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Notes
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- 2.
We leave out the definition of contractions because they are not needed as an auxiliary notion in the definition of revisions.
- 3.
Because of the obvious correspondence between defaults in default logic and justifications in Doyle’s TMS, the latter has been used for computing extensions in default logic [25, Chap. 4.4]
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Andreas, H. (2020). Defeasible Reasoning. In: Dynamic Tractable Reasoning. Synthese Library, vol 420. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36233-1_4
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