# Security Analysis of IoT Systems Using Attack Trees

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## Abstract

Attack trees are graphical representations of the different scenarios that can lead to a security failure. In combination with model checking, attack trees are useful to quantitatively analyse the security of a system. Such analysis can help in the design phase of a system to decide how and where to modify the system in order to meet some security specifications.

In this paper we propose a security-based framework for modeling IoT systems where attack trees are defined alongside the model. A malicious entity uses the attack tree to exploit the vulnerabilities of the system. Successful attacks can be *rare events* in the system’s execution, in which case they are hard to detect with usual model checking techniques. Hence, we use *importance splitting* as a statistical model checking technique for rare events. This technique requires a decomposition of an attack into sub parts, similarly to an attack tree. We argue that therefore, importance splitting is well suited, and benefits, from our modeling framework. We implemented our approach in a tool-set and verified its effectiveness by running a set of experiments over a real-word example.

## Keywords

Attack tree IoT Rare events Importance splitting## Notes

### Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Axel Legay for his helpfull suggestions on importance splitting, and Jean Quilbeuf for his technical help in the tool implementation.

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