Abstract
Between 1860 and 1866, monetary and banking policy in Brazil went through multiple changes. Starting with the 1860 Law of Impediments (Law 1083) and accompanying legislation, the government instituted a timetable for issuing banks to resume convertibility of their notes exclusively into gold. Eruption of a financial panic in 1864, centered on the operation of the private banking house of J. Souto, revealed that the government’s focus on the regulation of joint-stock banks alone was myopic. By acting as a lender of last resort during the panic, the Bank of Brazil increasingly distanced itself from the government’s goal of reinstating convertibility of notes into gold. Growing budget deficits associated with the Paraguayan War, which had started in December 1864, ultimately led the government to rescind the Bank’s issuing powers in September 1866, ushering in a long period dominated by the Treasury’s monopoly of note issues.
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Notes
- 1.
Session of 15 June 1859.
- 2.
Session of 25 July 1859. The Minister had already acknowledged this point himself three weeks earlier when he had presented the whole question as one of confidence in the cabinet. Session of 6 July 1859, in ACD, Tome III, p. 45.
- 3.
In the Speech from the Throne in 1860, the Emperor had already made known the wish of the cabinet to review ‘legislation on associations and corporations, both civil and commercial’. Fallas do Throno, p. 519.
- 4.
Session of 6 August 1860.
- 5.
See the speech by deputy Gomes de Souza, ibid., p. 70.
- 6.
de Aguiar (1960). The striking contrast with the results of the vote on the Torres Homem bill can be ascribed to the changes introduced by Ferraz to the original proposal. Additionally, the fact that the incoming cabinet was avowedly “parliamentarian”—all its members were either senators or national deputies—probably helped pave the way for its final approval.
- 7.
A comparison with a summary of the main provisions of the 1844 Joint-Stock Bank Act—which imposed several restrictions on the formation and operation of new joint-stock banks in Britain—reveals the similarity of the Law of Impediments with comparable legislation elsewhere at the time. ‘The minimum nominal capital was to be £100,000, no share was to be of lower denomination than £100, and no company thus formed could begin business until all the shares had been subscribed and at least one-half of their nominal amount paid up. It was required that the deed of partnership should be in a form approved by the Privy Council and that it should contain, among other clauses, provisions forbidding the company to purchase or lend upon the security of its own shares, requiring a statement of assets and liabilities to be published once a month, and arranging for the annual accounts to be examined by auditors elected by shareholders’. Cf. W. F. Crick and W. E. Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of Joint-Stock Banking (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1936), quoted in Collins (1988, p. 73).
- 8.
Notes of small denomination (1$000 to 30$000) issued by the Treasury and banks amounted to slightly over 50% of a total outstanding issue of 96,000 contos in mid-1859. Session of 19 July 1859, in ACD, Tome III, pp. 177–9.
- 9.
Although official figures for Treasury notes refer to end of year only, the combined sum represented by notes withdrawn from circulation by the Bank of Brazil (2000 contos per annum in several instalments), and the loss owing to their natural wear and tear suggests a decrease in government paper money of roughly 1300 contos every six months.
- 10.
This point was made in the petition sent by the Bank of Bahia to the Chamber of Deputies on 28 June 1859, transcribed in Azevedo and Lins (1969, p. 145).
- 11.
Banco do Brasil, Parecer Apresentado á Assembléa Geral dos Accionistas (1861).
- 12.
On this basic shortcoming of the 1860 Law, see also Dunlop (1881, p. 38). Actually, this contradiction had been in place ever since the Bank was created, although until 1860 it had the option, which it exercised, of giving Treasury notes, instead of gold, in exchange for its own notes. With the Law, the Bank was required to redeem its paper into gold whenever demanded by noteholders. See Jacobina (1881, p. 8).
- 13.
Having stabilized at near par between the end of the 1857 crisis (in August 1858) and early 1859, when the Bank of Brazil once again left gold, the value of the milréis oscillated around a declining trend for the next six months. It reached a low of 24d on the eve of the Law of Impediments, giving the government all the motivation it needed to take action and seek to restore the milréis to the 27d parity. Hence, Article 6 of Decree 2685, stipulating the goal of a fully gold-backed circulating medium.
- 14.
Banco do Brasil, “Actas”, session No. 571, 18 February 1861, AD 005/11-A.
- 15.
In a memorandum sent to Minister Ferraz on 22 February 1861, the president of the Bank asserted that the head office was already in a state where it could resume convertibility of its notes, although that was not yet the case with the provincial offices. Rather than have only part of the Bank on gold, which would have been illegal, it was decided that the Bank would have to abide by Article 1, paragraph 2, of the 1860 Law and, therefore, start retiring notes of smaller denomination in both Rio and the provinces. RMF 1860, p. 16.
- 16.
Parecer da Commissão Especial Nomeada Pela Directoria do Banco do Brasil (1862).
- 17.
Ibid., p. 9
- 18.
Session of 10 July 1862.
- 19.
During debates held at the Council of State on 10 July 1862, Souza Franco had already manifested fear of the Bank of Brazil abusing its monopolist position. On that occasion, he branded as an ‘odious privilege’ the Bank’s plea to retain monopoly of issue for the next twenty years in the places where it operated. See ACE, Vol. V, p. 287.
- 20.
Decree 2970. For details, Pacheco (1979, Vol. II, pp. 180 ff.).
- 21.
The number of bankruptcies in Rio more than doubled from an average of 45 between 1859 and 1861 to 104 in 1862. Data in Calógeras (1910, p. 142).
- 22.
In the 1862 Relatorio da Fazenda, Minister of Finance Marquês de Abrantes acknowledged that part of the difficulties that the Bank had been experiencing lately derived from ‘the needs of the Treasury, not only in December, but also in January, to which the Bank responded immediately, confident in obtaining (permission to) increase its issues to three times (its reserve fund), requested on 4 December 1862’. RMF 1862, p. 23.
- 23.
On that occasion, the government heard the Seção de Fazenda of the Council of State, as well as businessmen operating in Rio, but decided that in order to preserve the spirit of the 1860 Law the Bank’s request should not be met, ‘lest the risks and perils (of the days) before the Law return’ (ibid., p. 20).
- 24.
Ibid., p. 23.
- 25.
Relaxation of the issuing limit, as noted, ran counter to the recommendations of the Finance Standing Committee, which had convened earlier to examine the Bank’s request. On that occasion, Itaboraí and the Visconde de Jequitinhonha opposed granting permission for the Bank to increase its note issue to three times the reserve fund. Itaboraí, who was the rapporteur for this case, suggested instead that the Bank rely on other measures to increase its circulation, such as a capital expansion and the acceptance of interest-bearing deposits. The third member of the Committee, Cândido Batista de Oliveira, who at the time was also the president of the Bank, unsurprisingly, pressed the case for the need to change the limit on note issues. In support, he pointed out earlier instances when relaxation of the limit had been granted under more favorable circumstances, that is, when Bank of Brazil notes were not required to be convertible into gold, as they now were. The Finance Standing Committee, by two votes to one, decided against the Bank’s request, but this did not stop the government from issuing Decree 3054, thus expanding the limit for note issues to three times the Bank’s reserve fund. Resolution No. 726, in SFCE, Vol. V, pp. 359–68. For a detailed analysis of the debates and decisions on monetary and banking matters in the Seção de Fazenda of the Council of State, see Villela (2000a).
- 26.
ACE, Vol. V, pp. 348–61.
- 27.
Decree 3062.
- 28.
At the end of 1862, outstanding Treasury notes amounted to 31.3 thousand contos, while banknotes had reached a value of 45.7 thousand contos. See IBGE (1990, p. 544).
- 29.
The classic account of the operation of the English banks in Brazil is Joslin (1963). The London and Brazilian Bank had been incorporated in London in June, with a capital of £1,000,000. A few months later, it took over the business of the Anglo-Portuguese Bank in Portugal. See Banker’s Magazine, Vol. 22, June 1862, p. 393. The Brazilian and Portuguese Bank was also formed with a capital of £1,000,000 on 3 July 1863. Banker’s Magazine, Vol. 23, August 1863, pp. 638–9.
- 30.
On the conservative practices of the English banks, and the resentment generated in Latin American countries where they operated, see Jones (1977).
- 31.
Still, British banks occasionally invested in planter drafts, as noted by Sweigart (1987, p. 176, footnote 19). Crucially, they did not seek to become banks of issue, but rather to operate with deposits and discounts. Their subsequent success served to show that gaining the right to issue notes was not a prerequisite for expanding business, nor the only available means to support commercial activity. See Jones (1977, pp. 36 ff).
- 32.
Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Brazil on 18 May 1863, cited in Pacheco (1979, Vol. II, p. 197).
- 33.
Ibid.
- 34.
Ibid., pp. 197–8.
- 35.
Relatorio da Commissão de Inquerito de 1864 (1865, Introduction).
- 36.
Ibid., cited in Cavalcanti (1893, Vol. 2, pp. 274–5).
- 37.
Relatorio da Comissão de Inquerito de 1864, cited in Pacheco (1979, Vol. II, p. 212).
- 38.
Ibid.
- 39.
Banco do Brasil, “Actas”, session No. 811, 10 September 1864, AD 007/11-A. Contemporary estimates put Souto’s debts with the Bank of Brazil alone at the outbreak of the crisis at 14,000 contos (£1.6 million). Soares (1865, p. 51).
- 40.
Banco do Brasil, “Actas”, session No. 812, 12 September 1864, AD 007/11-A. It is not exactly clear what those ‘constituted powers’ were, if the interests of other commercial houses and investors, or the Legislative—most likely, the latter.
- 41.
Ibid.
- 42.
Memorandum sent by the Bank of Brazil to the imperial government on 13 September, cited in Pacheco, (1979, Vol. II, p. 217). At the time, the Bank had clearly exceeded the limits on its issues, its reserve fund amounting to 10.9 thousand contos, while outstanding issues exceeded 35.9 thousand contos (ibid., pp. 217–8).
- 43.
Between 12 and 14 September, the fundo disponível lost almost 3000 contos in specie. Figures from “Banco do Brasil: Quadro do Troco Realizado em Moeda Metálica em Setembro de 1864”, in the Annex to Relatorio da Commissão de Inquerito de 1864 (1865). Later, it emerged that some 90% of the gold losses (2800 contos) had been due to shipments made by the Mauá, MacGregor Bank to its branches in the River Plate, apparently in a move to pre-empt a run on them upon arrival of the news of the crisis in Rio.
- 44.
The run on the casas bancárias in Rio put them in a very delicate position, given that while they had borrowed short their assets were often immobilized in long-term rural loans. This left them to rely on the Bank of Brazil to provide the necessary liquidity to meet the demands from panic-stricken clients. See RMF 1864, p. 13.
- 45.
Note that although the decree did not refer to the caixas filiais, the Bank interpreted it as extending the new limit to its provincial offices as well.
- 46.
Decree 3307.
- 47.
Together with Decree 3308, the other piece of legislation to arouse most opposition was the appointment, by the government, of inspectors, who would oversee the liquidation of the major casas bancárias in difficulty (Decree 3322, of 22 October 1864). Not only would these inspectors be handsomely paid (by the businesses undergoing liquidation) but also they were often leading politicians of the time. Thus, Souza Franco was chosen to supervise Casa Souto, Ferraz took the house of Gomes & Filhos, and Paranhos (Visconde de Rio Branco), Montenegro, Lima & Cia. and Oliveira & Bello. Nabuco (1997, Vol. I, p. 471, footnote 2). Incidentally, both decrees (3308 and 3322) were for the most part drafted by Senator José Thomas Nabuco de Araújo, by then a highly respected jurist, but not a member of the cabinet in power. Nabuco’s crucial participation in the events that followed the 1864 commercial crisis went unnoticed to most contemporaries, until they were unearthed by his son, Joaquim Nabuco, when writing the biography of Senator José Thomas, which remains, after more than a century, one of the best histories of the Brazilian Empire.
- 48.
Overall, 95 firms (in all sectors) declared bankruptcy in Rio between 10 September 1864 and 31 March 1865. Also significant was the number of bankruptcies prior to the house of Souto closing its doors on September 10 (112 in all). This indicates the extent of the hardship under which the capital’s market was under throughout the year. Data on bankruptcies from Calógeras (1910, p. 142).
- 49.
Figures are from the statistical Annex to Relatorio da Commissão de Inquerito de 1864 (1865).
- 50.
For a comparison of the reactions to the 1857 and 1864 crises in Brazil, see Villela (2000b).
- 51.
Provincial offices played a less prominent role in the provision of liquidity to the market, reflecting the marginal impact of the crisis outside Rio de Janeiro.
- 52.
The house of Bahia & Irmãos and the Rural & Hypothecario endured the largest withdrawal of deposits during the crisis—16,000 and 15,000 contos, respectively (ibid.).
- 53.
Banker’s Magazine, Vol. 24, November 1864, p. 1006.
- 54.
Jornal do Commercio, cited in Pacheco (1979, Vol. II, p. 221).
- 55.
Ibid. The extent of the controversy generated by the official measures implemented to tackle the crisis can be gauged by a one-page daily bulletin that began circulating on 12 September. The Boletim Commercial maintained a rabid anti-government, anti-Portuguese (and anti-Semitic) tone throughout its short life of some twenty issues. The leaflet was adamantly opposed to the extra-legal measures decreed by the government, as well as the decision to expand liquidity and suspend convertibility. See Boletim Commercial, No. 18, 1 October 1864.
- 56.
Testimony collected by the enquiry into the crisis of 1864, cited in Pacheco (1979, Vol. II, p. 222). Unsurprisingly, the 1865 Relatorio da Fazenda congratulated itself (and the Bank of Brazil) for reacting to the crisis in the right manner, that is, by suspending convertibility and lending liberally. See RMF 1864, p. 13.
- 57.
Villa (2016).
- 58.
Relatorio da Commissão de Inquerito de 1864 (1865). The organization of the 1864 report was in many ways similar to that of its 1859 predecessor, although the final text is not as illuminating, perhaps because only 19 of the 79 individuals invited by the Commission ended up being interviewed.
- 59.
Vieira Bueno would serve as President of the Bank of Brazil from January to April 1866.
- 60.
Although far from being a synthesis of the testimonies heard on the occasion, the commissioners added that the 1864 crisis was (rather implausibly) the result of the “monetary excesses” that followed the events of 1857. Later commentators, who more often than not just repeated the conclusions of contemporary reports, shared this diagnosis. See, for example, Ortigão (1914, p. 73).
- 61.
See, for example, the account of the crisis given by the Minister of Finance, in RMF 1864, pp. 12–5.
- 62.
As a result of this official neglect, private banks were not required to file financial statements to the government and, therefore, have left very little record of their operations. A similar problem also besets the study of the early financial history of the United States. For a discussion, see Sylla (1976) and comments by L. Davis and T. Cochrane in the same volume.
- 63.
- 64.
Contemporaries put the combined issue of vales by the banks that failed in 1864 at 30,000 contos. Relatorio da Commissão de Inquerito de 1864 (1865, Annex C, p. 52).
- 65.
It is estimated that another eight casas bancárias (for which no data has been unearthed so far) survived the crash, which indicates that this segment of the banking sector attracted an even larger share of total deposits in the capital. See Villa (2016).
- 66.
These points will be taken up again in Chap. 5 in connection with a discussion of long-term trends in monetary policy during the Second Reign.
- 67.
In part, this process was boosted by the operation of the English banks, which arrived in Rio in the first half of 1863. See Jones (1977). By 1865, total (sight + interest-bearing) deposits accounted for 30% of the money supply (M2), up from 20% in 1855. Calculated from data in Brasil, IBGE (1990, p. 535).
- 68.
Of course, a nominal money supply at the same level as four years earlier may have constituted a real (inflation-adjusted) contraction, especially if both the price level and the economy were growing.
- 69.
See Table A1 in the Appendix for yearly data on outstanding note issues, by issuer.
- 70.
This is, for instance, Cavalcanti’s view, according to whom the root of the crises lay in the contraction of the money supply attempted through the 1860 legislation. ‘In one word, it was the abuse of the public powers against the abuse of credit, by restricting the circulating medium at a time when business was expanding fast, which caused the suppression of the partial movements […] of the great economic mechanism, which was thus forced to an abrupt halt’. See Cavalcanti (1893, Vol. 2, p. 279).
- 71.
Other contributing factors to the crisis, according to Schulz, were the increase in Bank (of England) Rate—mostly as defense against a reduction in Britain’s foreign reserves—and fears surrounding Brazil’s military involvement in the River Plate, prompting hectic speculation in the Rio money market. See Schulz (1996, pp. 42–3).
- 72.
See also Vianna (1864, p. 5).
- 73.
Cited in Pacheco (1979, Vol. II, p. 241).
- 74.
The point was made bluntly by the Minister of Finance in May 1865. ‘It is undisputedly pernicious to industry and the finances of the State that the circulation of values be made by […] inconvertible paper, especially when this issue is entrusted to a private entity, which finds in the expansion of the faculty to issue a source of profits’. RMF 1864, p. 14. The government’s message was clear: ‘it is […] absolutely paramount that the Bank of Brazil put itself as soon as possible in a condition such that its circulation becomes solid, relying exclusively on the trust it deserves, and resume convertibility; otherwise, and especially if the amount of paper increases, its value will no longer be equivalent to the metal it represents’ (ibid.).
- 75.
- 76.
The first casualty of the decision of the Committee would be Minister of Finance Dias de Carvalho, a long-time director of the Bank, who resigned in protest on 7 March.
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Villela, A.A. (2020). From the “Law of Impediments” to Restoration of Monopoly: 1860–6. In: The Political Economy of Money and Banking in Imperial Brazil, 1850–1889. Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32774-3_3
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