Skip to main content

Bureaucracies

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Book cover Who Governs?

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in American Economic History ((AEH))

  • 316 Accesses

Abstract

German sociologist Max Weber argued that because of their expertise and constant presence, bureaucracies were or could be the chief force in government, a position supported by reformers and progressive politicians who believed that technological advances required more sophisticated government administrations. It was questionable, however, whether expertise and efficiency in government and the political process have been, or could be, improved. The conflict between administrative and traditional judicial processes is still active, along with the political complications of regulation.

In a modern state the actual ruler is necessarily and unavoidably the bureaucracy, since power is exercised neither through parliamentary speeches nor monarchical enunciations but through the routines of administrations.

—Max Weber, Economy and Society (1922, p. 1393).

The widening area of what in effect is law-making authority, exercised by officials whose actions are not subject to ordinary court review, constitutes perhaps the most striking contemporary tendency of the Anglo-American legal order.

—Felix Frankfurter, “The task of administrative law” (1927).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Remini 1981, pp. ix, 15, 192. “The years 1816–28 are generally known as the Era of Good feelings because … one party ruled the nation…. (Actually there was considerable quarreling and factious bickering within that party.)”

  2. 2.

    For example, Schlesinger (1945, pp. 115, 218), and Richard Hofstadter (1949, p. 63, discussed by Temin, 1969, p. 16). Catterall (1902, p. 476), was representative of historians when he wrote that “Jackson and his supporters committed an offense against the nation when they destroyed the bank. [F]ew greater enormities are chargeable to politicians than the destruction of the Bank of the United States. It was a machine capable of incalculable service to this country – a service which can be rendered by no bank not similarly organized.” Hummel (1978) observed that even some normally inclined to laissez faire criticized Jackson’s war on the bank

  3. 3.

    In 1936, the president established a Committee on Administrative Management (chaired by Louis Brownlow) to make recommendations about how he might manage the independent agencies. The Committee pointed out that they had been created one by one over the past 50 years, and threatened to become a headless fourth branch of the Government, not contemplated by the Constitution, nor responsible administratively to the President, Congress, or the Courts. “The president needs help,” the Committee reported, and its recommendation for a new Executive Office of the President to oversee the agencies was adopted in the Reorganization Act of 1939, along with the assignment of several agencies to existing departments of government. (Fesler 1987)

  4. 4.

    In 1895, the Supreme Court ruled that the American Sugar Refining Company had not violated the law even though the company controlled about 98 percent of all sugar refining in the United States on the ground that the company’s control of manufacture did not constitute a control of trade. Manufacturing was not the commerce specified in the law. On the other hand, the Roosevelt and Taft “trustbusting” administrations used the Act successfully against the Northern Securities Company, Standard Oil, and American Tobacco. The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 was passed to make the Sherman Act’s provisions against anticompetitive practices more precise.

  5. 5.

    John Hampden was a member of Parliament who stood trial in 1637 for his refusal to be taxed for ship money, and was one of the five members (with John Pym) whose attempted unconstitutional arrest by King Charles I in the House of Commons in 1642 sparked the Civil War.

  6. 6.

    Demsetz (1969) made this point when he took issue with Arrow’s (1962) claim that a free-market economy tends to underinvest in research to such an extent that the (full-information, zero-transactions-cost) government must intervene.

  7. 7.

    McGarity (2012) addressed Dodd-Frank’s charge to the Federal Reserve to limit bank charges to retailers for credit- and debit-card transactions (“swipe fees”) to what is “reasonable and proportional” to their costs, and indicated a reduction from 44¢ to 12¢. The Fed’s decision of 21¢ was overruled in July 2013 by a U.S. district court which said Congress had wanted a much lower fee. The U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C. overturned the district court in March 2014, saying that Dodd-Frank’s language was sufficiently ambiguous to give regulators leeway to set a higher fee cap. The U.S. Supreme Court declined an appeal. Michigan democratic Senator Richard Durbin announced that efforts to reduce fees would continue (Reuters, January 20, 2015).

  8. 8.

    Failures, according to Bardach, included minority hiring, President Johnson’s plan to build model communities on surplus federal land in cities, a model education program, subsidized integration of southern schools under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and improved community mental health services.

  9. 9.

    Wilson earned a doctorate from Johns Hopkins University in 1886, taught at Cornell, Bryn Mawr, and Wesleyan, moved to Princeton in 1890, where he was president (1902–10) until becoming governor of New Jersey (1911–13) and president of the United States (1913–21).

References

  • Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. 1981. Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1990. Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight. New York: Brookings.

    Google Scholar 

  • Adler, Jonathan H. 2016. Should Chevron be Reconsidered? A Federal Judge Thinks So. Washington Post, August 24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, Kenneth T. 1962. Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Investment. In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bardach, Eugene. 1977. The Implementation Game: What Happens after a Bill Becomes Law? Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bordo, Michael, and Harold James. 2013. The Economic Challenge. Learning from Crises. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burke, Edmund. 1790. Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. E. J. Payne, Selected Works. Clarendon Press. (Liberty Fund, 1999).

    Google Scholar 

  • Caro, Robert. 2003. The Years of Lyndon Johnson. Master of the Senate. New York: Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Catterall, Ralph C.H. 1902. The Second Bank of the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chapman, Stephen. 1979. The ICC and the Truckers, in Peters and Nelson. The Culture of Bureaucracy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, Ronald H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law and Economics, October.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1964. The Regulated Industries: Discussion. American Economic Review, May.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooper, Charles J. 2015. Confronting the Administrative State. National Affairs, Fall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crenson, Matthew A. 1975. The Federal Machine: Beginnings of Bureaucracy in Jacksonian America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz, Harold. 1969. Information and Efficiency. Journal of Law and Economics, April, 1–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dodd, Lawrence C., and Richard L. Schott. 1979. Congress and the Administrative State. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fenno, Richard. 1966. The Power of the Purse. Appropriations Politics in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fesler, James W. 1987. The Brownlow Committee Fifty Years Later. Public Administration Review, August.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fiorina, Morris, and Roger Noll. 1978. Voters, Bureaucrats, and Legislators: A Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy. Journal of Public Economics, June.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurter, Felix. 1927. The Task of Administrative Law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, May.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1930. The Public and its Government. Boston: Beacon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1936. The Young Men Go to Washington. Fortune, January.

    Google Scholar 

  • Godwin, William. 1798. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness, 3rd. G.G. and J. Robinson (rep. F.E.L. Priestley, ed., 1946, Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hamby, Alonzo L. 1995. Man of the People. A Life of Harry S. Truman. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, Joseph P. 1951. The Senatorial Rejection of Leland Olds: A Case Study. American Political Science Review, September.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review, September.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1973, 1976,1979. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henderson, Gerald C. 1924. The Federal Trade Commission: A Study in Administrative Law and Procedures. New Haven: Yale University. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofstadter, Richard. 1949. The American Political Tradition. New York: Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmes, Oliver W., Jr. 1881. The Common Law. Boston: Little, Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoogenboom, Ari and Olive. 1976. A History of the ICC. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hough, Charles M. 1917. Covert Legislation and the Constitution. Harvard Law Rev, 801–811.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hummel, Jeffrey. 1978. The Jacksonians, Banking, and Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation. Journal of Libertarian Studies 2: 151–165.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hyman, Sidney. 1976. Marriner S. Eccles. Stanford Graduate School of Business.

    Google Scholar 

  • Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas. 2012. The Wise Men. Six Friends and the World They Made. New York: Simon and Schuster.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaffe, Louis L. 1964. James Landis and the Administrative Process. Harvard Law Review, December.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jefferson, Thomas. 1903–1907. Writings, ed. A.A. Lipscomb and A.E. Bergh. Washington, DC: Jefferson Memorial Foundation.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jenkins, John A. 1978. The Revolving Door Between Government and the Law Firms, in Peters and Nelson. Culture of Bureaucracy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, Paul. 1991. The Birth of the Modern. New York: Harper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karl, Barry D. 1987. The American Bureaucrat: A History of a Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing. Public Administration Review, January–February.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kirst, Michael W. 1969. Government Without Passing Laws. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kolko, Gabriel. 1965. Railroads and Regulation, 1877–1916. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Landis, James M. 1938. The Administrative Process. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1960. Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President Elect, December.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macey, Jonathan R. 2010. The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Spring.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macey, Jonathan, and David D. Haddock. 1985. Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System. University of Illinois Law Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macmahon, Arthur W. 1943. Congressional Oversight of Administration. Political Science Quarterly, June.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCraw, Thomas K. 1975. Regulation in America. A Review Article. Business History Review, Summer.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGarity, Thomas O. 2012. Administrative Law as Blood Sport. Duke Law Journal, May.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mendelsohn, Wallace. 1957. Mr. Justice Frankfurter on Administrative Law. Journal of Politics, August.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moe, Terry M. 1997. The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy. In Perspectives in Public Choice: A Handbook, ed. D. Mueller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neal, Phil C. 1953. The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case. Stanford Law Review, February.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. New York: Aldine-Atherton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, Mancur, Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Page, Edward C. 1985. Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power. A Comparative Analysis. Nashville: University of Tennessee Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peters, Charles, and Michael Nelson, eds. 1979. The Culture of Bureaucracy. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Postell, Joseph. 2017. Bureaucracy in America. The Administrative State’s Challenge to Constitutional Government. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Remini, Robert V. 1981. Andrew Jackson. The Course of American Freedom, 1822–32. New York: Harper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ritchie, Donald A. 1980. Reforming the Regulatory Process: Why James Landis Changed his Mind. Business History Review, Autumn.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Root, Elihu. 1912. Judicial Decisions and Public Feeling: Presidential Address Before the New York State Bar Association. In Addresses on Government and Citizenship, ed. Robert Bacon and James Scott. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. 1945. The Age of Jackson. Boston: Little, Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schoenbrod, David. 1993. Power without Responsibility. How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Reports and Speeches. Washington, DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Seligman, Joel. 2003. The Transformation of Wall Street. A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance. 3rd ed. New York: Wolters Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sharfman, I. Leo. 1931–37. The Interstate Commerce Commission. Vol. 4. New York: Commonwealth Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shlaes, Amity. 2007. The Forgotten Man. A New History of the Great Depression. New York: HarperCollins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, Adam. 1776. An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: Strahan and Cadell. (Random House 1937).

    Google Scholar 

  • Sowell, Thomas. 1987. A Conflict of Visions. New York: William Morrow.

    Google Scholar 

  • Temin, Peter. 1969. The Jacksonian Economy. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tushnet, Mark. 2011. Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Theory. Duke Law Journal, April.

    Google Scholar 

  • U.S. House of Representatives. 1976. Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, 94th Cong., 2nd sess.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1979. Progress Toward the Development of a National Market System: Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance, 96th Congress, 1st sess.

    Google Scholar 

  • U.S. Senate. 1972. Stock Exchange Commission Rates, Hearings, Banking Subcommittee, 92nd Congress, 2nd sess.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1973. Securities Industry Study, Report No. 865. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Riper, Paul P. 1958. History of the U.S. Civil Service. Evanston: Row, Peterson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, Max. 1922. Economy and Society, trans. E. Fischoff, et al., ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich. London: Bedminister Press, 1968.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1946. Essays in Sociology, ed. H. Gerth and C. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wildavsky, Aaron, and Jeffrey L. Pressman. 1979. Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland. 3rd ed. Oakland: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Oliver E. 1973. Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations. American Economic Review, May.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, Woodrow. 1885. Congressional Government. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin. (with Introduction by Walter Lippman, World Publishing Co.).

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1887. The Study of Administration. Political Science Quarterly, June.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, James Q. 1976. The Rise of the Bureaucratic State. In The American Commonwealth, ed. Nathan Glazer and Irving Kristol. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1989. Bureaucracy. What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wood, John H., and Norma L. Wood. 1985. Financial Markets. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John H. Wood .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Wood, J.H. (2020). Bureaucracies. In: Who Governs?. Palgrave Studies in American Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33083-5_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33083-5_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-33082-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-33083-5

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics