Abstract
The additively separable hedonic game (ASHG) is a model of coalition formation games on graphs. In this paper, we intensively and extensively investigate the computational complexity of finding several desirable solutions, such as a Nash stable solution, a maximum utilitarian solution, and a maximum egalitarian solution in ASHGs on sparse graphs including bounded-degree graphs, bounded-treewidth graphs, and near-planar graphs. For example, we show that finding a maximum egalitarian solution is weakly NP-hard even on graphs of treewidth 2, whereas it can be solvable in polynomial time on trees. Moreover, we give a pseudo fixed parameter algorithm when parameterized by treewidth.
A full version of the paper is available in [13]. This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP17K19960, 17H01698, 19K21537.
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Hanaka, T., Kiya, H., Maei, Y., Ono, H. (2019). Computational Complexity of Hedonic Games on Sparse Graphs. In: Baldoni, M., Dastani, M., Liao, B., Sakurai, Y., Zalila Wenkstern, R. (eds) PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11873. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_43
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