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Einstein’s Brain: A Conspiracy of Mythologies

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Einstein’s Brain

Abstract

In this chapter, I consider the decades of research carried out on Einstein’s brain and why they have proved to be, and indeed were destined to be, sterile. Intelligence, creativity, and genius are social phenomena. Einstein did stand alone and did not create ab novo. Genius is not as commonly supposed an individual attribute. It clusters, and genius clusters are associated with the rise and decline of civilizations and cultural areas. The myth of individualism supports the idea that Einstein made discoveries “merely by thinking” and that he embodied pure intellect.

The myth of Einstein as “pure intellect” is sociologically untenable and is based on the grammatical illusion of the “I” and the myth of the brain as an isolated biological organ independent of external causal factors. I introduce some of the initial elements related to the social brain paradigm such as the connectome, neuroplasticity, and regional concepts of the social brain (as opposed to wholistic concepts).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The word cryptomnesia is a portmanteau of crypto- (which comes from the Greek word kryptos meaning “hidden, concealed, secret”) and amnesia. The word was first used to explain latent memories in psychics. Psychiatrists Jung, Dukes, Ferenczi, and Freud treated the subject, and there have been empirical studies of the phenomenon. There are two types of cryptomnesia, coming under the general concept of plagiarism: (1) The plagiarizer regenerates an idea that was presented earlier, but believes the idea to be an original creation; and (2) the ideas of others are remembered as one’s own.

  2. 2.

    Merton distinguishes “adumbration,” foreshadowing elements in new research and “adumbrationism,” the ill-intentioned and sometimes occult search for ancient anticipations of new research. On the concept of adumbrationism, see Merton (1961: 474). The concept is also discussed in Sztompka (1991); see the extended discussion in Merton (1968: 13–27). For an historical case study of adumbrationism in the history of science and religion, see (Restivo 2018: 150–173).

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Appendices

Appendix: Case Study—Kekulé and the Dream that Stood on the Shoulders of a Social Network

Russell D. Larsen (1993), an epidemiologist , has written one of the most concise statements on how the sociology of science can reveal the social grounds of an episode of creative genius . His contribution to Wotiz’s (1993) edited volume on The Kekulé Riddle: A Challenge for Chemists and Psychologists is aptly titled “Kekulé’s Benzolfest Speech: A Fertile Resource for the Sociology of Science.” Larsen mobilizes all of the key concepts in Robert K. Merton’s sociology of science relevant to understanding the sociology of creative achievement. We begin with a classical tale of individual insight that seems invulnerable to sociological analysis: Kekulé’s dream revealing the cyclic structure of benzene. Larsen constructs a new narrative of this event at the nexus of Merton’s sociology of science and Kekulé’s Benzolfest speech, “On Beyond the Ouroboros,” delivered at the 1890 Berlin Benzolfest honoring the 25th anniversary of Kekulé’s publication of the structure of benzene. In this speech, he revealed that he had discovered the ring shape of the benzene molecule after having a day-dream of a snake seizing its own tail (an ancient symbol known as the Ouroboros).

Let’s begin by listing the Merton principles Larsen mobilizes:

  • The Giants Aphorism (OTSOG: On The Shoulders of Giants): Merton (1965) traces this to Bernard of Chartres but earlier instances are lost in the mists of history. It is most famously stated by Isaac Newton: “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.”

  • Principle of Multiple Discovery: Inventions and discoveries are in principle multiples; singletons are rare.

  • The Kindle-Cole Principle: Public controversy leads to battles for status; private controversy promotes the search for truth. The principle gets its name from the Hooke-Newton correspondence on their priority dispute . Hooke writes to Newton that if they take their dispute public it would “kindle cole (coal)” rather than uncover the truth of the matter.

  • Anatopism: Failure to cite or otherwise refer to the original source of an idea on the assumption that the source is so well known that a citation or reference is unnecessary. The result is that the writer is credited with the idea.

  • Larsen does not mention or use Merton’s treatment of cryptomnesia Footnote 1: On “cryptomnesia ” see Merton (1973: 402–412).

  • Matthew Effect: Crediting someone with an achievement she or he is not responsible for usually due to the halo effect or accumulated advantage (Merton cites Matthew’s Gospel: “For to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away;” Matthew 25: 29, RSV ).

  • Asparagus Effect (Ulam 1976): Trying to obtain more or all of the share of a joint effort for oneself.

  • Heroic Theory or Great Man Theory: Explaining great achievements by labeling the creator a “genius .” Credit accrues to the individual. In this book and elsewhere the heroic theory is opposed by social theory.

  • Nationalism: The Newton-Leibniz priority dispute pitted the English establishment (Newton and his supporters) against the Hanoverians (Leibniz and the Leibnizian court philosophers).

  • Priority Disputes : These are not rooted in humanitarian or personality considerations but rather arise from the institutional norms and structures of science that incline scientists to assert claims for their work.

How can we put these concepts to work in the case of Kekulé’s dream? The dream narrative begins with Kekulé’s remarks in his Benzolfest speech. He promises his audience “highly indiscreet disclosures from my inner life” that gave him the structure of benzene. The reasons we should doubt the dream narrative are given in Wotiz and Rudofsky (1993). If the dream narrative is a myth, what role does it play in the history of the discovery of the structure of the benzene molecule? Larsen claims that the dream narrative helped Kekulé establish the priority of his discovery in the context of a multiple discovery episode. Kekulé was not in fact the first one to propose the cyclic structure of benzene. His predecessors include J.J. Loseschmidt and A.S. Couper, among others. Kekulé fails to acknowledge directly the priority claimants but invokes the “giants aphorism” and the principle of multiples. This allows him to acknowledge that “certain ideas at certain times are in the air”; that his ideas “came from seeds that had previously been sown” and that there is “no such thing as novelty in the matter.” The “giants aphorism” allows Kekulé to indirectly acknowledge predecessors (the giants) but to give himself credit for standing on their shoulders and seeing further (establishing his priority). He liberally cites contributors to the benzene question but not the key contributors to the discovery of the structure of benzene. Larsen claims that Kekulé was known for a tendency to selectively acknowledge others and in the benzene case he may have been anatopic. There is further evidence of Kekulé’s misconduct in pursuit of his priority claims (Wotiz and Rudofsky 1993: 262–264).

With respect to the Matthew Effect, it appears that Kekulé got credit for the discovery because he had greater visibility than other potential claimants. Furthermore, Kekulé refers to the role of genius in discovery without specifically claiming to be a genius . Larsen sees this as a case of “thinly-veiled self-aggrandizement” especially given the fact that it is delivered in the Benzolfest speech.

The Kindle-Cole principle is evoked in the decision to pursue the debate between Kekulé and Ramsay and Rocke over the dream narrative through private correspondence instead of a public debate.

Nationalistic zeal is reflected in the conflict between the German nationalist Herman Kolbe and Kekulé who Kolbe accused of being an internationalist. The personal animosity showed up in Kolbe’s editorials for the Journal Für Praktische Chemie. Kolbe attacked Kekulé’s politics and also penned derogatory remarks about his dream narrative using terms like fantasy, figments of imagination, and deceptive speculations.

There is some evidence that Kekulé knew of and used Loseschmidt’s work and to the extent that this is true and is part of the multiple discovery context we have an example of the asparagus effect. Ulam (1976) named this effect based on a boardinghouse story of a man who ate most of a serving of asparagus. Another man pointed out that there were others at the table who also liked asparagus.

Merton also discussed adumbrationism.Footnote 2 This shows up in Kekulé’s remark in the Benzolfest speech that the explorer will never find anything essentially new. Kekulé’s dream narrative is a portal to a number of sociological insights into the nature of science. The point is not to discredit Kekulé but to ground his achievements by contextualizing them in a sociologically realistic framework.

Bibliographic Notes for Chapter 3

  • Documentaries and Websites

    On Einstein’s brain as a relic, see Hull (1994); see Kremer (2015) on the strange afterlife of Einstein’s brain, and the NPR (National Public Radio) Morning Edition program (2005); also see Levy (1978) and Edmonds (2008). The story of Ishi, “the last of the Mohicans” (in fact, the last [?] member of a tribe wiped out in the California genocide), is told in many books and films: see Kroeber (1961), and Fleras (2006). Theodora Kroeber was the wife of Alfred Kroeber, one of the prominent anthropologists who studied Ishi over a period of years. There are numerous ethical and scandalous issues raised by this episode in the history of anthropology (see references cited above).

  • Selected References

    Abraham (2002); Balter (2012); Diamond, Scheibel, Murphy, Jr., and Harvey (1985); Falk, Lepore, and Noe (2013); Hotz (2005); Men, Falk, Sun et al. (2014);

    And Witelson, Kigar, and Harvey (1999). NOTE: For an exhaustive list of references to studies of Einstein’s brain, see Lepore (2018); and see Paterniti (2000). On Kuhn’s widely admired but misunderstood theory of scientific revolutions, see Kuhn 1962, 1970; and Restivo’s critique (1983).

  • On the breakdown of the body/brain/mind divisions, see Brothers 1997, 2001; Pert 1997; and Rose and Rose 2016.

  • Environmental Enrichment/Enhancement

    Halperin and Healey (2011); Pang, Terence & Hannan, Anthony (2012); Mohammed, Zhu, Darmopil et al. (2002: 109) and other contributions to Hoffman, Boer, et al. (2002). In spite of the predominance of brains-in-a-vat and neuroist paradigms, the idea that external stimuli can cause structural and functional changes in the brain was already considered by the ancient Greeks. This has been observed in two related fish, one that inhabits caves the other swamps and streams, and in domesticated and wild rats, turkeys, pigs, and silver foxes. Against this background came the unexpected finding that small changes in the housing environments of adult laboratory rats could induce changes in brain chemistry and anatomy. And see Carey (2010) on genes as mirrors of life experiences: “By studying genes at the ‘epi’ level, scientists are hoping to discover patterns that have been elusive at the level of the genes—and ideally to find targets for calibrated treatments that would not simply shut off errant genes but would gradually turn their activity up or down, like adjusting the balance on a stereo.” Two of the most important contributions to my thinking about genes and genetics are David Moore (2002, 2015) and Shea (2008).

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Restivo, S. (2020). Einstein’s Brain: A Conspiracy of Mythologies. In: Einstein’s Brain . Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32918-1_3

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