/vi-utdyper-det-nordiske-forsvarssamarbeidet/id2404378/). As far as Poland is concerned, see the numerous statements to that effect by Polish officials, e.g., Polish ambassador to NATO Tomasz Szatkowski: “‘Russia Is Undoubtedly a Threat’: Polish NATO Ambassador,” TVP, September 2, 2019, http://www.tvp.pl/polandincom/news/politics-economy/russia-undoubtedly-a-threat-polish-nato-ambassador/44205787.
- 10.
See Florence Parly, “The US-French Relationship in a Changing World,” speech at the Atlantic Council, Washington, March 18, 2019, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/discours/discours-de-florence-parly/discours-a-l-atlantic-council-the-us-french-relationship-in-a-changing-world.
- 11.
German Ministry of Defense, Konzeption der Bundeswehr, July 20, 2018, https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/26544/9ceddf6df2f48ca87aa0e3ce2826348d/20180731-konzeption-der-bundeswehr-data.pd.
- 12.
On the increasing supranationalism in EU defense, see Pierre Haroche, “Supranationalism Strikes Back: A Neofunctionalist Account of the European Defence Fund,” Journal of European Public Policy, Published online April 26, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1609570.
- 13.
Emmanuel Macron, “Initiative pour l’Europe. Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique,” September 26, 2017, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique.
- 14.
Philip Olterman, “‘Europe’s Fate Is in Our Hands’: “Angela Merkel’s Defiant Reply to Trump,” The Guardian, January 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/16/europes-fate-is-in-our-hands-angela-merkels-defiant-reply-to-trump.
- 15.
For more background, see Justyna Gotkowska, “The CSDP’s Renaissance. Challenges and Opportunities for the Eastern Flank,” OSW Commentary 243, June 28, 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-06-28/csdps-renaissance-challenges-and-opportunities-eastern-flank.
- 16.
These advances most notably include Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund. For a good overview, see e.g., Margriet Drent, Eric Wilms and Dick Zandee, “Making Sense of European Defense,” Clingendael Report, December 2017, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Making_Sense_of_European_Defence.pdf.
- 17.
See Drent, Wilms, Zandee, “Making Sense of European Defence.” On the European Intervention Initiative, see Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, “European Intervention Initiative: The Big Easy,” Berlin Policy Journal, October 15, 2018, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/european-intervention-initiative-the-big-easy/.
- 18.
See Polish Ministry of National Defence, “The Foundation of Fort Trump Is an Investment in Our Security,” October 30, 2018, https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/the-foundation-of-fort-trump-is-an-investment-in-our-security.
- 19.
“Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,” June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/17304/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en.
- 20.
Emmanuel Macron, “Vœux du Président Emmanuel Macron aux Armées,” January 19, 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/01/19/voeux-du-president-emmanuel-macron-aux-armees.
- 21.
For an overview, see Margriet Drent, “European Strategic Autonomy: Going It Alone?” Clingendael Policy Brief, August 2018, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/PB_European_Strategic_Autonomy.pdf.
- 22.
Beata Szydło, “Remarks by Prime Minister Beata Szydło at the PISM Foreign Policy Forum” [undated, conference held in 2017], https://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/d64322fb-ff00-47f2-ac03-973423ad2aa3:JCR.
- 23.
See e.g., Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Revives Concerns About European Defense Plans, Rattling NATO Allies,” The New York Times, February 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/world/europe/nato-europe-us-.html. See also the letter Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Andrea L. Thompson sent to High Representative Federica Mogherini in May 2019, available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/1073-19-5-1-02-letter-to-hrvp-moghe/6cdebd319d226b532785/optimized/full.pdf#page=1.
- 24.
Compare again with Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło’s speech quoted above. Szydło went on to argue: “Presently we do not see any alternative to security guarantees resulting from our membership in the North Atlantic Treaty. The strategic autonomy should not mean distancing ourselves from our main ally in the field of security, the United States.” (Beata Szydło, “Remarks by Prime Minister Beata Szydło at the PISM Foreign Policy Forum.”) Similar statements can frequently be heard in countries subsumed under category one in this chapter.
- 25.
Frédéric Mauro, “Strategic Autonomy Under the Spotlight: The New Holy Grail of European Defence,” GRIP Report 2018/1, https://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/RAPPORTS/2018/Rapport_2018-1_EN.pdf.
- 26.
Andrzej Talaga, “Macron’s Visions Are Suicidal for Poland,” Euractiv, October 4, 2017, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-policy/opinion/macrons-defence-visions-are-suicidal-for-poland/.
- 27.
For more background, see Olivier Schmitt, “The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 463–474, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1220367.
- 28.
Hubert Védrine, “Rapport pour le Président de la République française sur les conséquences du retour de la France dans le commandement intégré de l’OTAN, sur l’avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspectives de l’Europe de la défense,” November 14, 2012, https://otan.delegfrance.org/Le-rapport-Vedrine.
- 29.
For a discussion of Europe’s nuclear options, see Bruno Tertrais, “The European Dimension of Nuclear Deterrence: French and British Policies and Future Scenarios,” FIIA Working Paper 106, November 2018, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/wp106_tertrais_european_nuclear_deterrence.pdf.
- 30.
The PESCO project on Military Mobility aims to simplify and standardize military transport across borders, thereby contributing to effective deterrence. Rail Baltica aims to integrate the Baltic states into the European rail network. Although not primarily a military project, better railway connections obviously have positive implications for military logistics and possibilities for troop transfers.
- 31.
For its latest edition, see German Bundestag, „Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten. Jahresbericht 2018 (60. Bericht)“, Drucksache 19/7200, January 29, 2019, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/072/1907200.pdf.
- 32.
US Department of Defense, “Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, Belgium,” June 10, 2011, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4839.
- 33.
See Barbara Kunz, “Why Franco-German Leadership on European Defense Is Not in Sight,” NUPI Policy Policy Brief 10, 2019, https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2599512/NUPI_Policy_Brief_10_2019_Kunz-2.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.
References
Drent, Margriet, Eric Wilms, and Dick Zandee. “Making Sense of European Defense.” Clingendael Report, December 2017. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Making_Sense_of_European_Defence.pdf.
Drent, Margriet. “European Strategic Autonomy: Going It Alone?” Clingendael Policy Brief, August 2018. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/PB_European_Strategic_Autonomy.pdf.
Gotkowska, Justyna. “The CSDP’s Renaissance: Challenges and Opportunities for the Eastern Flank.” OSW Commentary 243, June 28, 2017. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-06-28/csdps-renaissance-challenges-and-opportunities-eastern-flank.
Haroche, Pierre. “Supranationalism Strikes Back: A Neofunctionalist Account of the European Defence Fund.” Journal of European Public Policy, April 26, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1609570.
Kunz, Barbara. “Why Franco-German Leadership on European Defense Is Not in Sight.” NUPI Policy Policy Brief 10, 2019. https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2599512/NUPI_Policy_Brief_10_2019_Kunz-2.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.
Lord, Ellen M. and Andrea L. Thompson. “Letter to High Representative Federica Mogherini.” May 1, 2019. https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/1073-19-5-1-02-letter-to-hrvp-moghe/6cdebd319d226b532785/optimized/full.pdf#page=1.
Mauro, Frédéric. “Strategic Autonomy Under the Spotlight: The New Holy Grail of European Defence.” GRIP Report 2018/1. https://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/RAPPORTS/2018/Rapport_2018-1_EN.pdf.
Schmitt, Olivier. “The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context.” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 463–474.
Talaga, Andrzej. “Macron’s Visions Are Suicidal for Poland.” Euractiv, October 4, 2017. https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-policy/opinion/macrons-defence-visions-are-suicidal-for-poland/.
Tertrais, Bruno. “The European Dimension of Nuclear Deterrence: French and British Policies and Future Scenarios.” FIIA Working Paper 106, November 2018. https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/wp106_tertrais_european_nuclear_deterrence.pdf.
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Kunz, B. (2020). The Evolving Transatlantic Link: What European Response? Disentangling the European Security Debate. In: Quessard, M., Heurtebize, F., Gagnon, F. (eds) Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_3
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