Abstract
Romania was probably the first European country to experience the great red fear. Russia’s pulling out of the war and the fear of red contagion led the Romanian authorities to ask, sometime later, for a separate peace with the Central Powers. Until the First World War, Russophobia animated a large part of the ruling class of Bucharest, who became obsessed with communism. The chapter aims to analyse the first post-war period in Romania and how it influenced the political evolution of the ruling classes and the intellectual life of the country. Some fundamental domestic policy choices (suspended between reformism and hard legislation aimed at maintaining “the bourgeois order”) and foreign policy will also be analysed: an alliance with France and Poland to define Romania as a Thermopylae of European civilization against Bolshevik “barbarism”.
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Notes
- 1.
On the evolution of the Romanian foreign policy, see Rudolf Dinu, ‘The Reluctant Ally. Romania’s Relations with the Central Empires and Italy at the beginning of the Great War (1914–1915)’, Revista Istorică, Vol. XXVII (1–2) (2016): 5–28.
- 2.
The Russian forces, approximately 1 million men, were organized into three armies: the IV, VI and IX placed under the command of General Vladimir Sakharov. According to Glenn Torrey, the Romanian front was the only one of the fronts where large-scale effective cooperation between Russia and its allies was realized. Cf. Glenn E. Torrey, The Revolutionary Russian Army and Romania – 1917 (Pittsburgh: The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, nr. 1003, 1995), II.
- 3.
See Norman Stone, The Eastern Front. 1914–1917 (London–New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 282–284. See also Pritt Buttar, The Splintered Empires: The Eastern Front 1917–21 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2017), 41–102.
- 4.
See Alexander Kerensky, La Rivoluzione russa (Milano: Edizioni Sunland, 1931), 223.
- 5.
For the progressive process of disintegration of the Russian army in the spring of 1917, see: Allan K. Wildman, The End of Russian Imperial Army: the Old Army and the Soldiers (March–April 1917) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), passim.
- 6.
The issue also shocked the main biographers of the future Bolshevik leader. See Pierre Broue, Rakovsky, ou la revolution dans tous les pays (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 113–117 and Francis Conte, Un revolutionnaire-diplomate: Christian Rakovsky. L’Union sovietique et l’Europe (1922–1941) (Paris: Éditions Lille, 1975), 129–137.
- 7.
Diplomatic Historical Archives Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Rome (hereinafter ASDMAE), Affari Politici (hereinafter AP)-Russia 1914–1917, Busta 168. Telegram sent by Fasciotti to Rome on 1 May 1918.
- 8.
See Stelian Tanase (ed.), Rakovski. Dosar secret (Bucureşti–Iaşi: Polirom, 2008), 14–16.
- 9.
ASDMAE, AP-Russia 1914–1917, Busta 168, Telegram to Rome, 4 May 1917.
- 10.
Ibid., telegram to Rome, 5 May 1917.
- 11.
ASDMAE, AP-Russia 1914–1917, Busta 168.
- 12.
See Torrey, The Revolutionary Russian Army and Romania, 3–4. In early June, Fasciotti telegraphed Rome, alarmed at the outcome of a conversation with a man named Ignatiev, a Russian delegate of the Red Cross, who confessed the desire of most of the soldiers to leave the front and go home; but above all, in certain fields “the soldiers of the two armies [Russian and German] do visit each other in the trenches, they are photographed together and exchange wishes for peace and brotherhood among all peoples […]”. ASDMAE, AP-Russia 1914–1917, Busta 168. Telegram to Rome on 1 June 1917.
- 13.
Ibid. In another telegram on that same 7 August, after briefing King Ferdinand about the situation, Fasciotti annotated “the situation of this Court and the Government is really tragic and worthy of the sincere interest of the Allies”. Ibid.
- 14.
Ibid., telegram from Fasciotti to Rome, 18 November 1917.
- 15.
The possibility of a separate Romanian peace towards the end of 1917 started to become more and more concrete. “Lahovary [Minister of Romania in Rome] expounded to me on behalf of Brătianu in what difficult situation Romania is, and how the Royal Family and the Government […] in a crunch between the maximalists and the central Empires […] asked, starting from then, that the allies recognize this need if the painful situation mentioned as possible, were to come true […] I said that I understood the Romanian situation [… but] under no circumstances and in no case the allies could recognize any separate peace […].” ASDMAE, Archivio Politico di Gabinetto 1915–1918, Romania (hereinafter AP-G.R./15–18), Busta 169, Dispatch posted by Sonnino to Fasciotti, 9 January 1918.
- 16.
On the role of Bessarabia in the Romanian National vision, see: Alberto Basciani, Irredentismo e diplomazia nel Regno di Romania e la questione della Bessarabia, in Fabio Todero (ed.), L’irredentismo armato. Gli irredentismi europei davanti alla guerra, Vol. II (Trieste: Istituto Regionale per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione Nazionale del Friuli Venezia Giulia, 2015), 407–430.
- 17.
See Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale—Bucureşti (hereinafter ANIC), Fond Casa Regală—“Diverse” Ferdinand, Dosar 12/1918. Reported without any date or any signature, posted most likely in February or March 1918 for the attention of the Minister of Education at that time, Simion Mehendiţi.
- 18.
On the events of Bessarabia, see Alberto Basciani, La difficile unione. La Bessarabia e la Grande Romania 1918–1940 (Rome: Aracne, 2007), 72–122.
- 19.
See Relaţiile Romano-Sovietice, Documente, Vol. I, 1917–1934 (hereafter RRS-I), Doc. 3, 6–7. In truth, the note by Trockij referred to the alleged violence suffered by members and sympathizers of the Bolshevik movement when between 8 and 9 December 1918, after a dramatic Crown Council, the Government and the high-ranking Romanian military decided to take firm measures against the Russian troops located in Iaşi and the rest of the country with a sudden action, disarming and arresting the most relevant and active political agitators. See Torrey, The Revolutionary Russian Army and Romania, 63–74.
- 20.
ASDMAE, AP-G.R./15–18, Busta 169, Telegram reviewed by Brătianu to the Allied Powers, 29 January 1918.
- 21.
RRS-I, Doc. 20, Rakovski Statement issued in Moscow, 30 March 1918.
- 22.
See Ludmila Rotari, Mişcarea subversivă din Basarabia în anii 1918–1924 (Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 2004), 67–98.
- 23.
ASDMAE, A.P. Russia 1914–1917, Busta 168, Dispatch sent by the Minister of France in Iaşi, Graillet, to the Quai d’Orsay, 31 October 1918. An identical message was sent to the respective Foreign Affairs Ministers by his Italian, American and British colleagues.
- 24.
Cf. Keith Hitchins, Romania 1866–1947 (Oxford–New York: Clarendon Press, 1994), 285.
- 25.
Cf. Francesco Guida, Al “servizio” della democrazia. Nicolae Petrescu Comnen e la Repubblica dei Consigli, in Alberto Basciani and Roberto Ruspanti (eds.), La fine della Grande Ungheria. Fra rivoluzione e reazione 1918–1920 (Trieste: Beit, 2010), 185–187.
- 26.
Some illusion of a different attitude on the part of the Great Powers was created by a visit to Budapest in April 1919 by a delegation of Allies headed by the Prime Minister of South Africa, Jan Christiaan Smuts, and Harold Nicolson, who, however, left the Hungarian capital after only a few days without having offered any concessions to the Bolshevik government. See Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished. Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923 (London: Allen Lane, 2016), 137.
- 27.
ANIC, Fond Direcţia Generală a Poliţiei (hereinafter FDGP), Dosar 30/1920. Disclosure of 3 March 1920.
- 28.
Ibid., the Report of the Tighina Police, 20 December 1920.
- 29.
Ibid., Dosar 60/1920. Report sent by the Chișinău Police Headquarters to Bucharest on 10 November 1920.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
See the first part from Alexandru-Murad Mironov, Vremea Încercărilor. Relaţiile româno-sovietice 1930–1940 (Bucureşti: Academia Româna–Institutul Naţional Pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2014), 52–82.
- 32.
RRS-I, Doc. 56, 77. The Romanian answer did not take too long to arrive. On 5 January 1921, Take Ionescu informed Čičerin about his Government’s satisfaction reconfirming that Romania “ne se mêlant en rien aux affaires de son voisin et ne nourrissaient aucune intention d’hostilité contre lui” RRS-I, Doc. 58, 80.
- 33.
Cf. Hitchins, Romania 1866–1947, 393.
- 34.
See Marin C. Stănescu, Moscova, Cominternul, filiera comunistă balcanică si România (Bucureşti: Silex, 1994), 13–14.
- 35.
Alina Tudor-Pavelescu (ed.), Copilăria Comunismului Românesc în Archiva Cominternului (Bucureşti: Arhivele Naționale ale României, 2001), Minutes of the Meeting of the VI Conference of the Balkan Communist Movement of 9 July 1924. Doc. 16, 139–152.
- 36.
Cf. Vitalie Ponomariov, ‘Unele aspecte ale activităţii comuniste în Basarabia în anii 1922–1923’, Analele Universităţii “Dunarea de Jos” din Galaţi – Seria 19, Istorie XVI (2017): 73–88.
- 37.
ANIC, FDGP, Dosar 60/1920, cited above.
- 38.
Ibid.
- 39.
Ibid.
- 40.
Ibid. On the action of the Zakordot revolt against Poland, see: Jan Jacek Bruski, Between Prometheism and Realpolitick. Poland and Soviet Ukraine, 1921–1926 (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 2016), 125.
- 41.
Cf. Vitalie Ponomariov, ‘Zakordot și activitatea subversivă comunistă din Basarabia în anii 1920–1921’, Danubius 2 (2017): 95–116.
- 42.
ANIC, FDGP, Dosar 60/1920, cited above. Communication of September 1, 1921 sent by the Polish Foreign Ministry to the Romanian Legation in Warsaw.
- 43.
On the terms of the military agreement concluded 3 March 1921, see România-Polonia, Relaţii diplomatice, Vol. I, 1918–1939 (Bucureşti: Ministerul Afacerilor Externe–Direcţia Arhivelor Diplomatice, 2003), Doc. 14, 18–24. On this occasion, the French press spoke about the new Thermopylae in Europe against the red menace. See Dan Diner, Raccontare il Novecento. Una storia politica (Milano: Garzanti, 2007), 82.
- 44.
Polish Documents on Foreign Policy (PDFP) (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2017), 11 November 1918–28 June 1919, Doc. 188, 443.
- 45.
Cf. Florin Anghel, ‘Eastern Boardlands as “cordon sanitaire”. Romanian and Polish Frontiers in Interwar Geopolitics’ Ananles Universitatis Marie Curie-Sklodowska, Second Section F, Vol. LXVII, 1 (2012): 54.
- 46.
These fears, it is important to emphasize, were not unjustified: for the Comintern the new Romania was only a reactionary state and just an instrument of the Capital and the Western powers, and the Romanian state simply had to be demolished. See Alberto Basciani, ‘Screditare un sistema, delegittimare uno Stato. “La Fédération Balkanique” e la Grande Romania 1924–1932’, Krypton. Identità, Potere, Rappresentazioni, 2 (2013): 76–85.
- 47.
See Francesco Guida, ‘Romania 1917–22: Aspirazioni nazionali e conflitti sociali’ in Franco Gaeta (ed.), Rivoluzione e reazione in Europa 1917–1924, Vol. II (Roma: Mondo Operaio–Edizioni Avanti!, 1978), 78–85.
- 48.
Cf. Stănescu, Moscova, Cominternul, filiera comunistă, 18–19.
- 49.
Cf. Vladimir Tismaneau, Stalinism for All Seasons: a Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 73.
- 50.
During the proceedings, a document was adopted. This reiterated PCdR’s support to a revolutionary struggle strategy that would, among other things, separate Dobruja, Bukovina, Bessarabia and also Transylvania from Romania.
- 51.
Ibid., 76.
- 52.
The trial held in Chişinău of those arrested following the events of Tatar Bunar, was followed by an exceptional witness, the famous French Communist writer Henri Barbusse, who gave his impressions in an article that was very well known in Europe for a long time: “Un formidable process politique”. This writing together with other writings would make up the book entitled Le bourreaux (Paris: Flammarion, 1926), 181–259. This reportage contributed much to putting the Balkan political regimes then in power in a negative light in the eyes of the Western liberal public.
- 53.
ANIC, Fond DGP, Dosar 54/1924; report of 24 September 1924 of the V Regiment of the Gendarmerie to the National Gendarmerie.
- 54.
Laurenţiu Constantiniu, Uniunea Sovietică între obsesia securităţii şi insecuritaţii (Bucureşti: Corint, 2010), 45. On the birth of the Autonomus Socialist Republic (ARS) of Moldavia, see Charles King, The Moldovans. Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institutions Press, 2000), 51–62.
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Basciani, A. (2020). The Other Thermopylae of Europe: Greater Romania and the Red Menace. In: Lomellini, V. (eds) The Rise of Bolshevism and its Impact on the Interwar International Order. Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35529-6_4
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