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Traffickers in Transit: Analysing the Logistics and Involvement Mechanisms of Organised Crime at Logistical Nodes in the Netherlands: Empirical Results of the Dutch Organised Crime Monitor

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Understanding Recruitment to Organized Crime and Terrorism

Abstract

The Netherlands functions as an important source and transit country for international organised drug trafficking. This is in part due to its large logistical nodes in the world economy, like the airport and the seaport. Although knowledge on organised crime offenders engaging in transit crime has accumulated recently, systematic analyses of offenders operating on logistical nodes are still rare.

Based on in-depth analyses of 16 cases of the Dutch Organised Crime Monitor, this chapter explores how drug traffickers operate at logistical nodes, in particular airports. Furthermore, the occupational and social embeddedness of organised crime activities and the personal motivations of drug traffickers to become and stay involved are analysed. Although the main analyses focus on organised crime at airports (11 cases), organised crime at seaports (5 cases) is analysed as well in order to compare the logistics and involvement mechanisms at the airport with those at the seaport.

The results demonstrate that organised crime groups deploy mainly three types of tactics to traffic drugs, namely defying, avoiding, and neutralising security checks. Occupational embeddedness is manifested through several job-related factors. Autonomy, mobility, and the similarity between legitimate duties and criminal activities facilitate discrete engagement in organised crime activities during work time. Port employees are also attractive to organised crime groups because of their job-related social capital and knowledge. Co-offenders are recruited through snowballing and are most often family members or (former) colleagues. Finally, social bonds and money are both important in becoming and staying involved. Greed is more often a reason to stay involved than a need for money. If members do want to leave the group, threats of violence are not shunned.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This does not mean that every passenger is subjected to exactly the same type of checks (Van Haaften 2013, p. 2).

  2. 2.

    A specific modus operandi employed by organised crime groups is the ‘rip-off’ (Eski and Buijt 2016). Characteristic of a rip-off is that criminal groups transport drugs to other countries by using sea containers ordered by legitimate companies as their transport vehicle. Sea containers are transported as ordered by the legitimate companies and upon arrival, the criminal group takes out the drug packages before they or the packages are noticed.

  3. 3.

    Please note that these numbers do not add up to 16 because in several cases the suspects transported more than one type of drugs.

  4. 4.

    In several cases different tactics are used.

  5. 5.

    Although some cases include information that civil servants, such as customs or police officers, might be involved, the cases often lack sufficient information to prove such involvement.

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Correspondence to Edwin W. Kruisbergen .

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The Cases

The Cases

Airport Cases

  1. 1.

    Marijuana, cocaine, and heroin traded by a network consisting of several groups that used each other’s facilities and traded drugs with each other. Marijuana was shipped in large amounts, whereas cocaine was transported in smaller amounts by plane to the Netherlands. A janitor at the airport used his privileges to smuggle drugs from the airport, sometimes using vehicles provided by the cleaning company. Besides luggage, other smuggling methods were swallowing drug capsules and, in the case of shipped drugs, hiding drugs in machines.

  2. 2.

    Cocaine imported from South America by two related networks that are connected through their leaders. Cocaine was smuggled into and from planes by personnel working at the airports. Corrupt customs officials received pictures of drug mules beforehand, so they would recognise them at the airport.

  3. 3.

    Dutch suspects producing XTC (‘ecstasy’) and Israeli suspects exporting this XTC. Drugs were hidden in toy boxes that were to be transported by plane. Some flights were avoided due to the scanners used at some airports.

  4. 4.

    A family organisation importing cocaine from Curacao using drug mules and air freight. In the latter case, cocaine was added to a soup and sent as a frozen package.

  5. 5.

    Export of XTC to the United States of America and Canada by stewards who took the pills with them in their personnel luggage. After surveillance had been increased at the personnel entrance, the group bought plane tickets to get to airside with the drugs and then hand over the luggage to the stewards.

  6. 6.

    Cocaine import from Curacao and the Dominican Republic by a network with many ties to the exporting countries. Drugs were smuggled by mules, customs officials were corrupted, and several air routes were avoided to evade security checks.

  7. 7.

    Cocaine imported from South America by a network of colleagues working in the (luggage handling) basement of the airport. Most suspects worked in the same team and paid their coordinator to turn a blind eye on the drug trade. Drugs were carried off the airport with vehicles available for their regular duties.

  8. 8.

    Export of XTC to Asia and Oceania and import of cocaine from South America. Money mules were close to the Israeli core members, whereas drug mules were less close to the core and differed greatly in ethnicity. While the Israelis in this network were mainly occupied with trade, the Dutch were mainly occupied with producing drugs.

  9. 9.

    Cocaine imported by a network of colleagues working in the (luggage handling) basement of the airport. Luggage agents, transfer agents, and coordinators all engaged in the drug trade. Luggage labels were sent back to South America for re-use and luggage reports were falsified. The group used vehicles of airlines to transport drugs off the airport.

  10. 10.

    Cocaine imported from South America by a Dominican family organisation with a single mother being in charge. She bought plane tickets for drug mules. The drug mules swallowed capsules and coins or carried suitcases with metal to avoid detection by security scanners.

  11. 11.

    Cocaine imported from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles by a group of colleagues who were employed by a cleaning company established to traffic drugs. Through their duties, they had the privilege to enter airplanes and search for the hidden drug packages, and to check computer systems for information about specific flights. In addition, they sometimes borrowed airport vehicles from persons employed by airlines.

Seaport Cases

  1. 12.

    Hashish trade by a network consisting of several groups that sometimes worked together on ad-hoc basis and sometimes more structurally. Ships were bought by front companies to transport hashish hidden in containers to and from the Netherlands. Sometimes the hashish was not directly brought into the harbour by ship, but first unloaded onto a smaller boat and then brought to land. After a transport had succeeded and the ship was no longer necessary to the group, the ship was sold again. Persons with jobs and/or skills related to sea transport were recruited, such as captains and electricians.

  2. 13.

    Cocaine trade by a family organisation. The group bought machines in Israel and the Netherlands, transported the machines as air freight to South America, filled them with cocaine, and then transported them back to the Netherlands by ship. Sometimes the Netherlands served as the destination point and sometimes as a transit point to further distribute the drugs in Europe.

  3. 14.

    Four interrelated groups that imported cocaine and hashish, and exported synthetic drugs such as XTC. Cocaine and hashish were hidden in containers and shipped from South America to the Netherlands. XTC was hidden in air freight to the United States of America. Some suspects had connections with shipping and transportation companies. One suspect worked in the container business.

  4. 15.

    Cocaine exported from South America to several European ports. Certain ports were avoided due to the type of security scanners in use there. Cocaine was hidden inside the pallets and masked by different types of covers, such as bananas. The main suspect had established useful connections during his time in jail and through his trading company. Furthermore, XTC was exported to the United States through air freight.

  5. 16.

    Cocaine imported from South America by a large network that hacked a track and trace website to follow containers in which drugs were hidden. They also digitally intercepted pin codes to pick up the containers before the legitimately appointed truck drivers could do so. After unloading the drugs, they returned the containers to the legitimate companies that ordered the containers in the first place.

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Madarie, R., Kruisbergen, E.W. (2020). Traffickers in Transit: Analysing the Logistics and Involvement Mechanisms of Organised Crime at Logistical Nodes in the Netherlands: Empirical Results of the Dutch Organised Crime Monitor. In: Weisburd, D., Savona, E.U., Hasisi, B., Calderoni, F. (eds) Understanding Recruitment to Organized Crime and Terrorism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36639-1_12

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