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Ethics of the Firm and Strategic Behavior

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Business Ethics from the 19th Century to Today

Abstract

The industrialists of the last decades of the nineteenth century engaged in various controversial practices, and muckrakers gained prominence by highlighting alleged business malfeasance. Historians noted, however, that many of the allegedly unethical practices were not necessarily illegal at the time. These practices demonstrate cases where something that is legal may still be unethical. Then again, some allegedly unethical practices proved beneficial to consumers, workers, and some businesses. The United States proved especially keen to prevent cartels and monopolies unlike contemporaries in Germany and Japan.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Fans of Mel Brooks’ Blazing Saddles might add stampeding cattle through the Vatican.

  2. 2.

    See pages 460–469 for discussion of American Tobacco Company restricting sellers of their cigarettes from selling other brands—the company offered an additional commission for sellers who complied with the edict.

  3. 3.

    A modern-day take on this might be to issue bubble-gum cards of your defunct or soon-to-be-defunct rivals, listing similar business statistics.

  4. 4.

    For intervention in trade, Smith described how colonial enterprises received exclusive rights (575).

  5. 5.

    Parrillo offered the American income tax system as an example whereby people generally obey the laws at rates far higher than a Benthamite calculation of marginal gains from cheating versus the marginal cost from being detected and fined would predict (Parrillo 2014, 34–35).

  6. 6.

    The tax deductibility issue raises some intriguing possibilities, such as verifying how much was actually paid in bribes. Would companies have an incentive to overstate such payments on their tax returns? Did the bribed give receipts?

  7. 7.

    Plunkitt may have been at home with nineteenth-century Chinese bureaucrats. Bureaucrats were expected to augment their income by “squeeze (Feuerwerker 1958, 23; see also Hsin-pao Chan 1964, 9–10).”

  8. 8.

    Arthur Mann, in the introduction to Riordon’s book, pointed out that Tammany Hall and other big-city machines “acted as a social welfare agency when the poor and the immigrants had nowhere else to turn. What is more, the machine familiarized millions of newcomers to this country with representative government (Riordon 1963, xix).”

  9. 9.

    There was an old boast attributed to Simon Cameron: “An honest politician is one who, when he is bought, will stay bought (https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/simon_cameron, viewed February 27, 2017, 9:56 pm).”

  10. 10.

    Given the banks’ greater knowledge of acquaintances, such lending practices did not necessarily imply poor loans.

  11. 11.

    Carnegie usually was an unruly competitor (McConnell [1930] 1973, 105). He often refused to join price-setting schemes and was almost gleeful in undercutting his rivals’ price. J.R.T. Hughes described Carnegie’s bravura performance in dealing with a collusive agreement that dissatisfied him: “Carnegie leaped up, announced that he wanted an amount equal to the largest quota, moved his finger around the table from magnate to magnate telling each one his own business and costs and threatening to undercut them all. It was a typical Carnegie display, and it worked (Hughes [1965] 1986, 239).” Alfred Chandler Jr. suggests that Carnegie joined the Bessemer pool to see the cost figures of his rivals (Chandler 1977, 268).

  12. 12.

    The National Biscuit Company (Nabisco) stated in its annual report for 1901 that it had learned its lesson regarding trying to control or to limit competition (Chandler 1977, 335).

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Surdam, D.G. (2020). Ethics of the Firm and Strategic Behavior. In: Business Ethics from the 19th Century to Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37169-2_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37169-2_5

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