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Subversion-Resistant Simulation (Knowledge) Sound NIZKs

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Book cover Cryptography and Coding (IMACC 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11929))

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Abstract

In ASIACRYPT 2016, Bellare, Fuchsbauer and Scafuro studied security of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments in the face of parameter subversion. They showed that achieving subversion soundness (soundness without trusting to the third party) and standard zero-knowledge is impossible at the same time. On the positive side, in the best case, they showed that one can achieve subversion zero-knowledge (zero-knowledge without trusting to the third party) and soundness at the same time. In this paper, we show that one can amplify their best positive result and construct NIZK arguments that can achieve subversion zero-knowledge and simulation (knowledge) soundness at the same time. Simulation (knowledge) soundness is a stronger notion in comparison with (knowledge) soundness, as it also guarantees non-malleability of proofs. Such stronger security guarantee is a must in practical systems. To prove the result, we show that given a NIZK argument that achieves Sub-ZK and (knowledge) soundness, one can use an OR-based construction to define a new language and build a NIZK argument that will guarantee Sub-ZK and simulation (knowledge) soundness at the same time. We instantiate the construction with the state-of-the-art zk-SNARK proposed by Groth [Eurocrypt 2016] and obtain an efficient SNARK that guarantees Sub-ZK and simulation knowledge soundness.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A framework with practically optimized primitives which given a sound NIZK lifts it to a universally composable or more precisely a black-box simulation extractable NIZK argument [KZM+15].

  2. 2.

    It states that in an asymetric bilinear group, given \(\left[ 1\right] _{1}\) and \(\left[ 1\right] _{1}\), if an adversary manages to come out with \(\left[ a\right] _{1}\) and \(\left[ a\right] _{2}\), he must know a. Knowing a is formalized by showing that there exists an efficient non-black-box extractor that given access to source code and random coins of the adversary, it can extract a [Dam92].

  3. 3.

    It states that in a symmetric bilinear group, given \(\left[ 1\right] _{1}\), if an adversary manages to come out with \(\left[ a\right] _{1}\) and \(\left[ a^2\right] _{1}\), he must know a.

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Acknowledgement

This work was supported in part by the Estonian Research Council grant PRG49.

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  1. University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia

    Karim Baghery

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  1. Karim Baghery
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Correspondence to Karim Baghery .

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  1. Royal Holloway, University of London, London, UK

    Martin Albrecht

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Baghery, K. (2019). Subversion-Resistant Simulation (Knowledge) Sound NIZKs. In: Albrecht, M. (eds) Cryptography and Coding. IMACC 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11929. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_3

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