Abstract
This chapter offers a deeper theoretical analysis of rational-choice principles, interests, subjects, and methods of mediating interests including the position of interest groups in democratic political systems. A stakeholder-centered model is presented based on a simple scheme of interest groups, decision-makers, business, and the public. Three hypothetical situations are modeled: a world with no lobbying, with non-transparent lobbying, and with transparent lobbying. The role of information symmetry is discussed. It is argued that non-transparent lobbying can lead to government failures as it can lead to illegal practices of influence and corruption, with their economic implications. The failures are often corrected by some form of regulation but any regulation should always be discussed with regard to efficiency and the optimum of its outcome.
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These were mainly fascist regimes in southern Europe (Spain/Franco, Portugal/Salazar, Italy/Mussolini) and Hitler’s Germany.
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Laboutková, Š., Šimral, V., Vymětal, P. (2020). A Theoretical Model of Lobbying. In: Transparent Lobbying and Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36044-3_5
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