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Accommodating Legal Pluralism and “Pluralizing” the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom

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Debating Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism

Part of the book series: Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law ((GSCL,volume 41))

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Abstract

This chapter argues that the forms that the normative encounter between domestic and supranational constitutionalism has taken in the United Kingdom (UK) are intertwined with fundamental domestic constitutional principles. Even as the UK legal order ceded ground to external normative sources as a matter of practical outcomes, the key national constitutional actors self-consciously justified this move, as a matter of formal constitutional principle, by express reference to domestic constitutional principles and sources. In the attempt to accommodate legal pluralism in the constitutional edifice of the UK, the constitutional architecture itself became more plural and textured. This constitutional reconfiguration is ongoing and has come to the forefront as the UK is currently at a moment of constitutional reckoning owing to Brexit. This maps onto a long-standing debate on the position of the UK in the international sphere, most notably with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights. The chapter argues that Brexit and similar impulses highlight the interface between domestic and external legal orders (international or supranational). This interface cannot be nullified easily, contrary to what some proponents of Brexit may have expected or wished for. Rather, these recent developments add impetus to constitutional self-reflection; instead of negating constitutional pluralism they move the inquiry to the domestic sphere forcing national constitutional actors to reflect explicitly on the forms that pluralism ought to take.

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Change history

  • 08 July 2020

    The original version of Chapter 10 was inadvertently published with incorrect numbering of in-text citations.

Notes

  1. 1.

    Wright (2013), p. 19.

  2. 2.

    Bamforth and Leyland (2003).

  3. 3.

    Walker (2002) and Avbelj and Komárek (2008).

  4. 4.

    Walker (2002), p. 337.

  5. 5.

    Dicey (1959), pp. 39–40.

  6. 6.

    Feldman (2015), pp. 140–141.

  7. 7.

    Crawford (2012), p. 48.

  8. 8.

    Denza (2014), p. 418; Crawford (2012), pp. 110–111.

  9. 9.

    Crawford (2012), p. 63.

  10. 10.

    Feldman (2015), p. 142.

  11. 11.

    Capps (2007), p. 459.

  12. 12.

    Capps (2007), p. 469.

  13. 13.

    Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529, 553.

  14. 14.

    Id. See also Crawford (2012), p. 67.

  15. 15.

    Trendtex, supra note 13, at 554 (also stating “I now believe that the doctrine of incorporation is correct. Otherwise I do not see that our courts could ever recognise a change in the rules of international law. It is certain that international law does change. I would use of international law the words which Galileo used of the earth: ‘But it does move.’ International law does change: and the courts have applied the changes without the aid of any Act of Parliament. Thus, when the rules of international law were changed (by the force of public opinion) so as to condemn slavery, the English courts were justified in applying the modern rules of international law” (internal citations omitted).

  16. 16.

    R v Jones (Margaret) [2006] UKHL 16.

  17. 17.

    These defences were based on s. 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 providing that “a person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime” and s. 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 Act providing that (1) a person commits the offence of aggravated trespass if he trespasses on land and does there anything which is intended by him to obstruct or disrupt lawful activity. (2) Activity of a person or persons on land is ‘lawful’ for the purposes of this section if he or they may engage in the activity on the land …without committing an offence.

  18. 18.

    Jones, supra note 16, at [23].

  19. 19.

    Id., at [28].

  20. 20.

    Capps (2007), p. 459.

  21. 21.

    R v Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd [1973] AC 43.

  22. 22.

    Jones, supra note 16, at [23] citing Berman (2003), p. 11.

  23. 23.

    Jones, supra note 16, at [29].

  24. 24.

    Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69 [150].

  25. 25.

    Denza (2014), p. 424.

  26. 26.

    The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 P.D. 129.

  27. 27.

    JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, 500 (Lord Oliver).

  28. 28.

    Sales and Clement (2008), p. 397.

  29. 29.

    R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696; Feldman (2015), pp. 147–148.

  30. 30.

    R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 [55].

  31. 31.

    Sales and Clement (2008), p. 399; Denza (2014), p. 424.

  32. 32.

    R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 [57].

  33. 33.

    Feldman (2015), pp. 148–149.

  34. 34.

    The Parlement Belge (1879) 4 P.D. 129.

  35. 35.

    R (SG) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 [90] (Lord Reed), [115] (Lord Carnwath).

  36. 36.

    Id. at [256] (Lord Kerr).

  37. 37.

    Bjorge (2017).

  38. 38.

    Ahmed v HM Treasury [2010] UKSC 5.

  39. 39.

    Id. at [244].

  40. 40.

    Elliott and Thomas (2017a), p. 363. Section 2(1) ECA reads: “All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.”

  41. 41.

    R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (no. 2) 1 AC 603.

  42. 42.

    Wade (1996).

  43. 43.

    Craig (2015) and Allan (1997).

  44. 44.

    R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (no. 2) 1 AC 603 at 658-59 (Lord Bridge) (emphasis added).

  45. 45.

    Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] Q.B. 151 [59].

  46. 46.

    Id. at [62].

  47. 47.

    Id. at [63].

  48. 48.

    Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 states that “the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.” This provision has been described as “the most important statutory expression of parliamentary privilege” (Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, Parliamentary Privilege (2013-14, HL 30, HC 100) para 16).

  49. 49.

    R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) (Appellant) v The Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3 [79].

  50. 50.

    Id. at [207].

  51. 51.

    Miller, supra note 30.

  52. 52.

    Eeckhout (2016).

  53. 53.

    Neuberger Lord (2017).

  54. 54.

    Id. at [50]-[51].

  55. 55.

    Id. at [61]-[65], [76], [78], [86].

  56. 56.

    Id at [177], [189], [191].

  57. 57.

    Id. at [61], [228]. See also Young (2017a), pp. 293–294.

  58. 58.

    Id. at 65.

  59. 59.

    Elliott (2017a).

  60. 60.

    Id. at [90].

  61. 61.

    For a more detailed discussion of the 2018 Act and its implications, see Elliott and Tierney (2019), Craig (2019) and Segan (2018).

  62. 62.

    House of Commons Library (2017).

  63. 63.

    Elliott (2017b).

  64. 64.

    Elliott (2017b).

  65. 65.

    Syrpis (2017).

  66. 66.

    Elliott and Tierney (2019), pp. 41–42; Craig (2019), pp. 324–325.

  67. 67.

    Craig (2019), pp. 326–327.

  68. 68.

    Elliott and Tierney (2019), p. 43.

  69. 69.

    Paterson (2013), p. 221.

  70. 70.

    R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 [20].

  71. 71.

    Young (2017b), pp. 260–261.

  72. 72.

    R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38 [70], [73].

  73. 73.

    Id. at [70] (“In those circumstances, it does not appear to me that the dictum quoted above from Ullah is in point. (For this reason, this is not the occasion to address the question whether, and if so how far, the principle enunciated by Lord Bingham in Ullah, para 20, should be modified or reconsidered)”).

  74. 74.

    Ferreira (2015), pp. 370–371.

  75. 75.

    Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 [48] (Lord Neuberger).

  76. 76.

    Department for Constitutional Affairs (2006), p. 10.

  77. 77.

    Paterson (2013), p. 224.

  78. 78.

    Young (2017b), p. 277

  79. 79.

    Simson Caird (2017).

  80. 80.

    HM Government (2017a), para 46.

  81. 81.

    Feldman (2015), pp. 156–158; Paterson (2013), pp. 221–222.

  82. 82.

    See, e.g., Psygkas (2017).

  83. 83.

    Stephenson (2015).

  84. 84.

    Stephenson (2015), p. 398.

  85. 85.

    R (Osborn) v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61.

  86. 86.

    Id. at [54].

  87. 87.

    Id. at [56].

  88. 88.

    Id. at [58] (emphasis added).

  89. 89.

    Kennedy v The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20.

  90. 90.

    Id. at [46] (emphasis added).

  91. 91.

    Stephenson (2015), p. 401.

  92. 92.

    R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.

  93. 93.

    Id. at [66], [98].

  94. 94.

    Id. at [98].

  95. 95.

    Id. at [105]-[117].

  96. 96.

    Id. at [89].

  97. 97.

    Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223.

  98. 98.

    Elliott (2016) provides an elucidating timeline of these cases with links to detailed blog posts on each of the cases in the series.

  99. 99.

    Kennedy, supra note 89.

  100. 100.

    Id. at [54].

  101. 101.

    Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 [98].

  102. 102.

    Id. at [60].

  103. 103.

    Id. at [104].

  104. 104.

    Id. at [119].

  105. 105.

    Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 3 [56]-[57].

  106. 106.

    UNISON, supra note 92, at [99]-[102].

  107. 107.

    Miller, supra note 30, at [67], [80].

  108. 108.

    Id. at [81]. The High Court, the decision of which was appealed to the Supreme Court, had made this point even more clearly: “Since in enacting the ECA 1972 as a statute of major constitutional importance Parliament has indicated that it should be exempt from casual implied repeal by Parliament itself, still less can it be thought to be likely that Parliament nonetheless intended that its legal effects could be removed by the Crown through the use of its prerogative powers” ([2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) [88]).

  109. 109.

    Elliott and Thomas (2017b).

  110. 110.

    Explanatory Notes (2018), para 36; Elliott and Tierney (2019), pp. 53–54.

  111. 111.

    Explanatory Notes (2018), para 37; House of Commons Library (2017).

  112. 112.

    Elliott and Thomas (2017b).

  113. 113.

    Elliott and Tierney (2019), pp. 55–56.

  114. 114.

    It should be noted here that the Sewel convention, like all constitutional conventions, is not judicially enforceable. This did not change after the statutory recognition of the Sewel convention in the devolution legislation. On these points the Supreme Court was unanimous in Miller, supra note 30, at [136]-[151].

  115. 115.

    Elliott (2018).

  116. 116.

    The UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill – A Reference by the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Scotland [2018] UKSC 64.

  117. 117.

    Government (2017b).

  118. 118.

    Waldron (2012), pp. 3, 28.

  119. 119.

    Davis et al. (2015).

  120. 120.

    Dworkin (1978).

  121. 121.

    According to the Constitute project, the number is 146 out of 190 constitutions: https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=dignity.

  122. 122.

    Law and Versteeg (2012), p. 773.

  123. 123.

    Allan and Huscroft (2006), p. 36.

  124. 124.

    BBC (2017).

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Acknowledgement

I wish to thank Tony Prosser for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

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Correspondence to Athanasios Psygkas .

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Psygkas, A. (2020). Accommodating Legal Pluralism and “Pluralizing” the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom. In: Tusseau, G. (eds) Debating Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 41. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34432-0_10

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