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Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Active Intellectual Cognition

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Active Cognition

Part of the book series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind ((SHPM,volume 23))

Abstract

Since Antiquity, “active cognition” has been a problematic notion in Aristotelian scholarship. Part of the problem is the definition of what counts as “active”. In the first part of this paper I shall offer a short survey on various contenders for “active” perceptual cognition defended in recent interpretations of Aristotle, by way of introduction to the more complicated problems of “active” intellectual cognition. In the second part of the paper I will offer—in outline—my interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of intellectual cognition, which takes the most recent findings in the area of perceptual cognition as a starting point. Here I pursue the analogy that Aristotle sets up between perception and intellection throughout the De anima. In the third part of the paper I shall examine a number of influential accounts of active intellectual cognition found in the corpus of Alexander of Aphrodisias, in particular Mantissa 2–5 (also known as De intellectu). These accounts each develop the analogies offered in Aristotle’s De anima III.5 in their own way.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The central chapter where Aristotle applies, and adapts, the notions of potentiality and actuality to psychology is De anima II.5, for which see, e.g., Burnyeat (2002) and Johansen (2012). For my own approach to the topic see De Haas (2018b).

  2. 2.

    See Aristotle, De anima II.4–12. For comprehensive discussions of the senses and their respective objects see, e.g., Johansen (1997) and Everson (1997).

  3. 3.

    See Aristotle, De anima II.5.417a30–b16.

  4. 4.

    See Aristotle, De anima III.7.431a4-7; III.8.431b24–432a2.

  5. 5.

    For a concise description see, e.g., Johansen (2002), Corcilius (2014, 35–36 and 46–47), quoting Phys. VII.2.244b2–245a11.

  6. 6.

    See Corcilius (2014, 34).

  7. 7.

    See Aristotle, De anima II.5.417b18–27; II.7.418a26–b3 and 419a10–11 (colour) (with Sens. 2.438b2–16; Sens. 3.439a6–b1); De anima II.8.420a3–19 (sound); II.10.422b15–16; III.7.431a17–20 (despite the state of the text); Sens. 6.445b3–13.

  8. 8.

    See Aristotle, De anima II.12, esp. 424a21–28; 424b1–3. Corcilius (2014, 37) claims that when logoi, which he takes to be proportions, are actually perceived in the central organ there is no underlying matter or motion of which such a quality is an inherent quality. However, in view of passages in which the intellect seems to be able to further isolate intelligible forms from perceived forms (De anima III.7.431b1–3; III.8.432a3–14) this interpretation is probably too simple. Barker (1981) warns against taking logos as proportion in all cases.

  9. 9.

    Johansen (2002, 182–183), with De generatione animalium V.1.780a4–13.

  10. 10.

    Johansen (2002, 184).

  11. 11.

    See, e.g., Aristotle, De anima II.12.424a28–32. I cannot here go into the discussion whether a perceptual mean is located in the sense organ (too), which is what would arguably be damaged by strong impulses, rather than, or in addition to, the mean in the central sense organ.

  12. 12.

    De Haas (2009, esp. 59–61), quoting Somn. 2.455a12–16.

  13. 13.

    For thought, see De Haas (2009, 63–68).

  14. 14.

    See Aristotle, De anima II.2.414a11–12; III.2.426a2–6. This is an application to psychology of the general rule of Phys. III.3, for which see Coope (2005).

  15. 15.

    See, e.g., Aristotle, De anima II.6.418a14–15; II.11.424a4–6; III.2.426b8–427a16; III.3.427a17–21, 428a1–4; III.9.432a15–16; MA 6.700b17–22; and not least APo II.19.99b35. For an earlier expression of my view of discrimination in Aristotle see De Haas (2005).

  16. 16.

    For a concise statement of the options defended in later Antiquity see Sorabji (2004, vol. 1, 33–43).

  17. 17.

    Ebert (1983).

  18. 18.

    Corcilius (2014). However, Corcilius’ own analysis discussed below describes a form of “juxtaposition” and “contrast” that comes close to what some interpreters (including the author of this paper) meant when they used the term “comparison”.

  19. 19.

    Contrast Johansen (2006). This is not to deny, of course, that in Aristotle the central sense organ, as well as the mind, can make comparisons in a single act of perception or thought. Cf. Aristotle, De anima III.2.426b8–427a16; for thought see, e.g., III.6. For the multiple functions of the common sense see, e.g., Gregori´c (2007).

  20. 20.

    Corcilius (2014) and Corcilius and Gregori´c (2013). See also Bradshaw (1997) and Johansen (2002, 177–182).

  21. 21.

    Corcilius (2014, 37 and 47–48): “Perceptual discrimination—the separation of the perceptible form from its matter—is the production of an actual object of perception in the organism. It happens exactly in the moment at which a perceptible input reaches the endpoint of its motion toward the perceptual center of the animal […] and before it passes that point and, perhaps, reverses into a different region of the body: the point at which the motions literally stop moving in direction of the perceptual center is where the perceptual soul’s neutral value is actualised. The resulting juxtaposition of the incoming perceptible value with the soul’s neutral value generates a contrast and this contrast is the actual sense object.” For more details see Corcilius and Gregori´c (2013).

  22. 22.

    As Aristotle calls it at De anima III.7.431a10–11: τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τ῀ηͺ αἰσθητικ῀ηͺ μεσότητι.

  23. 23.

    See Corcilius and Gregori´c (2013, 60–64).

  24. 24.

    This system does not seem to be fail proof: animals (including humans) sometimes eat food that is harmful to them, and they have to build experience to learn to avoid these.

  25. 25.

    See Aristotle, De anima III.7.431a14–17.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Aristotle, De anima II.12.424a32–b2.

  27. 27.

    See Polansky (1999).

  28. 28.

    For a more rudimentary version of this interpretation, see De Haas (2005, 337–342).

  29. 29.

    See Aristotle, De anima III.4, esp. 429a22–24 and 429b31–430a2.

  30. 30.

    See Aristotle, De anima III.3.427b17–21; Mem. 2.

  31. 31.

    See Aristotle, APo II.19.100a13–14: “And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this.” (ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὖσα οἵα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο), with 100b3-5: “Thus it is clear that it is necessary for us to become familiar with the primitives by induction; for perception too instils the universal in this way.” (δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγ῀ηͺ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ) (Tr. RevOT). See De Haas (2002) for a reading of this and similar texts, and their reception in later philosophy.

  32. 32.

    See, e.g., Aristotle, EN III.5, esp. 1113b3–14 and 1114a3–1114a21.

  33. 33.

    For an excellent introduction to this chapter, with an interpretation that carefully balances the “divine” and “human” interpretations of productive intellect, see now Shields (2016).

  34. 34.

    I substituted ‘intellect’ for ‘thought’ in the RevOT translation.

  35. 35.

    See the title of Kosman (1992).

  36. 36.

    See Aristotle, De anima II.7.418b3–419a21 on light, with Sens. 3.439a13–b18 and 6.446b27–447a11.

  37. 37.

    This reading is inspired by Polansky (1999), although I depart from his interpretation in various ways.

  38. 38.

    Aristotle, De anima III.3.428b10–429a9.

  39. 39.

    Aristotle, De anima III.7.431a14–17; III.8.432a7–10.

  40. 40.

    Aristotle, De anima III.7.431b6–10.

  41. 41.

    Aristotle, De anima III.8.432a7–10.

  42. 42.

    I.e., in perceptibles, or from memory from which thought can conjure them up at will.

  43. 43.

    On Alexander of Aphrodisias in general see Sharples (1987), on intellect see pp. 1204–1214. For the Mantissa see Accattino and Cobetto Ghiggia (2005), Sharples (2004, 2008). Schroeder and Todd (1990) contains the first pioneering translation and commentary of De intellectu, as I shall henceforth call it. For the debate on its provenance see also Schroeder (1997).

  44. 44.

    For a survey see, e.g., Blumenthal (1987) and Kessler (2011). For a sample of relevant texts from later ancient commentators, see Sorabji (2004, 102–118).

  45. 45.

    I here follow the labelling of Sharples (2004), who discusses its rationale in the footnotes ad loc.

  46. 46.

    For Themistius, who has preserved for us Theophrastus’ list of questions in full (In DA, 107, 30–108, 18 = FGH&S 307A, with Huby and Gutas (1999, 114–217)), see Gabbe (2008b) and De Haas (2018a). For Themistius’ influence on the later tradition see Pines (1987) and Magrin (2011).

  47. 47.

    De int. 106,20; cf. Alex. ap. Philop., In DA, 15, 65–9; refuted in 106, 20–29; compare Alexander, DA, 83, 13–84, 14.

  48. 48.

    Cf. Alexander, DA, 80, 16–92, 11. For a more detailed account of my reading of Alexander’s De anima in this respect, see De Haas (2019). The concept of a higher eternally active intellect actualising human potential intellects already appears in Alcinous’ Didaskalikos, 10, 164.18–23 H.

  49. 49.

    This argument still plays an important role in modern adherents of this interpretation, e.g., Frede (1996) and Caston (1999).

  50. 50.

    See Tuominen (2010).

  51. 51.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 170, 7–8: ὁ νοῦς ἀντίληψις τις καὶ κρίσις τῶν νοητῶν, οὐδὲν αὐτὸν οἷον τε εἶναι τῶν κρινομένων ὑπ΄ αὐτοῦ.

  52. 52.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 107, 21–22: ὁ ἤδη νοῶν καὶ ἕξιν ἔχων τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ δυνάμενος τὰ εἴδη τῶν νοητῶν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν λαμβάνειν.

  53. 53.

    See Alexander, DA, 81, 22–83, 13. The commentary tradition derived this different (state of) intellect from Aristotle, De anima I.4.408b27–29, against any modern understanding of that passage.

  54. 54.

    See Alexander, DA, 83, 13–84, 14.

  55. 55.

    For a different interpretation see Tuominen (2006).

  56. 56.

    For the use of the analogy of light in Alexander cf. Schroeder (1981).

  57. 57.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 107, 33–34: ἕξιν ἐμποιῶν αὐτ῀ωͺ τὴν νοητικήν.

  58. 58.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 108, 14–15: ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τὸ εἶδος τοῦ νοουμένου λαμβάνων καὶ χωρίζων αὐτὸ τῆς ὕλης κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν ἐκεῖνό τε νοητὸν ποιεῖ καὶ νοῦς αὐτὸς κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν γίνεται.

  59. 59.

    See previous note.

  60. 60.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 109, 22–23: γίνεται οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὑτὸν νοῶν ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑλικοῦ νοῦ προΪών.

  61. 61.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 107, 34–108, 3; 108, 16–110, 3.

  62. 62.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 108, 21–22: κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτο εἶδος ἀναφορὰν.

  63. 63.

    See, Alexander, De intellectu, 108, 19–26; 112, 3–4. Cf. Alexander, DA, 87, 24–88, 8 (with the actual intelligibles in the plural); 89, 19–90, 2; 90, 11–91, 6: if we want to have something divine in us, and become immortal, we must think the divine intellect!

  64. 64.

    This is at least a logical order, if not a temporal one.

  65. 65.

    Cf. Sharples (1987, 1212n133); see Atticus Fragm. 7.75ff Des Places.

  66. 66.

    See Sharples (2004, 38n92) for other views on the relationship between B and C, and B1–B2, and C1–C2 respectively.

  67. 67.

    See Opsomer and Sharples (2000) for the argument that Aristotle (110, 4) is the Stagirite (as in 110, 5).

  68. 68.

    This may go back to Theophrastus’ theory of intellect as a mixture or composite, see Gabbe (2008b).

  69. 69.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 110, 15–16: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ποιητικόν τι εἶναί τινος μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ.

  70. 70.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 110, 18–20: αὕτη γὰρ ἐνέργεια τοῦ νοῦ, τὰ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθητὰ τ῀ηͺ αὑτοῦ δυνάμει χωρίσαι καὶ ἀφελεῖν τούτων, σὺν οἷς ὄντα ἐστὶν αἰσθητά, καὶ ὁρίσασθαι καθ᾿ αὑτά.

  71. 71.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 110, 30–31: τοῦτο δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς τελειούμενος καὶ αὐξόμενος νοεῖ.

  72. 72.

    The author compares the natural development of the ability to walk that starts from birth, and does not involve affection (De intellectu, 110, 31–111, 1).

  73. 73.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 111, 2–8: οὐ γὰρ παθητικὸς ὁ νοῦς τ῀ηͺ αὑτοῦ φύσει, ὡς ὑπὸ ἄλλου γίνεσθαι καὶ πάσχειν, καθάπερ ἡ αἴσθησις. ὑπεναντίως γὰρ ἔχει. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις κατὰ πάθος, παθητικὸν γάρ, καὶ ἡ ἀντίληψις αὐτ῀ηͺ διὰ πάθους, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ποιητικόν. νοητικὸς γὰρ ὢν τῶν πλείστων ἅμα καὶ ποιητὴς ἵνα αὐτὰ νοήσῃ γίνεται, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ τοῦτό τις καὶ τὸν νοῦν βούλοιτο παθητικὸν λέγειν, καθὸ ληπτικός ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν. πάσχειν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ λαμβάνειν. 111, 11–15: ὥστε εἰ κοινὸν μέν ἐστιν αὐτ῀ωͺ πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸ τῶν εἰδῶν εἶναι ληπτικ῀ωͺ, εἰ καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἴδιον δὲ τὸ ποιητικ῀ωͺ εἶναι τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν ἃ λαμβάνει, ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἂν μᾶλλον ὁρίζοιτο. ὥστε ποιητικὸν ἄν, οὐ παθητικὸν ὁ νοῦς εἴη.

  74. 74.

    At De intellectu, 111, 6 thinking and production are presented as occurring at the same time (ἅμα).

  75. 75.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 112, 4–5: ἴδιον γὰρ τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ποιητικόν, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν αὐτ῀ωͺ ἐνεργεῖν ἐστιν οὐ πάσχειν.

  76. 76.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 111, 27–112, 4.

  77. 77.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 111, 25–27. Note the echo of De anima III.5.430a25: “without it nothing thinks”.

  78. 78.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 111, 32–36.

  79. 79.

    Alexander, De intellectu, 111, 29–32: τοῦτο δὴ τ῀ηͺ αὑτοῦ φύσει νοητὸν ὂν ἐν τ῀ωͺ νοοῦντι γενόμενον διὰ τοῦ νοηθῆναι [1] νοῦς τέ ἐστι γεγενημένος ἐν τ῀ωͺ νοοῦντι καὶ [2] θύραθεν νοεῖται καὶ [3] ἀθάνατος καὶ [4] ἐντίθησιν τὴν ἕξιν τ῀ωͺ ὑλικ῀ωͺ ὥστε νοεῖν τὰ δυνάμει νοητά.

  80. 80.

    Cf. Sharples (2004, 37n86).

  81. 81.

    Sections [b] and [c] reflect phrases of De anima III.5.430a17–18 and 22–23.

  82. 82.

    This is elaborately confirmed in 112, 21–30, which contains the analogy of a craftsman who alternates using or not using instruments, without ceasing to be a craftsman in actuality. Here Aristotle’s craft analogy has borne another fruit. Since these views sit well with a Platonic world view, they seem to confirm the possibility that Atticus authored the argument.

  83. 83.

    Sharples (2004, 42–43 with nn. 107–109). Even if these suggestions originate with Alexander (De intellectu 112, 16–21); they are not in line with his own world view.

  84. 84.

    The objection [2] that the intellect from without changes place is now quickly dealt with in conformity with the reported view, by pointing out that intellect is “everywhere” rather than in a place. When the body it has been using as its instrument perishes, it continues to exist in actuality, like a craftsman whose craft remains unaffected once he has laid down the tools of his trade for a while (De intellectu, 112, 31–113, 2).

  85. 85.

    The interpretation of Themistius is similar, but preserves human responsibility for thinking and action, see Gabbe (2008a) and De Haas (2018a). For the the notion of composition in this context see Gabbe (2008b).

  86. 86.

    Alexander, DA, 89, 9–11: ἔτι, εἰ ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, εἴη ἂν καὶ ταύτῃ ποιητικός, ᾗ αὐτὸς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς νοουμένοις.

  87. 87.

    Alexander, DA, 89, 11–18.

  88. 88.

    Incidentally, in its extreme form it is unlikely to be upheld by a Platonist such as Atticus—which might suggest that the further elaboration of a creative and omnipresent god in the direction of the Stoic view is already part of the Peripatetic rebuttal.

  89. 89.

    Though not in making god material as Moraux (1942, 156–157) rightly observed.

  90. 90.

    It is not necessary that actualisation occurs instantly at birth—we may need to develop into suitable instruments of divine intellect first.

  91. 91.

    This is the view embraced earlier in De intellectu, and in Alexander’s De anima, as we have seen above. In this formulation it seems to rule out once more that the divine intellect is our first object of thought after birth, and that thinking the divine intellect enables us to abstract forms.

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  1. Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands

    Frans A. J. de Haas

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  1. Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France

    Véronique Decaix

  2. Gothenburg University (FLoV), Gothenburg, Sweden

    Ana María Mora-Márquez

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de Haas, F.A.J. (2020). Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Active Intellectual Cognition. In: Decaix, V., Mora-Márquez, A. (eds) Active Cognition. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35304-9_2

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