Abstract
By introducing the concept of disruptive unilateralism, this chapter explains why the mutual dependence of the governments of a federation in public policy-making may undermine federal stability. It distinguishes three different ways in which unilateral policy making by one government restricts the autonomy of the other governments of a federation, which leads to federal instability: individual policy-making, federal imposition, and non-compliance. The extent to which governments solve policy problems unilaterally or jointly when policy problems cut across jurisdictions indicates intergovernmental councils’ (in)effectiveness as federal safeguards.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Bakvis, H., & Brown, D. (2010). Policy Coordination in Federal Systems: Comparing Intergovernmental Processes and Outcomes in Canada and the United States. Publius, 40(3), 484–507.
Bednar, J. (2009). The Robust Federation. Principles of Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Benz, A., & Broschek, J. (2013). Federal Dynamics: Introduction. In A. Benz & J. Broschek (Eds.), Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and Varieties of Federalism (pp. 1–23). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Birch, A. H. (1955). Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation in Canada, Australia, and the United States. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bolleyer, N., & Thorlakson, L. (2012). Beyond Decentralization—The Comparative Study of Interdependence in Federal Systems. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 42(4), 566–591.
Braun, D. (2011). How Centralized Federations Avoid Over-Centralization. Regional & Federal Studies, 21(1), 35–54.
Braun, D., Ruiz-Palmero, C., & Schnabel, J. (2017). Consolidation Policies in Federal States: Conflicts and Solutions. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
de Figueiredo, R. J. P., & Weingast, B. R. (2005). Self-Enforcing Federalism. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 21(1), 103–135.
Elazar, D. J. (1987). Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press.
Hueglin, T. O., & Fenna, A. (2015). Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry (2nd ed.). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Landau, M. (1973). Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 3(2), 173–196.
Oates, W. E. (1999). An Essay on Fiscal Federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), 1120–1149.
Opeskin, B. R. (2001). Mechanisms for Intergovernmental Relations in Federations. International Social Science Journal, 53(167), 129–138.
Riker, W. H. (1964). Federalism. Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.
Rodden, J. (2006). Federalism. In B. R. Weingast & D. A. Wittman (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (pp. 357–370). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rodden, J., Eskeland, G. S., & Litvack, J. (Eds.). (2003). Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Scharpf, F. W. (1988). The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration. Public Administration, 66, 239–278.
Scharpf, F. W. (1994). Games Real Actors Could Play. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6(1), 27–53.
Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games Real Actors Play. Actor-centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wallner, J. (2014). Learning to School. Federalism and Public Schooling in Canada. Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press.
Watts, R. L. (1999). The Spending Power in Federal Systems: A Comparative Study. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University.
Watts, R. L. (2003). Intergovernmental Councils in Federations. Constructive and Co-Operative Federalism?, 2, 1–9.
Watts, R. L. (2006). Origins of Cooperative and Competitive Federalism. In S. L. Greer (Ed.), Territory, Democracy and Justice. Regionalism and Federalism in Western Democracies (pp. 201–223). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Watts, R. L. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Schnabel, J. (2020). The Dynamic Stability of Federal Systems. In: Managing Interdependencies in Federal Systems. Comparative Territorial Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35461-9_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35461-9_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-35460-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-35461-9
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)