Abstract
In this chapter, I discuss the relativity of truth and define the concept of viewpoint-relative truth. The relativity of truth is perhaps the strongest form of epistemological relativity that can used to deduce the relativity of knowledge and reality. One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is overcoming doubt, which is why I will introduce epistemology by presenting the problem of scepticism. After this, I discuss different theories of truth. The contextuality, or the dependency on context, of truth is focal to viewpoint relativism, and I build the definition of viewpoint-dependent truth upon it. As an example of relativism that utilises contextuality, I will present MacFarlane’s theory of relativism, which represents the so-called “new relativism.” Finally, I explain what I mean by truth relativism.
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Notes
- 1.
Protagoras’ principle can be presented in epistemic logic as the formula (Bp → p).
- 2.
The correspondence theory maintains a key position in scientific realism. I will return to it again in Chap. 7, where I will properly discuss scientific realism.
- 3.
- 4.
In fact, Rorty rejected the concept of truth in favour of the concept of justification in community.
- 5.
This is a question of compositionality and the recursive definition of satisfaction, used in Tarskian style semantics.
- 6.
See Strawson (1999), for criticism of Austin’s theory. Austin’s theory of truth has had a significant impact on the formation of the contextual concept of truth (David Kaplan, David Lewis, etc.).
- 7.
The type roughly responds to what Kaplan (1989, pp. 505–507) calls the character of the expression; for example, the word “I” refers to the speaker.
- 8.
For those familiar with logic, Austin’s theory of truth can be clarified in the following way. A language has models according to which the words of a language are interpreted. The interpretation is a question of agreement. Each sentence has a group of models where the sentence is true in terms of logic. If one of these models corresponds to the real situation referred to in the speech, then we can call that sentence true (in the world). I will further discuss this problem in Chap. 7.
- 9.
Alternatively, if p is true of O qua A.
- 10.
I am mimicking Lewis ’ (1980) approach here. I developed this definition to clarify the idea of a viewpoint-relative truth in order to respond to the comments Ilkka Niiniluoto made in a private correspondence about the concept of a viewpoint-relative truth.
- 11.
- 12.
One way to express this status of a viewpoint-relative concept of truth is to say that what is relatively true on a basic level (in object language, the relativity of the first order) is “absolutely” true on a metalevel. See Carter (2016, pp. 154–155). Nothing can be achieved by setting a truth condition in relation to another point of view, and setting its truth condition to yet a third point of view, etc. (See Chap. 3).
- 13.
This sentence can be viewpoint-dependent in a more basic way; for example, it is dependent on how we interpret the concepts of historical knowledge and time.
- 14.
This is my own way of clarifying how expressions can be assessment-sensitive.
- 15.
When, in the spring of 2018 in Berkeley, I asked MacFarlane if the class (or characteristics) of assessment-sensitive expressions could be defined, he responded to it doubtfully.
- 16.
- 17.
Absolutism means that for all sentences p the formula (Ap v A~p) is true. Strong relativism means that for all sentences p the formula (Rp & R~p) is true.
- 18.
This argument is based on the idea that if the formula RAp (relatively absolutely p) is true, then the formula Ap (absolutely p) is also true, contrary to the assumption of strong relativism. More precisely, the formula (RAp → Ap) in the S5 version of viewpoint logic is valid.
- 19.
Moderate relativism is the view that sentences p for which the formula (Rp & R~p) is true exist. Its negation is the formula (Ap v A~p) that characterises absolutism.
- 20.
Compare with the statement Wittgenstein considered, “Someone has been on the moon” (Wittgenstein 1958c, § 108, § 111).
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Hautamäki, A. (2020). The Relativity of Truth. In: Viewpoint Relativism. Synthese Library, vol 419. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34595-2_4
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