Abstract
This chapter brings together the findings from Chaps. 4 and 5 and reflects on configurations of the different aspects of council design. As soon as the federal government permanently chairs council meetings or provides the secretariat, federal unilateralism prevails. The chapter also discusses the role of the party system and other institutions and mechanisms outside the council system in regard to policy coordination in federal systems. Given that more than one council participate in most policy reforms, interactions of councils and different council types are also considered. Moreover, the chapter discusses the role of horizontal councils and their potential to contain federal encroachment. The last part of the chapter is dedicated to a broader generalization of the findings to other councils in different policy areas and other Western federations including younger ones such as Belgium and Spain.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Another federation in which the federal government dominates most vertical councils is Spain.
- 2.
https://www.estv.admin.ch/estv/de/home/allgemein/steuerpolitik/fachinformationen/abstimmungen/usr-3.html [last access: 8.08.2018].
References
Bednar, J. (2009). The Robust Federation. Principles of Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bolleyer, N., Swenden, W., & McEwen, N. (2014). A Theoretical Perspective on Multi-level Systems in Europe: Constitutional Power and Partisan Conflict. Comparative European Politics, 12(4–5), 367–383.
Bolleyer, N., & Thorlakson, L. (2012). Beyond Decentralization—The Comparative Study of Interdependence in Federal Systems. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 42(4), 566–591.
Braun, D., Ruiz-Palmero, C., & Schnabel, J. (2017). Consolidation Policies in Federal States: Conflicts and Solutions. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
Deschouwer, K. (2012). The Politics of Belgium. Governing a Divided Society. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fenna, A. (2008). Commonwealth Fiscal Power and Australian Federalism. University of New South Wales Law Journal, 31(2), 509–529.
Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C., & Shvetsova, O. (2004). Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gray, A. (2011). Federal Spending Power in Three Federations: Australia, Canada and the United States. Common Law World Review, 40(1), 13–39.
Painter, M. (1991). Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: An Institutional Analysis. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique, 24(2), 269–288.
Painter, M. (1996). The Council of Australian Governments and Intergovernmental Relations: A Case of Cooperative Federalism. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 26(2), 101–120.
Poirier, J., & Saunders, C. (2015). Conclusion: Comparative Experiences of Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems. In J. Poirier, C. Saunders, & J. Kincaid (Eds.), Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems. Comparative Structures and Dynamics (pp. 440–498). Don Mills: Oxford University Press.
Scharpf, F. W. (1988). The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration. Public Administration, 66, 239–278.
Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schnabel, J. (2019). Fiscal Consolidation in Federal Belgium: Collective Action Problem and Solutions. Politics of the Low Countries, 1(2), 120–140.
Thorlakson, L. (2009). Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in Seven Federations. Party Politics, 15(2), 157–177.
Trench, A. (2006). Intergovernmental Relations: In Search of a Theory. In S. L. Greer (Ed.), Territory, Democracy and Justice. Regionalism and Federalism in Western Democracies (pp. 224–256). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Vatter, A. (2016). Das politische System der Schweiz. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Watts, R. L. (1999). The Spending Power in Federal Systems: A Comparative Study. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University.
Watts, R. L. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Schnabel, J. (2020). The Intergovernmental Safeguard: Taking Stock. In: Managing Interdependencies in Federal Systems. Comparative Territorial Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35461-9_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35461-9_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-35460-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-35461-9
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)