Abstract
In this final chapter I tie things together, in part, by addressing the concern that if the Benefits to Inquiry Argument is sound it will license an irrational dogmatism by allowing an agent to remain steadfast in her beliefs by appealing to some vague notion of potential future epistemic benefits. I conclude the project by discussing this worry within the context of intellectual humility and competing epistemic values. My discussion will shed light on the appropriate conclusions to draw about the scope and strength of my argument. I will also note some of the similarities between my view and three dynamic responses to disagreement, Thomas Kelly’s ‘Total Evidence View’ (2010), Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Justificationist View’ (2010a, b), and Han van Wietmarschen’s ‘Well-Groundedness’ (2013).
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Notes
- 1.
By successful epistemic agent I mean one who achieves positive veritistic ends.
- 2.
It might appear too recent to refer to this account as canonical, but it seems to already have become a standard reference point for thinking about intellectual humility.
- 3.
By ‘tend to the moral’ I take them to mean tend to make one morally good.
- 4.
Of the other vices mentioned they say: Conceit is the dispositions of thought, action, and emotion that stem from an unwarrantedly high opinion of oneself. Egotism is a disposition to exaggerate the importance of, and focus attention on, oneself and one’s own interests, to the neglect of others and their interests. Grandiosity is a disposition, in thought and self-presentation, to exaggerate one’s greatness. Pretentiousness is a disposition to claim, in action and demeanour, higher dignity or merit than one possesses. Snobbishness is a disposition to associate oneself, in thought and practice, with persons of high social rank, intellect, or taste, and to shun… persons of lower rank. Impertinence or presumption is a disposition to act without proper respect for the limits of one’s competence or social station. Haughtiness is a disposition to treat others as hardly worthy of one’s attention or respect. Self-righteousness is a disposition to ascribe to oneself a greater moral excellence than one possesses, especially in acts of comparing oneself with others. Domination is a disposition to excessive exertion and enjoyment of control over others. Selfish ambition is a disposition to advance one’s own long-term interests to the exclusions or detriment of others’ interests. Self-complacency is a disposition to approve uncritically of one’s own abilities and accomplishments. Most of these vices have intellectual variants (Roberts and Wood 2007, 258–259).
- 5.
I use epistemic humility and intellectual humility interchangeably.
- 6.
Again, I use ‘true belief’ here for simplicity, but what I say is consistent with any other epistemic goal.
- 7.
Many of my ideas for these five types of rationality come from Lougheed and Simpson (2017).
- 8.
This is a distinct move away from Kelly (2005) where he does seem to think that the existence of disagreement can never swamp first-order reasons.
- 9.
This assumes that independence is a requirement of rationality.
- 10.
Lackey’s original defense of this view can be found in Lackey (2010b).
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Lougheed, K. (2020). Disagreement and Change of View. In: The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 51. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34503-7_6
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