Local Public Infrastructure and Corruption



The impact of decentralization on corruption (defined as the abuse of public office for private gain or exercise of official powers against public interest) is an area of growing interest inviting much controversy and debate. While this debate has largely centered on the overall impact of decentralization, the focus of the current chapter is to examine various arguments in this debate in the specific case of decentralized provision of infrastructure—a yet largely unexplored area of research. This chapter takes an important first step in this direction by providing a synthesis of conceptual and empirical literature on this subject and highlighting the limits of our knowledge in this area especially the void in the area of empirical underpinnings of lessons in combating corruption.


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© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of BusinessUniversity of New EnglandArmidaleAustralia
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsTrent UniversityPeterboroughCanada
  3. 3.University of AlbertaEdmontonCanada
  4. 4.Governance StudiesBrookings InstitutionWashington, DCUSA

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