Abstract
In this introduction, we explain how the chapters in this volume give support to the idea that different accounts of active cognition in the history of philosophy directly or indirectly respond to Aristotle’s account of cognition in his De anima.
This volume was produced with the financial support of Riksbanken Jubileumsfond, Sweden. A first version of some of the articles gathered here was prepared for the workshop “Activity and Passivity in Cognition”, organised in the framework of the research programme “Representation and Reality. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on the Aristotelian Tradition” (funded by Riksbanken Jubileumsfond) at the University of Gothenburg (Sweden). Their common goal was to discuss the different ways in which Aristotle’s account of cognition, according to which thinking is some sort of affection, was variously discussed and criticised in the history of Western philosophy. We would like to thank Colin Guthrie King for his valuable help with the last version of this introduction.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Cf. Aristotle, De anima III.4.429a13–15.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
See Davidson (1992).
- 6.
- 7.
See Ierodiakonou (2016).
- 8.
Cf. Aristotle, GA 736b27.
- 9.
Alexander, DA, 98.9–10.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
See Davidson (1992).
- 13.
On the controversy about the relation between Alexander and Plotinus, see Schroeder (1984).
- 14.
- 15.
See Gerson (2018).
- 16.
See Hutchinson (2018, 143).
- 17.
Augustine, Confessionum, VII, 8, VII, 20.
- 18.
Cf. Augustine, De quantitate animae, XXIII, 41: “[…] quod patitur sensus non laetere animam […]”; see O’Daly (1987).
- 19.
See, e.g., Wassmer (1960); cf. Augustine, De civitate dei, X, 2, 1.
- 20.
Cf. Augustine, De trinitate, X, X, 19.
- 21.
For Olivi’s theory of cognition, see Toivanen (2013).
- 22.
Peter John Olivi, In Sent., II, q.58, 413: “Sed intelligere et velle, secundum hoc quod active sumuntur, potius denominant mentem nostram et potentias nostras quam obiecta sua vel quam aliqua alia agentia, nos enim dicimur volentes et intelligentes, obiecta vero solum dicuntur intellecta et volita”.
- 23.
Peter John Olivi, In Sent., II, q.72, 9: “[…] quantumcumque potentia cognitiva per habitum et species ab actione cognitiva differente sit informata, non potest in actionem cognitivam exire, nisi prius intendat actualiter in obiectum, ita quod aspectus suae intentionis sit actualiter conversus et directus in illud.”
- 24.
Peter John Olivi, In Sent., II, q.58, 419: “[…] non omne quod necessario praeexigitur ad productionem alicuius est causa effectiva ipsius […]. Et sic dico quod obiecta voluntatis liberae […] non praeexiguntur ad eius actus liberos ad aliquid efficiendum seu coefficiendum in ipsis actibus, sed solum ad terminandum aspectum potentiae agentis […]”.
- 25.
- 26.
Peter John Olivi, In Sent., II, q.58, 477–478: “[…] potentiae habent per se sufficientem virtutem activam suorum actuum absque aliqua cooperatione seu coefficientia facta ab obiectis seu speciebus […] quia fere omnes rationes quibus probatur aut probari potest potentiam intellectivam et alias potentias inferiores non esse sufficienter activas respectu actuum suorum possunt aeque bene adduci ad probandum hoc ipsum […] de voluntate, in quantum est libera […]. Approbare autem sic huiusmodi rationes est idem quod dicere illas rationes esse veras et necessarias quibus concluditur voluntatem nullo modo esse liberam […]. Quod est destruere […] omnem fidem et legem et gratiam et culpam et omne bonum.”
- 27.
See Decaix (Forthcoming).
- 28.
Brentano (1867).
- 29.
See Mora-M´arquez (2019).
- 30.
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Decaix, V., Mora-Márquez, A.M. (2020). Introduction. In: Decaix, V., Mora-Márquez, A. (eds) Active Cognition. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35304-9_1
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