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Debating Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Global Age

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Debating Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism

Part of the book series: Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law ((GSCL,volume 41))

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Abstract

Globalisation has disrupted most of the intellectual and practical tools jurists had devised. Yesterday’s “high definition” law has given way to a new “low definition” law. The main features of the latter have debased such paradigmatic concepts as the authority of the State legislator, the dichotomy between internal and external legal norms, the distinction between public and private sources of law, the image of the Kelsenian pyramid of norms, and the centrality of legal obligation. Legal pluralism and constitutionalism have frequently been presented as the two main competing orientations to meet the challenges of the global age. Whereas the former insists on diversity, the latter insists on common values. The legal, empirical, and doctrinal information gleaned from nine national reporters about the respective situations of Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, and the United Kingdom tend to prove that no clear-cut distinction between pluralism and constitutionalism is evident. Nor are the strategies these two perspectives embody totally successful to meet the demands of the day. Section 2 of this general report sets the stage for the study of legal interactions in the global age. It sheds light on the degree of pluralism each of the studied legal systems admits, both in its relations with other legal systems that reach beyond the States, and in its relations with more or less autonomous inner forms of legal normativity. Section 3 tackles the forms of interactions that take place among legal actors in the context of an increasingly plural landscape, and how they contribute to changing legal mentalities. By focusing respectively on legal actors’ reasoning and on legal scholarship, understood as the interacting members of a unified epistemic community, Sects. 4 and 5 contribute to highlighting what “thinking like a lawyer” means today. Finally, Sect. 6 identifies how little neutral, and how value-laden, the current discussion about pluralism and constitutionalism is. The very concepts that are currently used to confront today’s major legal changes testify to the ideological dimension of legal analysis.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Grossi (2007), p. 8.

  2. 2.

    On this image, see Ferrarese (2012), p. 32. For a general presentation, see also Domingo (2008), Walker (2015), Frydman (2012, 2014) and Cotterrell (2006).

  3. 3.

    On the complexity and polycentricity of the common law, see esp. Samuel (2003, 2013).

  4. 4.

    Ferrarese (2012), pp. 52–53.

  5. 5.

    See also Yeh and Chang (2008), pp. 104–108.

  6. 6.

    Introducing further important conceptual discussions, see Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example.

  7. 7.

    On the major trends in constitutionalism, see McIlwain (1940), Wormuth (1949), Fioravanti (1999, 2009), Grimm (1991, 2016), Mohnhaupt and Grimm (2002) and Bastid (1985).

  8. 8.

    5 US 137 (1803).

  9. 9.

    Article VI of the US Constitution. On constitutional supremacy, see esp. Del Rosario-Rodríguez (2011).

  10. 10.

    See e.g. Kelsen (1962) and Merkl (1962).

  11. 11.

    Henkin (1998), pp. 11–12.

  12. 12.

    See e.g. Wittgenstein (2010), p. 57; Wittgenstein (2014), pp. 64–65.

  13. 13.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example.

  14. 14.

    Helfer (2003), Kadelbach and Kleinlein (2006), St. John Macdonald and Johnston (2005), Frishman and Muller (2010), Schwöbel (2011) and Queiroz (2011).

  15. 15.

    Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. See e.g. Orakhelashvili (2010).

  16. 16.

    Tomuschat (1993) and Simma (1994).

  17. 17.

    Fassbender (2009), Dupuy (1997), Doyle (2009) and Chemain and Pellet (2006).

  18. 18.

    Schneiderman (2008), Cass (2005), Petersmann (2000, 2011), McGinnis and Movsesian (2000) and Trachtman (2006).

  19. 19.

    ECHR, 23 March 1995, Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary objections), (Application no. 15318/89), § 75. See e.g. Walter (1999), Alkema (2000) and Stone Sweet (2009).

  20. 20.

    ECJ, 23 April 1986, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament, Case 294/83, § 23.

  21. 21.

    ECJ, 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13.

  22. 22.

    Weiler (1999), Weiler and Wind (2003), Schütze (2012), Rosas and Armati (2012), Von Bogdandy and Bast (2010) and Bailleux (2014).

  23. 23.

    Alston (2005), Clapham (2006), Gatto (2011) and Palombella (2012).

  24. 24.

    Nolan (2009). See also the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights of 2003, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/501576, and the United Nations Global Compact, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/. See e.g. Rasche (2010).

  25. 25.

    Teubner (2004, 2012, 2016).

  26. 26.

    Teubner (2010, 2013). On sectorial constitutionalisation, see also Tuori (2015), pp. 125–318.

  27. 27.

    See e.g. Zumbansen (2010, 2011), Hall and Biersteker (2011), Cutler (2003), Tuori (2013) and Maduro et al. (2014).

  28. 28.

    Scott et al. (2011), Schepel (2004, 2005) and Peters et al. (2009).

  29. 29.

    Muir Watt (2004), p. 274.

  30. 30.

    Teubner (2011). See also Robé (2012, 2013).

  31. 31.

    See e.g. Storini and Alenza García (2012) and Corrêa Souza de Oliveira and Luiz Streck (2014).

  32. 32.

    See esp. De Sousa Santos (2002).

  33. 33.

    See e.g. Neves (2009), pp. 216–229.

  34. 34.

    See e.g. Andrade et al. (2009), Ávila Santamaría et al. (2008) and López Freire et al. (2009).

  35. 35.

    See e.g. Acosta (2013), Pigrau Solé (2013) and Bagni (2013).

  36. 36.

    See also Yeh and Chang (2008).

  37. 37.

    See also Klabbers et al. (2009).

  38. 38.

    On pluralism, see among others, MacCormick (1995, 1999), Walker (2002, 2016), Teubner (1997) and Berman (2009).

  39. 39.

    Cover (1981).

  40. 40.

    Cruz Villalón (2004), p. 73.

  41. 41.

    Fischer-Lescano (2005), Schwöbel (2011), Lang and Wiener (2017) and Belov (2018).

  42. 42.

    Kjaer (2014).

  43. 43.

    Avbelj and Komárek (2008, 2012) and Millet (2018).

  44. 44.

    Stein (1981), Tsagourias (2007), Zumbansen (2012a, b), Goderis and Versteeg (2013) and Yeh and Chang (2008).

  45. 45.

    Pernice (1999, 2002), Freixes et al. (2012), Piattoni (2010), Walker (2012a), Cerri and Donnarumma (2014) and Navas Castillo and Florentina Navas Castillo (2016).

  46. 46.

    Neves (2009, 2015).

  47. 47.

    Shaw (2011), Krisch (2011) and Walker (2012b).

  48. 48.

    Teubner (2003).

  49. 49.

    Besselink (2006, 2007); Pernice and Mayer (2000); Claes and De Visser (2012), p. 144.

  50. 50.

    Bustos Gisbert (2005).

  51. 51.

    Gordillo Pérez (2014).

  52. 52.

    Jackson (2010), p. 91.

  53. 53.

    Letsas (2012).

  54. 54.

    Atienza (2013), pp. 31–60. See similarly Zumbansen (2012a, b).

  55. 55.

    De Julios-Campuzano (2009). For an overview of the current theoretical efforts, see Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 2.

  56. 56.

    Palandri (2013), pp. 61–62.

  57. 57.

    Palandri (2013), p. 67.

  58. 58.

    Griffiths (1986), pp. 38–39.

  59. 59.

    See esp. Petersen and Zahle (1995).

  60. 60.

    Tuori (2013). See also Tuori and Sankari (2010).

  61. 61.

    Kennedy (2008).

  62. 62.

    See e.g. Walker (2002, 2016); Cohen (2012), esp. pp. 21–79.

  63. 63.

    Palandri (2013), p. 68.

  64. 64.

    Walker (2016), pp. 333–334.

  65. 65.

    Bachelard (1967), p. 20. See Ost and Van de Kerchove (1988); Ponthoreau (2010), pp. 203–206.

  66. 66.

    Ross (1946).

  67. 67.

    Ross (2004), pp. 29–30.

  68. 68.

    Zucca (2018), p. 5.

  69. 69.

    Kletzer (2018), p. 96.

  70. 70.

    Delmas-Marty (2006).

  71. 71.

    Millet (2018), p. 128.

  72. 72.

    See e.g. Pegoraro and Figueroa Mejía (2017).

  73. 73.

    Schauer (2009).

  74. 74.

    Glenn (1987) and Flanders (2009). On the distinction between “must-”, “should-”, and “may-” sources of law, see also Peczenik (2009).

  75. 75.

    See esp. Ehrlich (1913) and Romano (2002).

  76. 76.

    Twining (2009).

  77. 77.

    For critical efforts at conceptual clarification, see for example Griffiths (1986), Merry (1988), Petersen and Zahle (1995), Tamanaha (1993, 2008), Teubner (1992, 1997) and Berman (2009).

  78. 78.

    Twining (2009), p. 28. See also Twining (2000), pp. 82–88, 224–233.

  79. 79.

    See e.g. Fombad (2012) and Killander (2017).

  80. 80.

    See generally Shelton (2011). See also Killander and Adjolohoun (2010) and Ramadi Dinokopila (2017).

  81. 81.

    Law relating to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, (Law No. 127(I)/2006).

  82. 82.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.2.1.

  83. 83.

    Attorney General v. Costas Constantinou (2005) LCR 1356, quoted by Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.3.2.3.

  84. 84.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.2.2.

  85. 85.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.2.2.

  86. 86.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.3.2.3.

  87. 87.

    Tassopoulos, Between Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism: Perspectives from Greece, § 1.

  88. 88.

    See also infra, § 3.

  89. 89.

    STF, RE 349.703; STF, RE 466.343. See De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 2.

  90. 90.

    Ucín, A Particular Dialogue Between Systems. The Argentinian Case.

  91. 91.

    Ucín, A Particular Dialogue Between Systems. The Argentinian Case, § 1.ii.

  92. 92.

    Ucín, A Particular Dialogue Between Systems. The Argentinian Case, § 1.

  93. 93.

    Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 2.1.

  94. 94.

    R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 [55], quoted by Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 2.1.

  95. 95.

    See ECJ, 5 February 1963, Van Gend & Loos (26/62); ECJ, 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v ENEL (6/64); ECJ, 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (11/70); ECJ, 9 March 1978, Simmenthal (106/77).

  96. 96.

    Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 2.3, alluding to Hart (2012).

  97. 97.

    Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, § 2. See also Tshosa (2007).

  98. 98.

    Attornery-General v. Dow [1992] BLR 119, 154, quoted by Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, § 2. See also Ramadi Dinokopila (2017), pp. 239–240.

  99. 99.

    Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 2.

  100. 100.

    Public Prosecutor v Tan Cheng Yew [2013] 1 SLR 1095 at [56], quoted by Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 2.

  101. 101.

    Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 2. See also Neo (2012).

  102. 102.

    Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 1129, quoted by Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 2.

  103. 103.

    Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 2.

  104. 104.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 3.1.

  105. 105.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.1.

  106. 106.

    Quoted by Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.3.

  107. 107.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.3.

  108. 108.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 2.2.1.

  109. 109.

    BVerfGE 58, 1, 34 (1981); BVerfGE 64, 1, 20 (1983), quoted by Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.1.3.

  110. 110.

    BVerfGE 74, 358, 370 (1987); BVerfGE 128, 282, 306 (2011), quoted by Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.1.3.

  111. 111.

    BVerfGE 111, 307, 315 (2004), quoted by Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.1.3.

  112. 112.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.1.3.

  113. 113.

    See Cossalter and Klement (2016) and Cossalter et al. (2017).

  114. 114.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 2.2.2.

  115. 115.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.1.4.

  116. 116.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, §§ 3.1.6 and 3.2.3.

  117. 117.

    Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, § 2.

  118. 118.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 2.

  119. 119.

    Wright, quoted by Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 1.

  120. 120.

    Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 1.

  121. 121.

    Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, § 1.

  122. 122.

    See for example Tetley (2000), Reid (2003), Du Plessis (2006), Palmer and Mattar (2015) and Palmer (2012).

  123. 123.

    Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 1.

  124. 124.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 1.

  125. 125.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 1.

  126. 126.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 1. See also ibid., § 7.

  127. 127.

    K v T [1985–1986] SILR 49, quoted by Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 3.4.

  128. 128.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 3.4.

  129. 129.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.1.

  130. 130.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.2.4.

  131. 131.

    Tassopoulos, Between Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism: Perspectives from Greece, § 5.

  132. 132.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 1.

  133. 133.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 2.

  134. 134.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 2.

  135. 135.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 2.

  136. 136.

    Ucín, A Particular Dialogue Between Systems. The Argentinian Case, § 1.iii.

  137. 137.

    Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 1.

  138. 138.

    Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 3.

  139. 139.

    Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 3.

  140. 140.

    Shafeeg bin Salim Talib and another v Fatimah bte Abud bin Talib and others [2010] 2 SLR 1123, quoted by Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 3.

  141. 141.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 2.1.

  142. 142.

    See infra, §§ 4 and 5.

  143. 143.

    For illustrations, see e.g. Burgorgue-Larsen (2009); Ayala Corao (2012), pp. 128–129.

  144. 144.

    Scalia-Breyer Debate on Constitutional relevance of foreign court decisions, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts.

  145. 145.

    7 Coke Report 1a, 77 ER 377 (1608).

  146. 146.

    These remarks follow from a project developped with Horatia Muir Watt and Mikhaïl Xifaras, about “Emerging Global Legal Characters: Arbitrators, Judges and Transnational Legal Analysis”, presented at the Institute for Global Law and Public Policy Workshop of 2011.

  147. 147.

    See for example Supreme Court of the United States, Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Constitutional Court of South Africa, State v T Makwanyane and M Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94; Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. For a more critical account, see also infra, § 6.

  148. 148.

    Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 2.4.

  149. 149.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 3.

  150. 150.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 3.

  151. 151.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 2.3.1.

  152. 152.

    De Savigny (1855), pp. 206–208.

  153. 153.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 2.3.1.

  154. 154.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.3.2.2.

  155. 155.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.3.2.2.

  156. 156.

    Alpha Bank Cyprus v. Si Senh Dau and others, Joint Civil Appeals 23-29/2013, Decision of 13 September 2013, quoted by Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.3.2.1.

  157. 157.

    On the remaining limitations, see Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.4.1.

  158. 158.

    Council of State 3670/2006, quoted by Tassopoulos, Between Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism: Perspectives from Greece, § 2.

  159. 159.

    VfGH, 10 March 1999, B 2251/97, B 2594/97.

  160. 160.

    Corte costituzionale, ord. 102/2008, 103/2008, 207/2013.

  161. 161.

    Decision n° 2013-314P QPC, 4 April 2013, M. Jeremy F. [Absence de recours en cas d’extension des effets du mandat d’arrêt européen - question préjudicielle à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne]. See generally Drigo (2013).

  162. 162.

    BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13.

  163. 163.

    Tassopoulos, Between Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism: Perspectives from Greece, § 2.

  164. 164.

    Cruz Villalón (2004), p. 73.

  165. 165.

    Tassopoulos, Between Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism: Perspectives from Greece, § 2.

  166. 166.

    See infra, §§ 4 and 6.

  167. 167.

    See e.g. Dubout (2015).

  168. 168.

    Dubout and Touzé (2010).

  169. 169.

    Bernardi (2017).

  170. 170.

    See infra, § 4.

  171. 171.

    Tassopoulos, Between Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism: Perspectives from Greece, § 3.

  172. 172.

    Tassopoulos, Between Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism: Perspectives from Greece, § 2.

  173. 173.

    Tassopoulos, Between Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism: Perspectives from Greece, § 4.

  174. 174.

    See infra, § 4.

  175. 175.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 1.

  176. 176.

    BVerfGE 37, 217 (1973); BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986); BVerfGE 102, 147 (2000), quoted by Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.1.4.

  177. 177.

    French Conseil constitutionnel, Decision n° 2006-540 DC, 27 July 2006 Loi relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l’information.

  178. 178.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment on Lisbon Treaty, June 30, 2009 (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08). On the doctrine of “constitutional identity”, see infra, §§ 4 and 6.

  179. 179.

    See e.g. Schmid (2001).

  180. 180.

    This case is also commented on by Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 2.4. For other examples of transconstitutional conflicts in Poland (where the Constitutional Tribunal was ready to ignore a EU Regulation if it had disregarded domestic fundamental rights (Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision SK 45/09), Venezuela (where the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court decided by Expediente n° 11-1130 du 17 octobre 2011, not to abide by a ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights), and Italy (where the Constitutional Court by Constitutional Court, sent. 238/2014, refused to abide by a ruling of the International Court of Justice), see Muir Watt and Tusseau (2016) and Tusseau (20122013b, 2014a). See also Lavranos (2008).

  181. 181.

    ECJ, 22 June 2011, Marie Landtová c/ Česká správa socialního zabezpečení, C-399/09, §§ 44–46.

  182. 182.

    ECJ, 22 June 2011, Marie Landtová c/ Česká správa socialního zabezpečení, C-399/09, § 49.

  183. 183.

    Décisions Pl. ÚS 50/04, Pl. ÚS 66/04, Pl. ÚS 19/08, Pl. ÚS 29/09.

  184. 184.

    BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993).

  185. 185.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 5/12, § VII.

  186. 186.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 5/12, § VII.

  187. 187.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 5/12, § VII.

  188. 188.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 5/12, § VII.

  189. 189.

    BVerfGE 126, 284 (2010), quoted by Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.1.4.

  190. 190.

    BVerfGE 134, 366 (2014), quoted by Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.1.4. On this case, see e.g. Tusseau (2014b).

  191. 191.

    Ucín, A Particular Dialogue Between Systems. The Argentinian Case, § 3.

  192. 192.

    Ucín, A Particular Dialogue Between Systems. The Argentinian Case, § 3.

  193. 193.

    Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 [48] (Lord Neuberger), quoted by Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 2.4.

  194. 194.

    Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, § 4.

  195. 195.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 3.4.

  196. 196.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.1.

  197. 197.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.1.

  198. 198.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.2.3.

  199. 199.

    See also Corrin Care (1999).

  200. 200.

    Quoted by Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.2.3.

  201. 201.

    See especially in this respect Muria CJ in Pusi v. Leni, quoted by Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 6: “I have made these observations because it appears to the court that this case is a classic example of an attempt to use the Constitution to circumvent the lawful application of custom, a course of action that may well engender disharmony in society. Such a course must not be allowed to flourish in this country.”

  202. 202.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.3.

  203. 203.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.3.

  204. 204.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 4.3.

  205. 205.

    Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 4.

  206. 206.

    Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209, quoted by Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 4.

  207. 207.

    Government of the State of Kelantan v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1963] MLJ 355, quoted by Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 4. See further Tan (2017).

  208. 208.

    See more precisely infra, § 6.

  209. 209.

    Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (AIR 1973 SC 1461).

  210. 210.

    Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Home Affairs & Ors. [1989] 2 MLJ 449 (High Court of Singapore), quoted by Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 4.2.

  211. 211.

    Mohammad Fiazal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947; Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 1129, quoted by Neo, Legal Pluralism in Centralist Singapore, § 4.2.

  212. 212.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 4.

  213. 213.

    On the opposition between these two types of reasoning, see Alexy (2003).

  214. 214.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 4.

  215. 215.

    Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 3.1.

  216. 216.

    Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 3.1.

  217. 217.

    Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 3.1.

  218. 218.

    Kennedy v The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20 at [54], quoted by Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 3.1.

  219. 219.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.3.3.

  220. 220.

    For a discussion from the viewpoint of the language (keywords) that is used by transconstitutional actors, see Bobić (2017).

  221. 221.

    Brudner (2004).

  222. 222.

    Hennette-Vauchez and Sorel (2011).

  223. 223.

    Beatty (2004).

  224. 224.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 17.

  225. 225.

    Dworkin (1978), pp. 40–41.

  226. 226.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 66.

  227. 227.

    Alexy (2002), pp. 47–48.

  228. 228.

    Alexy (2003), pp. 436–437.

  229. 229.

    See supra, n° 40.

  230. 230.

    McMahon (2009).

  231. 231.

    See for example Rosenfeld and Sajó (2006).

  232. 232.

    BVerfGE 101, 361 (1999).

  233. 233.

    ECtHR, 24 June 2004, Von Hannover v Germany (59320/00), §§ 76–79.

  234. 234.

    See especially in this respect Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.4.1.

  235. 235.

    See e.g. Barak (2012) and Bernal Pulido (2007).

  236. 236.

    ECJ, 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 11-70, §§ 3–4.

  237. 237.

    ECJ, 9 March 1978, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, 106/77, § 21.

  238. 238.

    BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974).

  239. 239.

    See esp. ECJ, 14 May 1974, Nold, 4-73.

  240. 240.

    BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986).

  241. 241.

    See e.g. Lavranos (2008).

  242. 242.

    Conseil d’Etat, 8 February 2007, Arcelor (287110).

  243. 243.

    Halberstam (2009), pp. 352–353.

  244. 244.

    See ECtHR, 30 June 2005, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim şirketi v Ireland (45036/98) concerning the respect of ECHR standards by EC law.

  245. 245.

    ECJ, 3 September 2008, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P).

  246. 246.

    Ibid. § 288.

  247. 247.

    Ibid. §§ 318–328, 365–371.

  248. 248.

    See Opinion of Advocate General M Poiares Maduro §§ 54–55.

  249. 249.

    Sabel and Gerstenberg (2010), pp. 512–513.

  250. 250.

    See infra, § 6.

  251. 251.

    See infra, § 6.1.

  252. 252.

    Cohen (2010), p. 30. See also Cohen (2012).

  253. 253.

    Tusseau G, “On a Constitutional ‘Identity Movement’ in Global Constitutionalism”, Les matinées constitutionnelles du Regroupement stratégique Droit et Changement, McGill University, Montreal, May 6th, 2011; Marti (2011), Derosier (2015), Burgorgue-Larsen (2011), Millet (2013) and Saiz Arnaiz and Alcoberro Llivina (2013).

  254. 254.

    BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, from which an immense literature has resulted. See for example Fischer-Lescano et al. (2010), Grimm (2009), Schorkopf (2009), von Bogdandy (2010), Terhechte (2009), Schönberger (2009) and Reestman (2009).

  255. 255.

    See supra, n° 44.

  256. 256.

    “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.”

  257. 257.

    Lissabon Urteil, §§ 217–219, 240–241.

  258. 258.

    Tribunal constitucional, DTC 1/2004, Fundamento jurídico 2.

  259. 259.

    Constitutional Tribunal, K 18/04; K 32/09.

  260. 260.

    See regarding European Union law: Corte costituzionale, sent. 183/1973; 170/1984; 232/1989, § 3.1. and very recently the “Tarrico Saga” (ord. 24/2017). Regarding the law of the United Nations, see sent. 238/2014.

  261. 261.

    Choudhry (2006).

  262. 262.

    See especially infra, § 6.

  263. 263.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 1.

  264. 264.

    De Barcelos, Brazil and Its Many Realities. Courts and State-Centrism; Administrative Agencies and International Cooperation, § 1.

  265. 265.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 6.

  266. 266.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 6.

  267. 267.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 3.4.2.

  268. 268.

    Corrin, Constitutionalism and Customary Law in Solomon Island, § 7.

  269. 269.

    Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, § 5.

  270. 270.

    Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, § 6.

  271. 271.

    Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, § 3.

  272. 272.

    Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, §§ 5–6.

  273. 273.

    Fombad, Reconciling Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Age of Globalisation in Botswana, § 6.

  274. 274.

    Kammen (2006).

  275. 275.

    See infra, § 6.

  276. 276.

    See supra, § 4.

  277. 277.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.3.1.

  278. 278.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.3.1.

  279. 279.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.3.1.

  280. 280.

    See e.g. Goldman (1964) and Toth (2017).

  281. 281.

    See e.g. Latty (2007), Siekmann and Soek (2012) and Leroy and Yboud (2017).

  282. 282.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.3.1.

  283. 283.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.3.3. See also Viellechner (2015).

  284. 284.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 2.2.

  285. 285.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, § 2.2.

  286. 286.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.3.2.

  287. 287.

    See esp. Kammerhofer (2010) and Loughlin (2014).

  288. 288.

    Loughlin (2014).

  289. 289.

    Kombos, Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism in the Cypriot Example, Introduction.

  290. 290.

    See e.g. Muir Watt and Tusseau (2016).

  291. 291.

    For a taxonomy of dialogues, see Poli (2016).

  292. 292.

    Kumm (2010), p. 203. See also Kumm (1999).

  293. 293.

    MacCormick (1995).

  294. 294.

    See e.g. Rijpkema (2013).

  295. 295.

    For a general overview of the use of the metaphore of dialogue in the literature, see Bateup (2006) and Rosas (2007). On this metaphor and its numerous illustrations see e.g. Fisher (1988), Hogg and Bushell (1997), Manfredi and Kelly (1999), Hogg and Thornton (1999), Hogg et al. (2007), Roach (2001a, b, 2004), Waldron (2004), Tremblay (2005), Petter (2003), Bernatchez and Russell (2008), Nogueira Alcalá (2012, 2013), Burgorgue-Larsen (2013), Friedman (1993), Webber (2002), AA VV (2009), Lichère et al. (2004), Meuwese and Snel (2013), Asociación de letrados del Tribunal constitucional (2013), Brandão (2011), Córdova Vinueza (2016), Fontanelli et al. (2010), Kenney et al. (1999) and Claes et al. (2012).

  296. 296.

    Weiler (2001), p. 10.

  297. 297.

    Neves (2009), p. 166.

  298. 298.

    See e.g. Choudhry (2006) and Le Quinio (2011).

  299. 299.

    McCrudden (2000) and Weiler (2000).

  300. 300.

    Neves (2009), p. 118.

  301. 301.

    Viellechner (2015), pp. 322–323.

  302. 302.

    Yeh and Chang (2008), p. 95.

  303. 303.

    Diálogo jurisprudencial. Derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. Tribunales nacionales. Corte interamericana de derechos humanos.

  304. 304.

    De Visser (2014), p. 329.

  305. 305.

    See esp. Fontanelli and Martinico (2008) and Martinico (2010).

  306. 306.

    Escobar-García (2012), pp. 84–85.

  307. 307.

    Criticizing the “dialogical literature” from a metalinguistic viewpoint, see Bateup (2006) and Meuwese and Snel (2013).

  308. 308.

    Simon and Rigaux (2010).

  309. 309.

    Paterson, quoted by Psygkas, Accommodating Legal Pluralism and ‘Pluralizing’ the Constitution: The Example of the United Kingdom, § 2.4. See also Law and Chang (2001).

  310. 310.

    See Tushnet (2005).

  311. 311.

    See e.g. Gibbs (2018).

  312. 312.

    See e.g. De Visser (2014), pp. 330–331; Meuwese and Snel (2013).

  313. 313.

    See e.g. Tayyab Mahmud (1994). See also Siems (2018).

  314. 314.

    See Tusseau (2013a).

  315. 315.

    See supra, § 4.

  316. 316.

    Supreme Court of Venezuela, Constitutional Chamber, 17 October 2011, Expediente n° 11-1130.

  317. 317.

    Corte costituzionale, sent 238/2014; ord. 24/2017.

  318. 318.

    On this theory, see esp. Bierling (1894). For a discussion, see Bahlmann (1995) and Yoon (2009).

  319. 319.

    See supra, § 4.

  320. 320.

    Troper (1988) and Tusseau (2008).

  321. 321.

    On this character, see Dworkin (1978).

  322. 322.

    See Holmes J., dissent in Lochner v. People of State of New York 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).

  323. 323.

    See supra, §§ 3 and 4.

  324. 324.

    Italics supplied.

  325. 325.

    ECJ, 14 October 2004, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn (C-36/02).

  326. 326.

    See Opinions of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-62/14 and of Advocate General Yves Bot in Case C-42/17.

  327. 327.

    ECJ, 12 June 12 2003, Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge and Republik Österreich.

  328. 328.

    ECJ, 22 December 2010, C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein. See also the Runević-Vardyn case, C-391/09 (2011) regarding the protection of national language as an element of constitutional identity that can limit freedom of movement, provided it respects a standard of proportionality.

  329. 329.

    See Ritleng (2010).

  330. 330.

    Constitutional Tribunal, DTC 1/2004.

  331. 331.

    Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461.

  332. 332.

    Weiler (2005).

  333. 333.

    Nuñez Poblete (2008).

  334. 334.

    For doubts as to the achievements of human rights protection by the ECJ, see Albi (2010).

  335. 335.

    See supra, § 4.

  336. 336.

    ECJ, 14 May 1974, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities, Case 4-73.

  337. 337.

    Poiares Maduro (2004), p. 16. See also Poiares Maduro (2012).

  338. 338.

    Italics supplied.

  339. 339.

    Italics supplied.

  340. 340.

    See e.g. the insistence of the German Constitutional Court in the Lisbon ruling, §§ 57, 153, 234, 304, 339.

  341. 341.

    See supra, § 4.

  342. 342.

    BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30th June 2009, § 240.

  343. 343.

    JHR and LB (2007), p. 180.

  344. 344.

    Simon (2011), p. 41.

  345. 345.

    See e.g. Stout and Love (2016), Gill (2008) and Diggelmann and Altwicker (2008).

  346. 346.

    See e.g. Wahl (2010) and Tzanakopoulou (2018).

  347. 347.

    Deplano (2013).

  348. 348.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.3. See also Viellechner (2012) and Millet (2018).

  349. 349.

    Frank (1949, 1950).

  350. 350.

    International Law Commission, Report on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc. A/CN/4/L.682, 13 avril 2006. See also Dupuy (2007) and Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2013).

  351. 351.

    Peters (2006).

  352. 352.

    Koskenniemi (2005), p. 3.

  353. 353.

    Viellechner, ‘Friendliness’ Towards Others: How the German Constitution Deals with Legal Pluralism, § 3.3.2. See also Viellechner (2012).

  354. 354.

    Unger (1996).

  355. 355.

    More precisely, regarding the use of the concept of “federalism” in the analysis of the relations between member states and the EU, see Tusseau (2014c).

  356. 356.

    Arato and Cohen (2018), p. 25.

  357. 357.

    Neves (2009), p. 5.

  358. 358.

    Sartori (1962), p. 855.

  359. 359.

    Kuo (2010). See also Holmes (1995), pp. 161–166.

  360. 360.

    García de Enterría (2006), p. 55.

  361. 361.

    Kammerhofer (2010), p. 724.

  362. 362.

    See esp. Scheiderman (2013).

  363. 363.

    Kennedy (2008).

  364. 364.

    Dunoff (2009), p. 179.

  365. 365.

    Ward (2001), p. 29 and Sinclair (2012), pp. 1–8, 29.

  366. 366.

    Bellamy (2007) and McGann (2004).

  367. 367.

    Bellamy (2007), p. 178.

  368. 368.

    Bellamy (2007), pp. 145–175.

  369. 369.

    Parker (1994), pp. 66, 76, 98, 105, 107.

  370. 370.

    Chimni (2004).

  371. 371.

    Yasuaki (2006).

  372. 372.

    Sosa (2004).

  373. 373.

    Gill (2000).

  374. 374.

    Yeh and Chang (2008).

  375. 375.

    Lassalle (1862).

  376. 376.

    Peters (2009a).

  377. 377.

    Peters (2009b).

  378. 378.

    Gadamer (2011).

  379. 379.

    See also Skinner (1969), esp. p. 6; Dunn (1968).

  380. 380.

    Rorty (1980), pp. 348–349.

  381. 381.

    Tusseau (forthcoming).

  382. 382.

    See e.g. Legrand (2011); Legrand (2009), pp. 209–244; Legrand (1999, 2003, 2013, 2014).

  383. 383.

    Legrand (1999), p. 1058.

  384. 384.

    On this concept, see Sacco (1991), esp. pp. 105–108.

  385. 385.

    Frankenberg (1985), p. 425. See also Frankenberg (2016).

  386. 386.

    Balkin (1993–1994), p. 166.

  387. 387.

    Samuel (1988), p. 827.

  388. 388.

    Samuel (1988), p. 833.

  389. 389.

    Ewald (1995), p. 2114.

  390. 390.

    Geertz (1993), p. 149.

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Tusseau, G. (2020). Debating Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism: New Trajectories for Legal Theory in the Global Age. In: Tusseau, G. (eds) Debating Legal Pluralism and Constitutionalism. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 41. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34432-0_1

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