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Regional Contestation of China’s Order-Building Project

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Order, Contestation and Ontological Security-Seeking in the South China Sea

Part of the book series: Governance, Security and Development ((GSD))

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Abstract

This chapter examines the social legitimacy of China’s order-building project in the South China Sea. It argues that all major interested regional parties, including non-Chinese specialists, regional states and the US, to the maritime and territorial disputes have challenged, by virtue of various legal, discursive and diplomatic means, the legitimacy of China’s expansionist order. What China has done and said in its discursive legitimation strategy are interpreted as an illegitimate revisionist rising power, aiming to unsettle the ‘liberal’ status quo unilaterally with little regard to historical evidence unfavourable to China’s claims, international treaty and international law. The non-recognition of China’s claims to the territories as well as historic rights in the South China Sea by regional states and the US exacerbates China’s ontological insecurity and anxiety. Needing biographical continuity of the self, China decides to stick to its self-comforting historical narrative and claims.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ikenberry, After Victory.

  2. 2.

    The most detailed ones are: Gao and Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea”; Shen, “International Law Rules and Historical Evidences Supporting China’s Title to the South China Sea Islands”; Shen, “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands.”

  3. 3.

    C. J. Jenner, “Conclusion: History, Strategy and the South China Sea,” in The South China Sea: A Crucible of Regional Cooperation or Conflict-Making Sovereignty Claims?, eds. C. J. Jenner and Tran Truong Thuy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 292–334 at 308–309.

  4. 4.

    It is worth noting that the Chinese were not cognisant of the European Westphalian concept and practice of sovereignty until the first Anglo-Chinese Opium War of 1839–1842. The Chinese concept of sovereignty, known in the literature as Eastphalian sovereignty, was a product of the Chinese empire; it was universal and absolute in both its external and internal aspects. Imperial China held that it was at the centre of the political universe (Andrew Coleman and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, “‘Westphalian’ Meets ‘Eastphalian’ Sovereignty: China in a Globalized World,” Asian Journal of International Law 3, no. 2 (2013): 237–269 at 249–255). In the Confucian political order, the Emperor and his officials ruled over people rather than territorial space (Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 51).

  5. 5.

    Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm.”

  6. 6.

    Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 29–32.

  7. 7.

    Ryan Mitchell, “An International Commission of Inquiry for the South China Sea: Defining the Law of Sovereignty to Determine the Chance for Peace,” Vanderbilt Journal of Translational Law 49, no. 3 (2016): 749–817 at 778, 781.

  8. 8.

    They were Funan, Champa, Srivijaya, Angkor, Majapahit and Melaka (Malacca). Hayton, The South China Sea, 10–28; Bill Hayton, “When Good Lawyers Write Bad History: Unreliable Evidence and the South China Sea Territorial Dispute,” Ocean Development & International Law 48, no. 1 (2017): 17–34 at 21; Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 10–11; Stein Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable? A Historical Approach,” Asian Journal of Social Science 30, no. 3 (2002): 570–601 at 572–574.

  9. 9.

    It was, however, not due to China’s design but to the invasion of the Song dynasty by the Jurchens from Manchuria. The Song had to retreat to the south of the Yangtze. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 13.

  10. 10.

    Jung-Pang Lo, “The Emergence of China as a Sea Power during the Late Sung and Early Yuan Periods,” Far Eastern Quarterly 14, no. 4 (1955): 489–503 at 502.

  11. 11.

    Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 14–15.

  12. 12.

    Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 20.

  13. 13.

    Ulises Granados, “The South China Sea and Its Coral Reefs During the Ming and Qing Dynasties: Levels of Geographical Knowledge and Political Control,” East Asian History, nos. 32/33 (2006/2007): 109–128 at 119–122; Li Kangying, The Ming Maritime Trade Policy in Transition, 1368–1567 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010), 3; Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 20–22, 32; Wang Gungwu, “Ming Foreign Relations: Southeast Asia,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 8: The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 2, eds. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 301–332 at 302, 326. That may explain why the coverage of the Ming’s expeditions and naval patrols by Shen is brief. Shen, “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands,” 112, 125.

  14. 14.

    Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 14–15. For China’s decline as a naval power, see C. P. Fitzgerald, The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People: “Southern Fields and Southern Ocean” (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1972), 100–116; Lo, “The Emergence of China as a Sea Power during the late Sung and early Yuan periods”; Jung-pang Lo, “The Decline of the Early Ming Navy,” Oriens Extremus 5, no. 2 (1958): 149–168.

  15. 15.

    Léonard Blussé, “Chinese Century: The Eighteenth Century in the China Sea Region,” Archipel 58 (1999): 107–129. Between 1656 and 1684, the Qing banned maritime trade and launched a ‘scorched earth’ campaign along its southern coast. Hayton, The South China Sea, 42–43; Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 32–34. See also Stein Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” Modern Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (2006): 1–57 at 1–2n1.

  16. 16.

    Chris P. C. Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line: China’s Claim in the South China Sea, 1946–1974,” Modern China 42, no. 1 (2016): 38–72 at 50–52; Granados, “The South China Sea and Its Coral Reefs During the Ming and Qing Dynasties,” 124, 128; Shen, “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands,” 133; Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable?” 573–574. A clear distinction between the two archipelagos was not made in Chinese documents (Chemillier-Grandreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 57). See also the discussion of wanli shitang (literally meaning 10,000-li stone embankment) in Hayton, The South China Sea, 34, 43. Li was a unit of length in China, of which the precise length had varied over time. The phrases, wanli changsha (10,000-li long sand) and qianli shitang (1000-li stone embankment), appeared in China’s historical writings (Granados, “The South China Sea and Its Coral Reefs During the Ming and Qing Dynasties,” 111–119).

  17. 17.

    Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 40.

  18. 18.

    Chemillier-Grandreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 66. Before the formation of the French Indochina in 1887, Vietnam was known in the West as Annam. After 1887, Vietnam was composed of Tonkin in the north, Annam in the central and Cochinchina in the south.

  19. 19.

    Chemillier-Grandreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 66–79; Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Strategy of ‘Cooperating and Struggling’ with China over Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3, no. 2 (2016): 200–220 at 202; Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 43; Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” 4. But China regarded Vietnam of the Nguyen dynasty as a junior, tributary state in the Sino-centric world which assigned supreme authority to China (Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 62).

  20. 20.

    Hayton, The South China Sea, 53; Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable?” 574–575; Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” 1–2.

  21. 21.

    John L. Rawlinson, China’s Struggle for Naval Development, 1839–1895 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), Chap. 1.

  22. 22.

    Hayton, The South China Sea, 37–40; Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable?” 575–576.

  23. 23.

    Chemillier-Grandreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 50, 81.

  24. 24.

    Tek-Kuang Chang, “China’s Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 23, no. 3 (1991): 399–420 at 411, 414–415.

  25. 25.

    This issue has been discussed extensively in the literature. See: Chemillier-Grandreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 81–86; Hungdah Chiu and Choon-Ho Park, “Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands,” Ocean Development & International Law 1, no. 1 (1975): 1–28 at 13; Cordner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea,” 62, 64; Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands Dispute,” 9 (see also the map on p. 2); Hayton, “When Good Lawyers Write Bad History,” 23–24; Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, China versus Vietnam: An Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South China Sea. CNA Occasional Paper August 2014, 86, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/iop-2014-u-008433.pdf (accessed August 28, 2017); Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 62; Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999), 21; Van Dyke and Bennett, “Islands and the Delimitation of Ocean Space in the South China Sea,” 64.

  26. 26.

    Michael Bennett, “The People’s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute,” Stanford Journal of International Law 28, no. 2 (1992): 425–450, at 447.

  27. 27.

    Chemillier-Grandreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 98; Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 133.

  28. 28.

    Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 52–54. The Paracels were put under the administration of Hainan Island in 1909 (Ulises Granados, “As China Meets the Southern Sea Frontier: Ocean Identity in the Making,” Pacific Affairs 78, no. 3 (2005): 443–461 at 448).

  29. 29.

    Chemillier-Grandreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 75, 99; Granados, “As China Meets the Southern Sea Frontier,” 447; Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 133–140; Shen, “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands,” 135 (although Shen argues that the Qing navy reached the Spratlys and it was not China’s first attempt to send troops to the Spratlys, other accounts dispute the claim that the Qing troops went as far as the Spratlys); Chang, “China’s Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands,” 405; Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands Dispute,” 9; Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 52–54; Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable?” 576.

  30. 30.

    Hayton, “When Good Lawyers Write Bad History,” 25.

  31. 31.

    Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 139.

  32. 32.

    Granados, “The South China Sea and Its Coral Reefs During the Ming and Qing Dynasties,” 122.

  33. 33.

    Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line,” 50; Keyuan Zou, “The South China Sea,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, eds. Rothwell et al., 626–646 at 633.

  34. 34.

    The report was written by Professor Shen Pengfei of the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, Guangdong. Cordner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea,” 62; Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands Dispute,” 9; Granados, “As China Meets the Southern Sea Frontier,” 450; Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 141–142; Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 68.

  35. 35.

    Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 63.

  36. 36.

    Chemillier-Grandreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 103.

  37. 37.

    Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 145–146; Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” 2–8.

  38. 38.

    Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 146–147.

  39. 39.

    Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line,” 50; Granados, “As China Meets the Southern Sea Frontier,” 461; Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 150–151, 154–160; Hayton, “When Good Lawyers Write Bad History,” 25–27; Zou, “The South China Sea,” 633–634.

  40. 40.

    Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 63–66; Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” 9–20.

  41. 41.

    Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 158–160.

  42. 42.

    Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 161, 163.

  43. 43.

    It is the main argument of Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims.”

  44. 44.

    The Cairo Declaration said, ‘It is [the purpose of the US, the UK and the ROC] that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed’. It can be interpreted that the South China Sea islands were not parts of the territories Japan had stolen from China and only as the ‘other territories’ Japan had taken by violence and greed. The Declaration did not specify that they would be returned to China. The text of the Cairo Declaration is available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46tx.html (accessed 19 January 2019).

  45. 45.

    Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line,” 43; Hayton, “The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims,” 161. Chung’s study of the ROC archival documents reveals that the ROC government was single-mindedly concerned about protecting the sovereignty over the islands’ land territory rather than about the waters. Discussions or mention of historic rights to the waters in the South China Sea were absent from the governmental meetings at that time. The PRC inherited this standpoint up to 1958.

  46. 46.

    It was included into the Atlas of Administrative Areas of the Republic of China. Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line,” 52; Zou, “The South China Sea,” 634.

  47. 47.

    Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” 20–30. Almost all ROC naval forces on the South China Sea islands were redeployed to Taiwan by June 1949 with only a small naval force remaining up to May 1950. Taiwanese forces returned to Itu Aba in June 1956 in the wake of the Philippine claim to the ‘Freedomland’. Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line,” 47–48; Hayton, The South China Sea, 64; Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” 48; Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable?” 583.

  48. 48.

    There was no record of a transfer of French rights to the Spratlys to Vietnam. Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands Dispute,” 17, 49.

  49. 49.

    Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable?” 585–586.

  50. 50.

    Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder, 43. Malaysia began to occupy Swallow Reef in 1983. Chang, “China’s Claim to Sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands,” 418; Cordner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea,” 67; Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands Dispute,” 20.

  51. 51.

    Garver, “China’s Push through the South China Sea,” 1000–1005; Jenner, “Conclusion,” 303; Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable?” 586–587.

  52. 52.

    Cited in Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line,” 57–58; emphasis added by Chung.

  53. 53.

    Article 1 of the Declaration of the Government of the PRC on China’s Territorial Sea of September 1958 said, ‘The breadth of the territorial sea of the [PRC ] shall be twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to all territories of the [PRC ], including the Chinese mainland land and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Pratas Islands, the Paracels Islands, Macclesfield Bank, the Spratly Islands, and all other islands belonging to China, which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas.’ Source: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1341822-declaration-of-the-government-of-the-prc-on.html (assessed August 11, 2018).

  54. 54.

    Jenner, “Conclusion,” 305.

  55. 55.

    Cordner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea,” 64, 65; Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands Dispute,” 21–23; Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China Sea,” 1009–1013; Hayton, The South China Sea, 81–84; Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable?” 588. They are known as Yongshu jiao and Chigua jiao in Chinese.

  56. 56.

    Mischief Reef, a ‘low tide elevation’, falls within the Philippine EEZ. Hayton, The South China Sea, 85–89; Ian James Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 4 (1999): 95–118 at 101; Tønnesson, “Why Are the Disputes in the South China Sea So Intractable?” 589.

  57. 57.

    Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder, 70–71, 100n34.

  58. 58.

    Hayton, The South China Sea, 159, 195–199. For a detailed account of the Scarborough Shoal standoff, see Michael J. Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017), 95–123, https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-coercion-maritime-asia (accessed July 3, 2019).

  59. 59.

    The American version says that the negotiations were held in a hotel in southern Virginia in early June 2012 between Kurt Campbell, US assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Fu Ying, China’s Vice Foreign Minister. They agreed to a de-escalation of the standoff. An alternative version, however, says that Fu Ying was only committal to bringing Campbell’s suggestion to senior leaders in Beijing for their consideration without any idea of reaching a deal and the terms of it. Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, 118–19.

  60. 60.

    Ben Dolven et al. Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options. Congressional Research Service Report R44072 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44072.pdf (accessed July 3, 2017); Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Updated: China’s Big Three near Completion,” Updated June 29, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-big-three-near-completion/ (accessed July 3, 2017). See also Chap. 1 for the particulars of the militarisation.

  61. 61.

    Seen in this light, the Chinese imperial order shared the same principle as the European standard of ‘civilization’. For the latter, see Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society.

  62. 62.

    See, for example, Chang, “China’s Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands,” and Shen, “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands.”

  63. 63.

    Gao and Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea,” 108, 113. The Chinese government has remained ambiguous about the terms ‘adjacent waters’ and ‘relevant waters’, officially referred to in the aforementioned Chinese notes verbales of May 2009.

  64. 64.

    See Chap. 5, n 25 above.

  65. 65.

    This was echoed by the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal, which held that “although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other states, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources.” Permanent Court of Arbitration, “PCA Press Release,” 12 July 2016. Emphasis in original.

  66. 66.

    Zou and Liu, “The Legal Status of the U-shaped Line in the South China Sea and Its Legal Implications for Sovereignty, Sovereign Rights and Maritime Jurisdiction,” 71–73.

  67. 67.

    Duncan French, “In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration: Republic of Philippines v People’s Republic of China, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, Case No. 2013–19, Award of 12 July 2016,” Environmental Law Review 19, no. 1 (2017): 48–56 at 49; Rehman, “India, China, and Differing Conceptions of the Maritime Order,” 15.

  68. 68.

    See Dai Bingguo, “Speech by Dai Bingguo at China-US Dialogue on South China Sea Between Chinese and US Think Tanks” and Fu Ying, “China and the Future of International Order,” Chatham House (London), July 6, 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/china-and-future-international-order (accessed December 24, 2017). They were followed by Liu Xiaoming (Ambassador of the PRC to the UK), “China’s Perspectives on the South China Sea Verdict,” Chatham House, July 25, 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/chinas-perspectives-south-china-sea-verdict (accessed August 21, 2017).

  69. 69.

    Rehman, “India, China, and Differing Conceptions of the Maritime Order,” 15.

  70. 70.

    For example, the Tribunal ruled that China has violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines’ EEZ by obstructing Filipino fishermen from accessing their historical fishing grounds and resource exploration, as well as restricting access to Filipino fishermen to their traditional fishing grounds off the Scarborough Shoal. Furthermore, China’s claims to historic rights within the “nine-dash line” are incompatible with UNCLOS. Rehman, “India, China, and Differing Conceptions of the Maritime Order,” 15–16; The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, para. 261.

  71. 71.

    The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, para. 225–226.

  72. 72.

    Permanent Court of Arbitration, “PCA Press Release,” 12 July 2016. Emphasis in original.

  73. 73.

    The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, para. 269–270.

  74. 74.

    The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, para. 261. Emphasis added. For a study of how the Tribunal interpreted the concept of historic rights and assessed China’s claim to the rights, see Tanaka, “Reflections on Historic Rights in the South China Sea Arbitration (Merit)”.

  75. 75.

    The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, para. 275.

  76. 76.

    The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, para. 271. Emphasis added.

  77. 77.

    Jeremy Page, “Beijing’s Claims of South China Sea Support May Not Hold Water,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/beijings-claims-of-south-china-sea-support-may-not-hold-water-1466138014 (accessed August 12, 2017).

  78. 78.

    Lynn Kuok, “Progress in the South China Sea? A Year after the Hague Ruling,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2017, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asai/2017-07-21/progress-south-china-sea (accessed August 18, 2017).

  79. 79.

    Alan Dupont, “An Asian Security Standoff,” National Interest (May/June 2012): 55–61 at 61.

  80. 80.

    Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 3 (2008): 489–518; Kai He, Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China’s Rise (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).

  81. 81.

    Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (2007): 113–157; T. V. Paul, Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2018), 128–133.

  82. 82.

    Manolo Serapio, “Philippines’ Duterte says pointless discussing South China Sea woes at summit,” Reuters, April 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-summit-idUSKBN17T11J (accessed May 10, 2018).

  83. 83.

    Josh Kurlantzick, “ASEAN Meets, but Remains Mostly Silent on Major Regional Issues,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 4, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/asean-meets-remains-mostly-silent-major-regional-issues/ (accessed May 29, 2018).

  84. 84.

    Kurlantzick, “ASEAN Meets, but Remains Mostly Silent on Major Regional Issues.”

  85. 85.

    Koh Swee Lean Collin and Ngo Minh Tri, “Learning from the Battle of the Spratly Islands,” The Diplomat, March 20, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/learning-from-the-battle-of-the-spratly-islands/ (accessed May 14, 2018).

  86. 86.

    Koh Swee Lean Collin, “Trump and Southeast Asia: Sustaining the Maritime Pivot,” The Diplomat, May 6, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/trump-and-southeast-asia-sustaining-the-maritime-pivot/ (accessed May 10, 2018).

  87. 87.

    Mischief Reef, a ‘low-tide elevation’, falls within the Philippine EEZ. Erik Beukel, “China and the South China Sea: Two Faces of Power in the Rising China’s Neighborhood Policy,” DIIS Working Paper 2010:07 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010), 12–14, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/116218/WP2010-07_South_China_Sea_web.pdf (accessed August 27, 2017); Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands Dispute,” 34–42; Hayton, The South China Sea, 84–89.

  88. 88.

    Leifer, “Indonesia’s Encounters with China and the Dilemmas of Engagement,” 98.

  89. 89.

    Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands Dispute,” 35; U.S. Department of State, “US Policy on Spratly Islands and South China Sea,” Daily Press Briefing, May 10, 1995, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9505/950510db.html (accessed July 6, 2017).

  90. 90.

    Fu and Wu, How Have We Come to This Stage in the South China Sea, 40, 42.

  91. 91.

    Nguyen Hong Thao, “The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Note,” Ocean Development and International Law 34, nos. 3–4 (2003): 279–285 at 280.

  92. 92.

    Fu and Wu, How Have We Come to This Stage in the South China Sea, 42–43, 44.

  93. 93.

    Fu and Wu, How Have We Come to This Stage in the South China Sea, 45–47.

  94. 94.

    Fu and Wu, How Have We Come to This Stage in the South China Sea, 61, 63, 65.

  95. 95.

    Fu and Wu, How Have We Come to This Stage in the South China Sea, 88, although their own words are ‘last straw on the camel’s back’.

  96. 96.

    Fu and Wu, How Have We Come to This Stage in the South China Sea, 103–107, 114–115.

  97. 97.

    Carlyle A. Thayer “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013): 75–84 at 75–76.

  98. 98.

    Hayton, The South China Sea, 159, 195–199.

  99. 99.

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    Anisa Heritage & Pak K. Lee

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Heritage, A., Lee, P.K. (2020). Regional Contestation of China’s Order-Building Project. In: Order, Contestation and Ontological Security-Seeking in the South China Sea. Governance, Security and Development. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34807-6_6

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