Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

International conference on Model-Based Reasoning

MBR 2018: Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology pp 83–102Cite as

Modeling Morality

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 49))

Abstract

Unlike any other field, the science of morality has drawn attention from an extraordinarily diverse set of disciplines. An interdisciplinary research program has formed in which economists, biologists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and even philosophers have been eager to provide answers to puzzling questions raised by the existence of human morality. Models and simulations, for a variety of reasons, have played various important roles in this endeavor. Their use, however, has sometimes been deemed as useless, trivial and inadequate. The role of models in the science of morality has been vastly underappreciated. This omission shall be remedied here, offering a much more positive picture on the contributions modelers made to our understanding of morality.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Based on an earlier co-authored paper with Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) of the same name.

  2. 2.

    See Dawkins’ (1976) book The Selfish Gene for an elegant illustration of the problem.

  3. 3.

    See Rosenberg and Linquist (2005); Northcott and Alexandrova (2015); Nagel (2012) respectively as examples for each.

  4. 4.

    The EMP has faced similar criticism itself, relating not only to mathematical models but towards scientific explanations of morality at large. My goal here is only to provide a defence of the models used in this research program. I suggest, however, that if my attempt succeeds the entire EMP justifies its status as a genuine science of morality. Nevertheless, see FritzPatrick (2016) for a recent overview of EMP critics and defenders alike.

  5. 5.

    See D’Arms (1996, 2000); D’Arms et al. (1998); Rosenberg and Linquist (2005); Nagel (2012); Northcott and Alexandrova (2015); Arnold (2008); Kitcher (1999); Levy (2011, 2018).

  6. 6.

    Godfrey-Smith (2006), for instance, diagnoses a general distrust among philosophers in respect to “resemblance relations [of models] because they are seen as vague, context-sensitive, and slippery” (p. 733). Similarly Sugden (2009) has argued that models work by a form of induction “however problematic [that] may be for professional logicians” (p. 19).

  7. 7.

    See Knuuttila (2011); Muldoon (2007); Wimsatt (2007); Weisberg (2007a, 2013); Ylikoski and Aydinonat (2014); Lisciandra (2017); Aydinonat (2018); Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018).

  8. 8.

    To some extent one may treat his contribution as an extended robustness analysis of Skyrms’ prior work. This would not do justice to Alexander’s contribution, however.

  9. 9.

    Joyce (2006) book The Evolution of Morality offers perhaps the most valuable contribution in this regard.

  10. 10.

    See Hegselmann (2009).

  11. 11.

    Plato (1961). Protagoras. In: Hamilton E, Huntington C (eds) The collected dialogues of Plato. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

  12. 12.

    Hume (1998). An enquiry concerning the principles of morals (ed by Beauchamp TL). Oxford University Press, Oxford.

  13. 13.

    See Alexander (2007); Hegselmann and Will (2010, 2013).

  14. 14.

    See also O’Connor (forthcoming).

  15. 15.

    See Veit et al. (forthcoming) for an analysis of the ‘Rationale of Rationalization’.

  16. 16.

    Here the often drawn distinction between biological and psychological altruism plays an important role.

  17. 17.

    See Gould and Lewontin 1979 for their famous critique of adaptationism.

  18. 18.

    See Kagel and Roth (1998) for an overview of such studies in experimental economics.

  19. 19.

    I treat abduction, i.e. inference to the best explanation, here similar to Sugden (2009) as a form of induction. Others do not share this view, instead arguing that eliminative induction is a form of IBE e.g. Aydinonat (2007, 2008). However, I have no bone to pick in this debate. What conception one holds does not impact the validity of the arguments presented here.

  20. 20.

    See Gelfert (2016) for a recent discussion of the various exploratory functions of models.

  21. 21.

    The Nash Equilibrium introduced by John Nash, is the central, in fact, most important solution concept in Game Theory. The concept picks out a combination of strategies, i.e. one for each ‘player’ in the game, in which none of the players has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his chosen strategy, while the strategies others have chosen remain fixed. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma this classically leads to only one unique solution, i.e. mutual defection. Morality quickly suggests itself as an evolved social solution to such inefficient equilibria.

  22. 22.

    I use how actual explanations in a modal sense, i.e. as a subset of how possibly explanations.

  23. 23.

    One may even treat robustness analysis as a necessary component of model-based science itself. Sometimes it is used in a very narrow sense, at other times quite broadly. See Lisciandra (2017) for a recent overview, but also Woodward (2006)

  24. 24.

    See Mäki (2005) and Parke (2014)

  25. 25.

    See Hausman (1992).

  26. 26.

    As Zollman (2009) points out in his review of Arnold 2008, models have directly inspired experimental work on the evolution of morality, e.g. Wedekind and Milinki (2000); Seinen and Schram (2006).

  27. 27.

    Similar arguments have recently been raised against the use of game theoretic tools to explain the evolution of multicellularity. See Veit (2019a).

  28. 28.

    I thank Richard Joyce for suggesting this formulation to me.

  29. 29.

    A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, part II, section II.

  30. 30.

    Joyce (2001, 2006) explores these issues in more detail than I can do justice here.

  31. 31.

    Sterelny and Fraser (2016) offer a defence of such a weaker form of moral realism. I will note that I do not find such approaches plausible, as they commonly rest on a re-definition of what is traditionally understood as moral realism.

  32. 32.

    This, however, is a matter for another paper. Nagel (2012) recognizes this threat but turns the modus ponens into a modus tollens even going so far as to argue that since moral realism is true the Darwinian story of how morality evolved must be false. This gets things backwards. See Garner (2007) for radical conclusions regarding the elimination of morality, or for nihilism more generally, see Sommers and Rosenberg (2003) and Veit (2019b). A collected volume on the question whether morality should be abolished has recently been published by Garner and Joyce (2019).

References

  • Alexander JM (2007) The structural evolution of morality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Arnold E (2008) Explaining Altruism: A Simulation-Based Approach and its Limits, Ontos

    Google Scholar 

  • Aydinonat NE (2018) The diversity of models as a means to better explanations in economics. J Econ Methodol 25(3):237–251

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aydinonat NE (2008) The invisible hand in economics: How economists explain unintended social consequences. IN EM advances in economic methodology. Routledge, London

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Aydinonat NE (2007) Models, conjectures and exploration: an analysis of Schelling’s checkerboard model of residential segregation. J Econ Methodol 14:429–454

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod R (1984) The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod R, Hamilton WD (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science 211:1390–1396

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Binmore K (1994) Playing fair: game theory and the social contract I. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Binmore K (1998) Just playing: game theory and the social contract II. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Binmore K (2005) Natural justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Binmore K, Swierzbinski J, Hsu S, Proulx C (1993) Focal points and bargaining. Int J Game Theory 22:381–409

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boehm C (2012) Moral origins: the evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and shame. Basic Books, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bowles S, Gintis H (2011) A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cartwright N (2009) If no capacities then no credible worlds: but can models reveal capacities? Erkenntnis 70:45–58

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Churchland PS (2019) Conscience: the origins of moral intuition. W. W. Norton Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins R (1976) The selfish gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett DC (1996a) Darwin’s dangerous idea: evolution and the meanings of life. Simon & Schuster, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • D’Arms J, Batterman R, Górny K (1998) Game theoretic explanations and the evolution of justice. Philos Sci 65:76–102

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D’Arms J (1996) Sex, fairness, and the theory of games. J Philos 93(12):615–627

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D’Arms J (2000) When evolutionary game theory explains morality, what does it explain? J Conscious Stud 7(1–2):296–299

    Google Scholar 

  • de Waal F (1996) Good natured: the origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • de Waal F (2006) Primates and philosophers. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • FitzPatrick W (Spring 2016) Morality and evolutionary biology. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Zalta EN (ed). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/morality-biology/

  • Garner R, Joyce R (2019) The end of morality: taking moral abolitionism seriously. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Garner R (2007) Abolishing morality. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 10(5):499–513

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gelfert A (2016) How to do science with models. Springer, Dordrecht

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Giere R (1999) Science without laws. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere R (1988) Explaining science. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (2006) The strategy of model-based science. Biol Philos 21:725–740

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grüne-Yanoff T, Marchionni C (2018) Modeling model selection in model pluralism. J Econ Methodol 25(3):265–275

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guala F (2005) The methodology of experimental economics. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Guala F (2002) Models, simulations, and experiments. In: Magnani L, Nersessian NJ (eds) Model-based reasoning. Springer, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett DC (1996b) Darwin’s dangerous idea: evolution and the meanings of life. Simon & Schuster, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Hausman D (1992) The inexact and separate science of economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hegselmann R, Schelling TC, Sakoda JM (2017) The intellectual, technical, and social history of a model. J Artif Soc Soc Simul 20(3):15

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hegselmann R, Will O (2013) From small groups to large societies: how to construct a simulator? Biol Theory 2013(8):185–194

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hegselmann R, Will O (2010) Modelling Hume’s moral and political theory - the design of HUME1.0. In: Baurmann M, Brennan G, Goodin R, Southwood N (eds) Norms and values: the role of social norms as instruments of value realisation. Baden-Baden, Nomos, pp 205–232

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hegselmann R (2009) Moral dynamics. In: Meyers RA (ed) Encyclopedia of complexity and systems science. Springer, New York, pp 5677–5692

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hobbes T (1651/1982) Leviathan. Harmondsworth. Penguin, Middlesex

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume D (2007) A treatise of human nature (ed by Norton DF, Norton MJ). Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume D (1998) An enquiry concerning the principles of morals (ed by Beauchamp TL). Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Joyce R (2006) The evolution of morality. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Joyce R (2001) The myth of morality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kagel JH, Roth AE (1998) Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher P (1999) Games social animals play: commentary on Brian Skyrms’ Evolution of the Social Contract. Philos Phenomenol Res 59(1):221–228

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knuuttila T (2011) Modelling and representing: an artefactual approach to model-based representation. Stud Hist Philos Sci 42:262–271

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuorikoski J, Lehtinen A (2009) Incredible worlds, credible results. Erkenntnis 70:119–131

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levy A (2018) Evolutionary models and the normative significance of stability. Biol Philos 33:33

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levy A (2011) Game theory, indirect modeling, and the origin of morality. J Philos 108(4):171–187

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lisciandra C (2017) Robustness analysis and tractability in modeling. Eur J Philsoophy Sci 7:79–95

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mackie JL (1977) Ethics – inventing right and wrong. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth

    Google Scholar 

  • Mäki U (2005) Models are experiments, experiments are models. J Econ Methodol 12(2):303–315

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Muldoon R (2007) Robust simulations. Philos Sci 74:873–883

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nagel T (2012) Mind and cosmos: why the materialist neo-darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Northcott R, Alexandrova A (2015) Prisoner’s Dilemma doesn’t explain much. In: Peterson Martin (ed) The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 64–84

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Nowak MA, Highfield R (2011) Super cooperators: Altruism, evolution, and why we need each other to succeed. Free Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connor C (forthcoming) Methods Models and the Evolution of Moral Psychology. Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology

    Google Scholar 

  • Parke EC (2014) Experiments, simulations, and epistemic privilege. Philos Sci 81(4):516–536

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plato (1961) “Protagoras”. In: Hamilton E, Huntington C (eds) The collected dialogues of Plato. Princeton UP, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenberg A (2011) The atheist’s guide to reality. W. W. Norton & Company, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenberg A, Linquist S (2005) On the original contract: evolutionary game theory and human evolution. Analyze und Kritik 27:137–157

    Google Scholar 

  • Sadrieh A, Güth W, Hammerstein P, et al (2001) Group report: is there evidence for an adaptive toolbox? In: Gigerenzer G, Selten R (eds) Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox, chap 6. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 83–102

    Google Scholar 

  • Seinen I, Schram A (2006) Social status and group norms: indirect reciprocity in a helping experiment. Eur Econ Rev 50(3):581–602

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Skyrms B (2004) The stag hunt and the evolution of social structure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Skyrms B, Pemantle R (2000) A dynamic model of social network formation. Proc Natl Acad Sci United States 97(16):9340–9346

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Skyrms B (1996) Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sterelny K, Fraser B (2016) Evolution and moral realism. Br J Philos Sci 68(4):981–1006

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober E, Wilson DS (1998) Unto others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Sommers T, Rosenberg A (2003) Darwin’s nihilistic idea: evolution and the meaninglessness of life. Biol Philos 18:653–668

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sugden R (2009) Credible worlds, capacities and mechanisms. Erkenntnis 70:3–27

    Google Scholar 

  • Sugden R (2001) The evolutionary turn in game theory. J Econ Methodol 8(1):113–130

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sugden R (2000) Credible worlds: the status of theoretical models in economics. J Econ Methodol 7:1–31

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Street S (2006) A darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Philos Stud 127:109–166

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Veit W (2019a) Evolution of multicellularity: cheating done right. Biol Philos 34: 34. Online First. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9688-9

  • Veit W (2019b) Existential Nihilism: the only really serious philosophical problem. J Camus Stud 2018:211–232

    Google Scholar 

  • Veit W (forthcoming) Model Pluralism. Philos Soc Sci. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16451/1/Model%20Pluralism.pdf

  • Veit W, Dewhurst J, Dolega K, Jones M, Stanley S, Frankish K, Dennett DC (forthcoming) The rationale of rationalization. Behav Brain Sci. PsyArXiv https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/b5xkt

  • Wedekind C, Milinski M (2000) Cooperation through image scoring in humans. Science 288:850–852

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weisberg M (2013) Simulation and similarity: using models to understand the world. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Weisberg M (2007a) Three kinds of idealization. J Philos 104(12):639–659

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weisberg M (2007b) Who is a modeler? Brit J Philos Sci 58:207–233

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williams B (1981) Moral luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wilson EO (1975) Sociobiology: the new synthesis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Wimsatt W (2007) Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations. Harvard University Press, Harvard

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodward J (2006) Some varieties of robustness. J Econ Methodol 13:219–240

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yaari ME, Bar-Hillel M (1984) On dividing justly. Soc Choice Welf. 1:1–24

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ylikoski P, Aydinonat NE (2014) Understanding with theoretical models. J Econ Methodol 21(1):19–36

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zollman K (2009) Review of Eckhart Arnold, Explaining Altruism: A Simulation-Based Approach and its Limits. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank Richard Joyce, Rainer Hegselmann, Shaun Stanley, Vladimir Vilimaitis, Gareth Pearce and Geoff Keeling for on- or offline conversations on the topic. Furthermore, I would like to thank Cailin O’Connor, Caterina Marchionni, and Aydin Mohseni for their comments on a much earlier draft that was concerned with evolutionary game theory models more generally and Topaz Halperin, Shaun Stanley and two anonymous referees for comments on the final manuscript of this paper.

Also, I would like to thank audiences at the 11th MuST Conference in Philosophy of Science at the University of Turin, 2018’s Model-Based Reasoning Conference at the University of Seville, the 3rd think! Conference at the University of Bayreuth, the 4th FINO Graduate Conference in Vercelli, the Third International Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science at the University of Cologne and the 26th Conference of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Rijeka. Sincere apologies to anyone I forgot to mention.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

    Walter Veit

Authors
  1. Walter Veit
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Walter Veit .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Seville, Seville, Spain

    Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández

  2. Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section, and Computational Philosophy Laboratory, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy

    Lorenzo Magnani

  3. Department of Spanish Language, Linguistics and Theory of Literature, University of Seville, Seville, Spain

    Francisco J. Salguero-Lamillar

  4. Department of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Seville, Seville, Spain

    Cristina Barés-Gómez

  5. Centre for Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Matthieu Fontaine

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Veit, W. (2019). Modeling Morality. In: Nepomuceno-Fernández, Á., Magnani, L., Salguero-Lamillar, F., Barés-Gómez, C., Fontaine, M. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. MBR 2018. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 49. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32722-4_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation