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Points of View and Relativism

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Viewpoint Relativism

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 419))

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Abstract

This chapter defines the central concept of this book, the point of view. The development of viewpoint relativism is largely based on this concept. A point of view is defined as choosing a certain aspect of its object to represent it. In principle, points of view are subjective and they are anchored to the internal cognitive models of a person. But points of view can also be objectified linguistically and brought out to be publicly examined. Points of view are not permanent, but can be changed and developed, and even exchanged in certain cases. Points of view are not true or untrue as such, but the maps that are acquired through their adoption are more or less true. We can compare objectified points of view, which allows us to avoid the incommensurability often connected with perspectives and conceptual frameworks. As examples of points of view, I will examine Thomas Nagel’s anthropocentric cosmology and Karl Marx’s theory of dialectic contradictions. I define viewpoint relativism as the hypothesis of the viewpoint-dependency of epistemic questions; it is a testable theory. Finally, I will discuss the critique and defence of relativism at the end of the chapter, and reject the claim that relativism cannot be rationally defended.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Metaphysical realism, according to Putnam (1981, pp. 49–54), assumes that the world is a certain way independent of the subject. In Colomina-Almiñana’s metaphysics, there are several of these ways.

  2. 2.

    I already presented my idea of an aspect in my research titled Points of View and their Logical Analysis (1986). I will develop this idea much further here.

  3. 3.

    Represent is an ambiguous verb, but the phrase “act as a substitute for” seems to capture the meaning I’m giving to this verb.

  4. 4.

    Aspect comes from the Latin verb aspicere, “to look at.”

  5. 5.

    Essentialism is incompatible with viewpoint relativism. I will further discuss essentialism in Chap. 6 in connection to ontological relativism. What is “essential” is a matter of convention.

  6. 6.

    It is interesting to note that reframing in therapeutic conversation involves helping a client to see her situation in a new light, from a new point of view (Mattil a, 2001).

  7. 7.

    He expressed this fear very strongly in a private communication.

  8. 8.

    By “female” I do not mean that a female could not take another point of view. Female refers to discussion about points of view in feminism; see Harding (2015).

  9. 9.

    Sometimes the word “perspective” is associated with points of view as seeing.

  10. 10.

    I am indebted to an anonymous referee for the recommendation to consider objectivity and the unions of points of view. I will discuss about unions of points of view also in Sect. 5.2.2.

  11. 11.

    The triangle of Fig. 3.3 reminds the process of triangulation presented by Davidson (2001). Triangulation is a situation involving “two or more creatures simultaneously in interaction with each other and with the world they share” (p. 128).

  12. 12.

    This objection was presented by Juan Colomina in a private communication.

  13. 13.

    Describing the dialectic method with the thesis-antithesis-synthesis paradigm originates from J.G. Fichte, not from Hegel himself.

  14. 14.

    These cases are for exemplifying what typical epistemic questions are, but they do not exhaust the types of epistemic questions.

  15. 15.

    As my discussion partner, I have chosen Mosteller, whose book Relativism is specifically anti-relativist, and who wants to “warn us about the ‘anything goes’ attitudes that seem to arise from relativism” (2008, p. 10). Later in Chaps. 4 and 5, I will discuss other critics, especially Paul Boghossian’s critique (cf. Boghossian, 2006b).

  16. 16.

    This argument is formatted from sceptic Agrippa’s trilemma of infinite regression, cf. Williams (2001, pp. 61–63).

  17. 17.

    This important issue is discussed further in Sects. 5.3 and 8.1.

  18. 18.

    It is possible to also give relativism the status of a philosophical stance, rather than the status of a doctrine that is true or false. This means that relativism is an orientation or perspective with normative consequences (see Sect. 8.1 and Kusch, 2019).

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  1. Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Science, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylän yliopisto, Finland

    Antti Hautamäki

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Hautamäki, A. (2020). Points of View and Relativism. In: Viewpoint Relativism. Synthese Library, vol 419. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34595-2_3

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