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Internal Senses and Aristotle’s Cognitive Theory

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The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition

Part of the book series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind ((SHPM,volume 22))

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Abstract

The question I plan to address is: Does Aristotle posit one or more internal senses in theorizing about perception and other types of sensory experience? My initial thought is that there are good reasons to be skeptical.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a critical analysis of the argument for this claim in De Anima 2.3, see C. Shields, comm. 2016.

  2. 2.

    It is precisely this dependence upon a concurrent perception of an external object that accounts for the morally pernicious effects of pleasure and pain. Too much pleasure associated with flavors is implicated in gluttony; too much pain associated with the sights and sounds of an approaching hostile army is implicated in cowardice.

  3. 3.

    For a succinct thumbnail sketch of this construal of the common sense, see P. Gregoric, (2007) pp. 9–13.

  4. 4.

    Modrak (1987) chapter six.

  5. 5.

    For present purposes, treating dream phantasmata as images is unproblematic. Granted, there has been considerable discussion of the broader question of whether phantasmata are images in the secondary literature. See Modrak (1986) and Modrak, chapter four (1987); for more recent contributions to this discussion, see Scheiter (2012) and Radovic (forthcoming).

  6. 6.

    Aristotle also mentions the metaphorical use of phantasia only to set it aside in 3.3. There is no evidence that when Aristotle appeals to phantasia in other places that he is using the term metaphorically.

  7. 7.

    Even phantasia is true in the case of proper objects when perception is also present, but it need not be in the absence of a concurrent perception (3.3.428b27–30).

  8. 8.

    See, e.g., Nussbaum, (1978) pp. 223–321. Conceiving phantasia as appearances has prompted other commentators to downplay the role of imagery in it. See, e.g. Schofield (1978) p. 102. See also Scheiter (2012) and Radovic (forthcoming).

  9. 9.

    For a detailed defense of the Sensory Content Analysis of phantasia, see Modrak (1986) and Modrak (1987).

  10. 10.

    See, for a different interpretation of the canonical account, M. Wedin (1988), chap. 2, which argues for the functional incompleteness of phantasia.

  11. 11.

    Cf. Schofield (1978) which characterizes Aristotle’s conception of imagination in 3.3 as non-paradigmatic sensory experience.

References

  • Gregoic, P. (2007). Aristotle on the common sense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  • Lloyd, G., & Owen, G. (Eds.). (1978). Aristotle on mind and the senses: Proceedings of the seventh symposium Aristotelicum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Modrak, D. (1986). Phantasia Reconsidered. In Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie. Band 1986. Heft 1, 47–69.

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  • Modrak, D. (1987). Aristotle: The power of perception. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

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  • Nussbaum, M. (1978). Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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  • Radovic, F. (Forthcoming). Eidola, phantasmata and images in Aristotle.

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  • Scheiter, K. M. (2012). Images, appearances and Phantasia in Aristotle. Phronesis, 57, 251–278.

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  • Schofield, M. (1978). In G. Lloyd & G. Owen (Eds.), Aristotle on the imagination.” Aristotle on mind and the senses (pp. 249–277). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  • Shields, C. (2016). Aristotle De Anima. Translation with introduction and commentary. Oxford: University of Oxford.

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  • Wedin, M. (1988). Mind and imagination in Aristotle. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Depatment of Philosophy, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA

    Deborah Modrak

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  1. Deborah Modrak
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Correspondence to Deborah Modrak .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

    Seyed N. Mousavian

  2. SAXO-Instituttet, København, Denmark

    Jakob Leth Fink

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Modrak, D. (2020). Internal Senses and Aristotle’s Cognitive Theory. In: Mousavian, S., Fink, J. (eds) The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33408-6_2

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