Abstract
Emotions can signal moral character because emotions can be linked to morality in three ways: one by being intrinsically moral themselves, another by arising from moral judgments of oneself or of another, and a third by being morally appropriate or inappropriate in the context in which they occur. An emotion’s morality rests on the moral appropriateness of its appraisal, motivation, feeling, expression, and regulation. The emotions that a person does not have can be as informative about their morality as do emotions that actually occur. Emotions express character better than mere beliefs because emotions convey conviction, prioritization, and resolve. The uncontrollability of some emotions can convey sincerity and reliability, but even voluntary verbal expressions are speech acts that constitute a public commitment to a moral position. The full range of human emotionality can provide information about moral character.
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Parrott, W.G. (2019). Emotions as Signals of Moral Character. In: Hess, U., Hareli, S. (eds) The Social Nature of Emotion Expression . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32968-6_9
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