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Migrants, Receiving Communities, and Virtues

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Solidarity and Reciprocity with Migrants in Asia

Part of the book series: Religion and Global Migrations ((RGM))

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Abstract

In affirming virtues and human rights are related and complementary, in this chapter, Yuen explains the relevancy of virtue ethics in nurturing the caring attitude of people in the receiving countries toward the migrants. She investigates the features of virtue ethics in general, and Christian virtue ethics in particular, that are relevant to social ethics, with focus on its telos, other-regarding virtues, and cultural sensitivity. She also discusses ways to cultivate and sustain the relational virtues, through examining the role of human agency, practices, emotion and moral imagination, and role models in virtue cultivation. The author also discusses the role of prudence as a guide to action and virtuous action.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Judith A. Merkle, “Social Ethics in the New Millennium,” in Ethical Dilemmas in the New Millennium, ed. Francis A. Eigo (Villanova, PA: Villanova University Press, 2000), 85.

  2. 2.

    For an account of the history of ancient virtue ethics, please refer to Rachana Kamtekar, “Ancient Virtue Ethics: An Overview with an Emphasis on Practical Wisdom,” in The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel C. Russell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 29–48; Raymond J. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002). The revival of virtue ethics came about with the advocacy of British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe in the late 1950s and the publication of After Virtue by moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre in 1981. See Elizabeth Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 26–44; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

  3. 3.

    Philip J. Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1990); Yuli Liu, The Unity of Rule and Virtue in Confucianism: A Critique of a Supposed Parallel between Confucian Ethics and Virtue Ethics (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004); Manhong Lin, “Toward a Chinese Christian Ethic: Individual, Community and Society,” Graduate Theological Union, Unpublished Dissertation, 2007; Lai Chen, “Virtue Ethics and Confucian Ethics.” Dao 9, no. 3 (2010): 275–287; Yiu-sing Lucas Chan, “Bridging Christian and Confucian Ethics: Is the Bridge Adequately Catholic and East Asian?” Asian Christian Review 1, no. 5 (August 2011): 49–93.

  4. 4.

    Robert Louden, “Virtue Ethics,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Donald Borchert, 2nd ed. vol. 9, (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), 687–689. Gale Virtual Reference Library, Web version: http://einproxy.gotdns.org:2056/gps/start.do?prodId=IPS&userGroupName=hkhss (accessed 11 November 2009); James Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” in Development of the Historical Fundamental Moral Theology in the United States, Readings in Moral Theology No. 11, eds. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick (New York: Paulist Press), 282.

  5. 5.

    Despite the variety of virtue ethics, there are some common elements. For example, Daniel C. Russell outlines the central concepts in all ancient virtue ethicists which are still prevalent today, that is, the stress on cultivation of virtues or character traits that are essential to living a fulfilling human life, a life in which one both cares about the right things and has the wisdom and skill to act intelligently about those things. See Daniel C. Russell, “Introduction: Virtue Ethics in Modern Moral Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel C. Russell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3. See also Joseph J. Kotva, Jr., The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 38–39.

  6. 6.

    Richard Gula, The Call to Holiness (New York: Paulist Press, 2003), 33.

  7. 7.

    Jean Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. Robin Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 96; Joseph J. Kotva, Jr., The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 24.

  8. 8.

    Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 ed.), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/ (accessed 25 November 2013).

  9. 9.

    Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 24.

  10. 10.

    William Spohn, “The Return of Virtue Ethics,” Theological Studies 53, no.1 (1992): 61–67; Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 143–155; David Solomon, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics,” in Midwest Study in Philosophy Volume XIII. Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, ed. Peter A. French et al. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 431–433.

  11. 11.

    David B. Wong, “On Flourishing and Finding One’s Identity in Community,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIII. Ethical Theory, 337; Alasdair. A MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 161–163; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, rev. ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 303–306.

  12. 12.

    Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 137–138.

  13. 13.

    As mentioned in Chap. 2, since Vatican II, the Catholic Church employs both the Christian Scripture and natural law theory in Catholic social teaching, depending on the target audience. In Chap. 2, I emphasized natural law and human rights theories, due to the need to use a common morality with other people of good will. When discussing Christian virtue ethics in this chapter, with Christians as main audience, I will employ Scripture, especially in the sections on evoking emotions and imagination in virtue ethics (3.2) and spiritual practices (3.4). Later in Chap. 4, when I discuss the relational virtues, I will also highlight the biblical roots of these virtues.

  14. 14.

    Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 38; Patricia Lamoureux and Paul J. Wadell, The Christian Moral Life: Faithful Discipleship for a Global Society (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 111.

  15. 15.

    MacIntyre, After Virtue, 53–55.

  16. 16.

    Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 137–138.

  17. 17.

    Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 121–123. Also see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, rev. ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 344–349.

  18. 18.

    David B. Wong, “On Flourishing and Finding One’s Identity in Community,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIII. Ethical Theory, 337.

  19. 19.

    Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Vol. 1 (ST I), trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzigner Brothers, 1947), 65.2.

  20. 20.

    The notion of common good is central in Aquinas’ moral thought because for him, as for Aristotle, human beings are intrinsically social beings who can exist and flourish only within the context of a community. See Aquinas, ST I, 96.4; II–II, 47.10.

  21. 21.

    Aquinas, ST II–II, 47.10 ad 2; Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 50–51.

  22. 22.

    Aquinas, ST I, 6.1 ad 2; I–II, 109.3; I, 12.1, II–II, 23.1,6. Also see Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 63, 91.

  23. 23.

    Paul Wadell, The Primacy of Love: An Introduction to the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), 115.

  24. 24.

    Thomas Aquinas, Summa of the Summa, ed. and trans. Peter Kreeft (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 383.

  25. 25.

    As stated in the Gospel of Matthew 22:37–39, “Jesus said to him, ‘You must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. The second resembles it: You must love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments hang the whole Law, and the Prophets too.” Also see Gaudium et Spes, no. 24.

  26. 26.

    Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 144.

  27. 27.

    Jesus teaches his disciples that his followers must be humble and be servants of others (Matt 23:12, Mark 9:35); willing to renounce themselves, take up the cross, and lose their lives (Mark 8:35); and choose the narrow gate and hard road if they desire life (Matt 7:14).

  28. 28.

    In the parable of the last judgment in the Gospel of Matthew 25: 31–46, the King said, in so far as you did this to one of the least of these brothers and sisters (strangers, prisoners, and those who are hungry, thirsty, lacking clothes and being sick), you did it to me.

  29. 29.

    Richard Gula, The Call to Holiness, 28–29.

  30. 30.

    Edward C. Vacek, “Love for God—Is It Obligatory?” Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics (1996): 220; Gula, The Call to Holiness, 30–31.

  31. 31.

    Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 144.

  32. 32.

    For example, Exod 22:20–24 (do not molest the stranger or oppress them, do not be harsh with the widow or orphan, do not demand interest from the poor when lending money to them); Deut 24:14–19 (not to exploit the hired servant, leave something for the stranger, orphan and widow when harvest); Ps 3:14–17; 6; 10:8–14; 94:3–7 (petitions showing the general expectation that Yahweh will be the protector of the weak and unprotected); Eccles 10:30–31 (the poor man is honored for his wits); Isa 10:1–4; Jer 22:1–5; Amos 6:4–6; Micah 3:9–12 (prophets spoke against injustice and defended the poor). See Clodovis Boff and George V. Pixley, The Bible, the Church and the Poor (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1989), 17–52.

  33. 33.

    Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 149.

  34. 34.

    For example, Luke 4:17–21 (to bring good news to the poor); Luke 21:1–4 (Jesus praised the poor widow); John 8:1–11 (Jesus forgave the Samaritan woman who was regarded as a sinner); Luke 16:19–31 (the parable of the beggar Lazarus and the rich man); Matthew 25:31–34 (show concern to the least advantaged in the parable of the last judgment); Mark 5:21–43 (Jesus healed the bleeding woman); Matthew 5 (the sermon on the mount).

  35. 35.

    Paul’s letter to the Colossians 3:12–15.

  36. 36.

    MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 2, 10–11.

  37. 37.

    The 11 spheres of experience and their corresponding virtues are (1) fear of important damages (courage); (2) bodily appetites and their pleasures (moderation); (3) distribution of limited resources (justice); (4) management of one’s personal property where others are concerned (generosity); (5) management of personal property (expansive hospitality); (6) attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth (greatness of soul); (7) attitude to slights and damages (mildness of temper); (8). association and living together and the fellowship of words and actions (truthfulness, easy grace, friendliness); (9) attitude to the good and ill fortune of others (proper judgment); (10) intellectual life (intellectual virtues); (11) the planning of one’s life and conduct (practical wisdom). See Martha Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” in The Quality of Life, ed. Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 246.

  38. 38.

    Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues,” 251.

  39. 39.

    Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues,” 260.

  40. 40.

    Nussbaum illustrates this concept with an example of increasing the rate of female literacy in rural Bangladesh by a government development group. The project began with good intentions but without consulting the rural women themselves. Later they changed their approach and let the local women define for themselves a set of aspirations for change. The change in approach from general talk of education and self-respect to immersion in a concrete historical reality, forming cooperative groups that brought together development workers with local women, led to a much more complex understanding of the situation. Nussbaum claims that this narrative demonstrates a combination of Aristotelian commitment to the human good and Aristotelian contextual sensitivity. Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues,” 258–259.

  41. 41.

    Kotva, Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 146.

  42. 42.

    Aquinas speaks of virtue as habits, that is, firm, stable, and predictable ways of being and acting, genuinely expressing who we have become. A virtue shapes not only our acts but also ourselves; the virtues are habits that make us good. See Aquinas, ST I–II, 49.1.

  43. 43.

    Based on Aristotle’s account of virtue, Devettere points out the difference between natural character virtue from authentic character virtue. See Raymond J. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics: Insights of the Ancient Greeks (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 70. Also see Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethic, 1144b17 (1925. Reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 156–158.

  44. 44.

    Aquinas observed that it is not easy to grow in virtue (ST, I–II, 51.3). He defines three stages to the acquisition of the virtues. There are the virtues of beginners, the virtues of those already on their way, and the virtues of those who have finally arrived (ST, II–II, 24.9). In the first stage, virtues work not so much to do good but to overcome bad, to uproot and overpower vices. Thomas says the individual must “devote himself mainly to withdrawing from sin and resisting the appetites, which drive him in the opposite direction to charity. This is the condition of beginners, who need to nourish and carefully foster charity to prevent its being lost” (ST, II–II, 24.9). In the second stage we are trying to grow in the virtues we have acquired, to strengthen their hold on our lives, living in a way that enables us to participate more deeply in a virtue’s goodness. We begin to practice with facility and delight. Finally, the third stage of the virtuous life marks those who have fully arrived. Aquinas explains that this stage is “when a man applies himself chiefly to the work of cleaving to God and enjoying him, which is characteristic of the perfect who long to depart and to be with Christ” (ST II–II, 24.9). Aquinas’ delineation of the virtuous life into stages assures us that, however difficult, we can make progress in the moral life. No matter how difficult growing in justice, forbearance, generosity, or compassion might be, the virtues tell us we can take on these qualities the more we practice these acts. See Wadell, The Primacy of Love, 118–119.

  45. 45.

    Aquinas, ST I–II, 51.2; Paul Wadell, The Primacy of Love: An Introduction to the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), 116–117. Also see Patricia Lamoureux and Paul Wadell, The Christian Moral Life (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Book, 2010), 120–121.

  46. 46.

    Wadell, The Primacy of Love, 114.

  47. 47.

    Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz, “Mujeristia Theology,” in Encyclopedia of Women and Religion in North America, Vol. 3, ed. Rosemary S. Keller and Rosemary R. Ruether (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 1188–1193.

  48. 48.

    Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 28–29. Aquinas understands human goodness in two senses: a good act is an act that conforms to reason, and a good act is one that can actualize and perfect the powers of the agent, including her passion, will, and intellect. Thus, the human agent plays an important role in the process of growing in virtues. See Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics, 141–142.

  49. 49.

    Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 24, 27.

  50. 50.

    Louden, “Virtue Ethics,” 687–689.

  51. 51.

    Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 108, 118.

  52. 52.

    Martha Nussbaum, “Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and the Moral Imagination,” in Love’s Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 152–153.

  53. 53.

    Wadell, The Primacy of Love, 79.

  54. 54.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 78.

  55. 55.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 83.

  56. 56.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 82.

  57. 57.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 91.

  58. 58.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 95.

  59. 59.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 96. Also see James Gustafson, Can Ethics Be Christian? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 65.

  60. 60.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 97.

  61. 61.

    Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 120–122.

  62. 62.

    Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 6; Wadell, The Primacy of Love, 122.

  63. 63.

    Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 81.

  64. 64.

    Richard M. Gula, The Good Life (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), 79–80.

  65. 65.

    Matt 10:37 (giving up family and its affection); Mark 10:21 (giving up property); Mark 10:43 (giving up ambition); and Mark 10:45 (giving up life itself). Also see Gula, The Good Life, 86, 90, 91.

  66. 66.

    William Spohn, Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics (New York: Continuum, 2000), 150.

  67. 67.

    As Jesus said, “Wherever your treasure is, there will your heart be too” (Matt 6:21). Also see Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 142–143; Gula, The Call to Holiness, 193–194.

  68. 68.

    Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 153. Also see Ronald Rolheiser, The Holy Longing: The Search for a Christian Spirituality (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 120.

  69. 69.

    Rolheiser, The Holy Longing, 174.

  70. 70.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 115.

  71. 71.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 117–118.

  72. 72.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 150.

  73. 73.

    Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 112–113, 120–121, 135–137; Rolheiser, The Holy Longing, 173–175.

  74. 74.

    Gula, The Call to Holiness, 156.

  75. 75.

    Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 38; Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 73.

  76. 76.

    Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 38–39; Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 160.

  77. 77.

    Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 41–43.

  78. 78.

    For Aristotle, phronesis, or prudence, is a central virtue, and it is an intellectual virtue. To be good, one must also be wise, and to be wise, one must also be good. To put this in medieval terms, one cannot exercise prudence without justice, temperance, and courage, and one cannot exercise temperance, courage, or justice without prudence. Aquinas calls this the unity of the virtues. See Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 154.

  79. 79.

    Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 89.

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Yuen, M.MY. (2020). Migrants, Receiving Communities, and Virtues. In: Solidarity and Reciprocity with Migrants in Asia. Religion and Global Migrations. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33365-2_5

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