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Conclusion

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China’s Belt and Road Vision

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

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Abstract

The concluding chapter, seeking answers to the prefatory questions, summarises the foregoing examination. It is impossible to predict BRI’s final outcome before all its planned projects are operational, but the evidence presented above suggests much anxiety informing Western analyses is rooted in a fear of the unknown precipitated by systemic transitional fluidity flowing from China’s rapid renascence, rather than a rational evaluation of the BRI blueprint per se. An uncertain transition from the 300-year old trans-Atlantic-centric political-economic order catalysed fearful suspicions and a profound displacement anxiety stemming from accretive disruptions backstopping Beijing’s BRI vision. Strategists’ angst-ridden, zero-sum prophecies drew greater attention than bankers’ reasoned analyses. A lack of objective detachment could promote self-fulfilling assumptions. This work aims to address that risk.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brunei, Cambodia, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan, UAE, Vietnam.

  2. 2.

    Watts (2019), Pieraccini (2019), Khanna (2019) and Dodwell (2019).

  3. 3.

    Xi (2018a).

  4. 4.

    Xi (2019a).

  5. 5.

    Pence (2019).

  6. 6.

    Baniya et al. (2018, p. 28).

  7. 7.

    Baniya et al. (2018, p. 29).

  8. 8.

    See, for instance, Ochmanek et al. (2015).

  9. 9.

    Lu et al. (2018, pp. 2–3).

  10. 10.

    Lu et al. (2018, pp. 3–8).

  11. 11.

    Leading Group for Promoting the BRI (2019).

  12. 12.

    FMPRC (2019).

  13. 13.

    Bianji (2019), NDRC (2019) and Zhang (2018).

  14. 14.

    Bo (2016).

  15. 15.

    Pompeo (2018). Emphasis added.

  16. 16.

    Dow Jones (2019), Reuters (2019) and Sanger et al. (2019).

  17. 17.

    Sukhankin (2018), Eiterjord (2018), Scrafton (2018) and Wen (2018).

  18. 18.

    Edel and Brands (2019), Pei (2019a) and Wu (2019).

  19. 19.

    Jones and Zeng (2019).

  20. 20.

    Politi (2019) and Swanson (2019).

  21. 21.

    Shanahan et al. (2019).

  22. 22.

    Shanahan (2019a).

  23. 23.

    Pence (2019).

  24. 24.

    Richardson (2019, p. 3). Emphasis added.

  25. 25.

    Richardson (2019, p. 4).

  26. 26.

    Shanahan (2019b).

  27. 27.

    Shanahan (2019b).

  28. 28.

    Shanahan (2019c).

  29. 29.

    Wei (2019, pp. 1–3).

  30. 30.

    Wei (2019, pp. 3–5).

  31. 31.

    State Council (2019).

  32. 32.

    Sabu et al. (2019).

  33. 33.

    Shanahan (2019b).

  34. 34.

    Lee (2019).

  35. 35.

    Lee (2019).

  36. 36.

    Mahathir (2019).

  37. 37.

    Thayer and Han (2019), Lian (2010), Economy (2019) and Fukuyama (2018).

  38. 38.

    Pei (2019a) and Wu (2019).

  39. 39.

    Deng (1989a).

  40. 40.

    Lian (2010), Economy (2019), Yin (2019), Tang (2019) and Ming (2018).

  41. 41.

    Li and Liang (2019).

  42. 42.

    Deng (1989b).

  43. 43.

    Deng (1989b).

  44. 44.

    Deng (1989c).

  45. 45.

    These being adherence to the socialist road, adherence to the people’s democratic dictatorship, adherence to the leadership of the CPC, and adherence to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. State Council (1979) Four Cardinal Principles. Foreign Language Press, Beijing, March 1979.

  46. 46.

    Deng (1989c).

  47. 47.

    Deng (1989a, d).

  48. 48.

    Deng (1989e).

  49. 49.

    Deng (1989f).

  50. 50.

    Deng (1989g).

  51. 51.

    Deng (1989g).

  52. 52.

    Deng (1989h).

  53. 53.

    Kosaka (2019), Tillett (2019), Liu (2019a) and Martina (2019).

  54. 54.

    MND (2009, Chap. 1).

  55. 55.

    MND (2011). Preface.

  56. 56.

    MND (2011, Chap. 1).

  57. 57.

    MND (2011, Chap. 1).

  58. 58.

    MND (2013).

  59. 59.

    MND (2015).

  60. 60.

    Yao (2016).

  61. 61.

    Liu (2019b).

  62. 62.

    Ford (2019).

  63. 63.

    O’Rourke (2019).

  64. 64.

    O’Rourke (2018, pp. 2–7).

  65. 65.

    Xi (2018b).

  66. 66.

    Report (2014) and Saunders et al. (2019, p. 711).

  67. 67.

    Saunders et al. (2019, p. 723).

  68. 68.

    MND (2019).

  69. 69.

    Ashley (2019, p. 12).

  70. 70.

    Ashley (2019, p. v).

  71. 71.

    Davidson (2019).

  72. 72.

    Shanahan (2019d).

  73. 73.

    Shanahan (2019e).

  74. 74.

    Shanahan (2019d).

  75. 75.

    Esper (2019a).

  76. 76.

    Esper (2019b).

  77. 77.

    Strayer (2019).

  78. 78.

    Carter and Hurt (2019).

  79. 79.

    Spokesperson (2018) and Gehrke (2018).

  80. 80.

    Pence (2019).

  81. 81.

    Mair and Packham (2019).

  82. 82.

    Lu (2019).

  83. 83.

    Xinhua (2018a).

  84. 84.

    Spokesperson (2018), Xinhua (2018b) and Gehrke (2018).

  85. 85.

    Xi (2019b).

  86. 86.

    Rudd (2018).

  87. 87.

    Rudd (2018).

  88. 88.

    Dobbins et al. (2018, p. 2).

  89. 89.

    Dobbins et al. (2018, p. 10).

  90. 90.

    Dobbins et al. (2018, p. 12).

  91. 91.

    Shanahan (2019d).

  92. 92.

    Shanahan (2019d).

  93. 93.

    Rolland (2019).

  94. 94.

    Skinner (2019).

  95. 95.

    Wolf (2019), Editorial (2019), Pastreich (2019), Pei (2019b), Chen and Hu (2019) and Schell and Shirk (2019).

  96. 96.

    Report (2019), O’Rourke (2018), Zakheim (2018), Mosteiro (2018) and Grossman (2018).

  97. 97.

    Franck (2019) and Hass (2018).

  98. 98.

    Mazarr et al. (2018).

  99. 99.

    Mazarr et al. (2018).

  100. 100.

    Fravel et al. (2019).

  101. 101.

    Esper (2019c).

  102. 102.

    Milley (2019).

  103. 103.

    Gilday (2019).

  104. 104.

    Xi (2019c).

  105. 105.

    Xi (2019c).

  106. 106.

    Trump and Xi (2019), Trump (2019) and Sheng and Liang (2019).

  107. 107.

    Armstrong (2019).

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Ali, S. (2020). Conclusion. In: China’s Belt and Road Vision. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36244-7_7

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