Skip to main content

Subset Spaces for Conditional Norms

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Book cover PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 11873))

Abstract

We introduce two notions of conditionals, forward conditional for deductive implication and backward conditional for abductive implication. The former is in regard to Lewis [16]’s conditional, while the latter is treated as a binary window modality. We introduce logics of forward and backward conditionals, interpreted over a point-set semantics (with explicit likelihood) from the logic of subset spaces. These conditionals and their logics have applications in the studies of conditional norms.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Subset space is a more general concept than topological space, in the sense that \(\mathscr {O}\) can be any set of subsets of W in a subset space (WO), while as a topological space, \(\mathscr {O}\) must in addition satisfy several closure conditions. Therefore, all topological spaces are subset spaces, but not vice versa. Further note that the opens in a subset space may also lack the closure conditions.

  2. 2.

    In literature, STIT-logic [22] offers a standard way to illustrate obligation and permission in games. But the connection between STIT and the approach we take has been aware [1, 6]. We compare our account with STIT-logic in the future.

  3. 3.

    Like the discussion in [1], we also model the chicken game by express agents implicitly. The reason is that our two deontic concepts can be discussed without the explicit modalities regarding to multi-agents, because it is symmetric for agents to choose strategies in chicken game.

References

  1. Anglberger, A.J., Gratzl, N., Roy, O.: Obligation, free choice, and the logic of weakest permissions. Rev. Symb. Logic 8, 807–827 (2015)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  2. Arlo-Costa, H., Egré, P., Rott, H.: The logic of conditionals. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Summer 2019 Edition (2019)

    Google Scholar 

  3. van Benthem, J.F.A.K.: Minimal deontic logics. Bull. Sect. Logic 8(1), 36–41 (1979)

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Chellas, B.F.: Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1980)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  5. Dabrowski, A., Moss, L.S., Parikh, R.: Topological reasoning and the logic of knowledge. Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 78(1–3), 73–110 (1996)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Dong, H., Roy, O.: Three deontic logics for rational agency in games. Stud. Logic 8(4), 7–31 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Douven, I.: Abduction. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Summer 2017 Edition (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Fraassen, B.C.: The logic of conditional obligation. J. Philos. Logic 1(3), 417–438 (1972)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Gabbay, D., Horty, J., Parent, X., van der Meyden, R., van der Torre, L.: Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. College Publication, London (2013)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Gargov, G., Passy, S., Tinchev, T.: Modal environment for boolean speculations. In: Skordev, D.G. (ed.) Mathematical Logic and Its Applications, pp. 253–263. Springer, Boston (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0897-3_17

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Gelati, J., Rotolo, A., Sartor, G., Governatori, G.: Normative autonomy and normative co-ordination: declarative power, representation, and mandate. Artif. Intell. Law 12(1–2), 53–81 (2004)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Goldblatt, R.I.: Semantic analysis of orthologic. J. Philos. Logic 3(1), 19–35 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00652069

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Governatori, G., Gelati, J., Rotolo, A., Sartor, G.: Actions, institutions, powers: preliminary notes. In: International Workshop on Regulated Agent-Based Social Systems: Theories and Applications, RASTA 2002, pp. 131–147. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Hansson, S.O.: The varieties of permissions. In: Gabbay, D., Horty, J., Parent, X., van der Meyden, R., van der Torre, L. (eds.) Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, vol. 1. College Publication, London (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Humberstone, I.L.: Inaccessible worlds. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 24(3), 346–352 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093870378

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Lewis, D.: Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford (1973)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  17. Makinson, D.: On a fundamental problem of deontic logic. In: Norms, Logics and Information Systems. New Studies on Deontic Logic and Computer Science, pp. 29–54 (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Moss, L.S., Parikh, R.: Topological reasoning and the logic of knowledge. In: Moses, Y. (ed.) Proceedings of the 4th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge (TARK), Monterey, CA, pp. 95–105. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, March 1992. Preliminary report

    Google Scholar 

  19. Pigozzi, G., Van Der Torre, L.: Multiagent deontic logic and its challenges from a normative systems perspective. Ifcolog J. Logics Appl. 4, 2929–2993 (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Ramsey, F.P.: General propositions and causality. In: Mellor, D.H. (ed.) F. P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1990)

    Google Scholar 

  21. Schelling, T.C.: The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1980)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  22. Tamminga, A.: Deontic logic for strategic games. Erkenntnis 78(1), 183–200 (2013)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  23. Tuzet, G.: Legal abductions. In: Legal Knowledge and Information Systems, pp. 41–49. IOS Press, Amsterdam (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  24. Vickers, S.: Topology via Logic. Cambridge University Press, New York (1989)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  25. Wáng, Y.N., Ågotnes, T.: Multi-agent subset space logic. In: Proceedings of IJCAI, pp. 1155–1161 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  26. Wooldridge, M.: An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems, 2nd edn. Wiley, Hoboken (2009)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgement

Huimin Dong is supported by the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant No. 2018M632494), the National Social Science Fund of China (Grant No. 18ZDA290), the National Science Centre of Poland (Grant No. UMO-2017/26/M/HS1/01092), and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China. Yì N. Wáng acknowledges funding support by the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 16CZX048, 18ZDA290).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Yì N. Wáng .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

A Some Proofs of Proposition 3

A Some Proofs of Proposition 3

Clause 1. We show this by giving a counter model. Consider \(M=(\{w\},\mathscr {O},V)\) such that \(\mathscr {O}= \{\emptyset ,\{w\}\}\), \(V(p)=\emptyset \) and \(V(q)=\{w\}\). We show . It suffices to show that if

$$\begin{aligned} \hbox {for all} \, O'\in \mathscr {O}_w, \, \text {if} \, M,w, O'\models q \, \ \text {then} \ \, {\llbracket p\rrbracket }_{O'}\in \text {sub}(\{w\}), \end{aligned}$$
(1)

then

$$\begin{aligned} \hbox {for all} \, O'\in \mathscr {O}_w, \, \text {if} \, {\llbracket q\rrbracket }_{O'}\in \text {sub}(\{w\}) \, \ \text {then} \, \, M,w, O'\models p. \end{aligned}$$
(2)

Since there is only one open neighborhood of w. Clause (1) is equivalent to:

$$\begin{aligned} \text {if} \, \, M,w,\{w\} \models q, \text {then} \, \, {\llbracket p\rrbracket }_{\{w\}}\in \text {sub}(\{w\}) \end{aligned}$$
(3)

By definition, \(M,w,\{w\}\models q \iff w\in V(q)\) which is true, and \({\llbracket p\rrbracket }_{\{w\}}=\emptyset \in \text {sub}(\{w\})\) is also true. So clause (3) holds.

Similarly, clause (2) is equivalent to the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \text {if} \, \ {\llbracket q\rrbracket }_{\{w\}}\in \text {sub}(\{w\}), \, \text {then} \, \ M,w,\{w\}\models p. \end{aligned}$$
(4)

While \({\llbracket q\rrbracket }_{\{w\}}=\{w\}\in \text {sub}(\{w\})\) holds, \(M,w,\{w\}\models p\) does not. So clause (4) does not hold. Which shows that the given model M is such that .

Clause 2. Consider the formula \(\bot \multimap \bot \). Given a model \(M=(W,\mathscr {O},V)\), \(w\in W\) and \(O\in \mathscr {O}_w\), by definition,

$$\begin{array}{lll} M,w,O\models \bot \multimap \bot &{}\iff &{} \text {for all} \, O'\in \mathscr {O}_w, \, \text {if} \, \ {\llbracket \bot \rrbracket }_{O'}\in \text {sub}(O) \, \ \text {then} \, \ M,w,O'\models \bot \\ &{}\iff &{}\text {for all} \, O'\in \mathscr {O}_w, \text {if} \, \ \emptyset \in \mathscr {O}\ \ \text {then} \, \ M,w,O'\models \bot \\ &{}\iff &{}\text {for all} \, O'\in \mathscr {O}_w, \emptyset \notin \mathscr {O}\\ \end{array}$$

To find a counter model, all we need is to make the empty set an open in a model and make sure that there is an open neighborhood of a world w. A candidate of such a model is \((\{w\},\{\emptyset , \{w\}\}, V)\), where the valuation V is arbitrary.

This shows that \(\varphi \multimap \varphi \) is not valid in general, and further that \(\alpha \multimap \alpha \) is not valid even when \(\alpha \) is propositional.

Clause 5. Consider the fomrula . Given a model \(M=(W,\mathscr {O},V)\), \(w\in W\) and \(O\in \mathscr {O}_w\), by definition,

This is clearly not valid. We can easily find a counterexample, as long as \(W\notin \mathscr {O}\).

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Dong, H., Ramanujam, R., Wáng, Y.N. (2019). Subset Spaces for Conditional Norms. In: Baldoni, M., Dastani, M., Liao, B., Sakurai, Y., Zalila Wenkstern, R. (eds) PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11873. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_18

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_18

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-33791-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-33792-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics