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An Inferential View on Human Intuition and Expertise

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Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology (MBR 2018)

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 49))

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Abstract

There are two central assumptions in expertise research. First, skilled performance and expertise are not genuinely deliberative processes, but closely related to intuition. Second, intuitions cannot be reduced to mere emotionally driven behaviour. Rather, they are considered as the acquisition and application of (tacit) knowledge. To distinguish it from deliberatively acquired knowledge, tacit knowledge is referred to as know-how. However, little is known about the logicality of these cognitive processes and how such know-how is acquired and applied in actu. The aims of this paper are (1) to explicate the cognitive characteristics of intuitive processes and (2) to propose a framework that enables us to model intuitive processes as inferences. For the first aim, we turn to Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing. For the second aim, we draw on Peirce’s conception of abduction. In this respect, we shall consider the function of epistemic feelings for the validation of abductive results. Finally, we draw on the inferential approach developed by Minnameier, which integrates the Peircean inferences (abduction, deduction, induction) into a unified framework. This framework is used to explain how to proceed from abduced suggestions to tacit knowledge. As a result, we can explicate the inferential processes underlying intuition in detail. Expertise research might benefit from our findings in two ways. First, they suggest, how know-how might be generated in actu. Second, they may contribute to educational research in facilitating the acquisition of expertise from rules to skillful know-how.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Gerhard Minnameier and Tim Bonowski for their helpful discussions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Goethe University, Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4, 60629, Frankfurt/Main, Germany

    Rico Hermkes & Hanna Mach

Authors
  1. Rico Hermkes
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  2. Hanna Mach
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rico Hermkes .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Seville, Seville, Spain

    Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández

  2. Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section, and Computational Philosophy Laboratory, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy

    Lorenzo Magnani

  3. Department of Spanish Language, Linguistics and Theory of Literature, University of Seville, Seville, Spain

    Francisco J. Salguero-Lamillar

  4. Department of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Seville, Seville, Spain

    Cristina Barés-Gómez

  5. Centre for Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

    Matthieu Fontaine

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Hermkes, R., Mach, H. (2019). An Inferential View on Human Intuition and Expertise. In: Nepomuceno-Fernández, Á., Magnani, L., Salguero-Lamillar, F., Barés-Gómez, C., Fontaine, M. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. MBR 2018. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 49. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32722-4_16

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