Abstract
Incentives have been a central part of managing banks from the Medici to today. Bonuses were awarded for production, being successful banking, and not for management. When banks were mainly partnerships, one incentive for the partners was to keep the bank from failing. Once banks listed on stock exchanges, incentives became shorter term. They were about a high share price of the bank rather than its survival. Annual bonuses became path dependent and difficult to reduce because of the fear of losing hard-working and talented bankers. At times, incentives were so large that the recipients became financially independent within a few years and thereby unmanageable.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsReferences
Dávila, Antonio, and Robert Simons. 1997. Citibank: Performance Evaluation. Boston: Harvard Business School.
Doyle, Stephen X., and Jay W. Lorsch. 1975. First Federal Savings (A). Boston: Harvard Business School.
Ferguson, Niall. 2010. High Financier. The Lives and Times of Siegmund Warburg. London: Penguin.
Fulmer, William E. 2000. Credit Suisse (A). Boston: Harvard Business School.
Holden, R.T. 2005. The Original Management Incentive Schemes. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (4): 135–144.
Johnson, Simon. 2009. The Quiet Coup. The Atlantic, May 2009.
———. 2010. The Next Financial Crisis. Boston: Forum for the Future of Higher Education.
Liebowitz, S.J., and S.E. Margolis. 2000. Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History. The Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 11 (1): 205–226.
Maedler, Markus, and Scott van Etten. 2013. Risk Management at Lehman Brothers, 2007–2008. Madrid: IESE Business School of Navarre.
Nanda, Ashish, Malcolm Salter, Boris Groysberg, and Sarah Matthews. 2006. The Goldman Sachs. Boston: Harvard Business School.
Roover, Raymond de. 1966. The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397–1494. The North Library.
Sharp Paine, Lynn, and Michael A. Santoro. 2004. Forging the New Salomon. Boston: Harvard Business School.
Subramanian, Guyana, and Eliot Sherman. 2008. Lazard LLC. Boston: Harvard Business School.
Zeisberger, Claudia, Na Boon Chong, and Grace Wu. 2009. Bank United States: The Challenge of Compensation After the 2008 Financial Crisis. Fountainbleu: INSEAD.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dinesen, C. (2020). The Absence of Incentives to Manage: How the Wrong Incentives Resulted in Absent Management. In: Absent Management in Banking. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35824-2_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35824-2_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-35823-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-35824-2
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)