Abstract
We introduce two notions of conditionals, forward conditional for deductive implication and backward conditional for abductive implication. The former is in regard to Lewis [16]’s conditional, while the latter is treated as a binary window modality. We introduce logics of forward and backward conditionals, interpreted over a point-set semantics (with explicit likelihood) from the logic of subset spaces. These conditionals and their logics have applications in the studies of conditional norms.
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Notes
- 1.
Subset space is a more general concept than topological space, in the sense that \(\mathscr {O}\) can be any set of subsets of W in a subset space (W, O), while as a topological space, \(\mathscr {O}\) must in addition satisfy several closure conditions. Therefore, all topological spaces are subset spaces, but not vice versa. Further note that the opens in a subset space may also lack the closure conditions.
- 2.
- 3.
Like the discussion in [1], we also model the chicken game by express agents implicitly. The reason is that our two deontic concepts can be discussed without the explicit modalities regarding to multi-agents, because it is symmetric for agents to choose strategies in chicken game.
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Acknowledgement
Huimin Dong is supported by the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant No. 2018M632494), the National Social Science Fund of China (Grant No. 18ZDA290), the National Science Centre of Poland (Grant No. UMO-2017/26/M/HS1/01092), and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China. Yì N. Wáng acknowledges funding support by the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 16CZX048, 18ZDA290).
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A Some Proofs of Proposition 3
A Some Proofs of Proposition 3
Clause 1. We show this by giving a counter model. Consider \(M=(\{w\},\mathscr {O},V)\) such that \(\mathscr {O}= \{\emptyset ,\{w\}\}\), \(V(p)=\emptyset \) and \(V(q)=\{w\}\). We show . It suffices to show that if
then
Since there is only one open neighborhood of w. Clause (1) is equivalent to:
By definition, \(M,w,\{w\}\models q \iff w\in V(q)\) which is true, and \({\llbracket p\rrbracket }_{\{w\}}=\emptyset \in \text {sub}(\{w\})\) is also true. So clause (3) holds.
Similarly, clause (2) is equivalent to the following:
While \({\llbracket q\rrbracket }_{\{w\}}=\{w\}\in \text {sub}(\{w\})\) holds, \(M,w,\{w\}\models p\) does not. So clause (4) does not hold. Which shows that the given model M is such that .
Clause 2. Consider the formula \(\bot \multimap \bot \). Given a model \(M=(W,\mathscr {O},V)\), \(w\in W\) and \(O\in \mathscr {O}_w\), by definition,
To find a counter model, all we need is to make the empty set an open in a model and make sure that there is an open neighborhood of a world w. A candidate of such a model is \((\{w\},\{\emptyset , \{w\}\}, V)\), where the valuation V is arbitrary.
This shows that \(\varphi \multimap \varphi \) is not valid in general, and further that \(\alpha \multimap \alpha \) is not valid even when \(\alpha \) is propositional.
Clause 5. Consider the fomrula . Given a model \(M=(W,\mathscr {O},V)\), \(w\in W\) and \(O\in \mathscr {O}_w\), by definition,
This is clearly not valid. We can easily find a counterexample, as long as \(W\notin \mathscr {O}\).
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Dong, H., Ramanujam, R., Wáng, Y.N. (2019). Subset Spaces for Conditional Norms. In: Baldoni, M., Dastani, M., Liao, B., Sakurai, Y., Zalila Wenkstern, R. (eds) PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11873. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_18
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